Week 2: What is Knowledge? I

A.J. Ayer. 1956. ‘The Right to Be Sure’, from The Problem of Knowledge (Penguin,

Harmondsworth), reprinted in L.M. Alcoff (ed.), Epistemology: The Big

Questions (Blackwell, Oxford, 1998).

E. Gettier. 1963. ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23, 121-3, reprinted

in S. Bernecker and F. Dretske (eds.) Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary

Epistemology (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).

A. Goldman. 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy 64, 357-72.

T. Williamson. 2000. ‘Unanalysable Knowledge’, from Knowledge and its Limits

(Oxford University Press, Oxford). Focus on §2, pp. 2-5.

B. Weatherson. 2003. ‘What Good are Counterexamples?’, Philosophical Studies

115, 1-31.
Week 4: The Structure of Knowledge

L. Bonjour. 1978. ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?’,

A. Goldman. 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy 64, 357-72.

(See Week 1.)
Week 5: The Argument from Illusion and Sense-Data

B. Russell. 1912. ‘Appearance and Reality’, from The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford

University Press, Oxford).

J.L. Austin. 1962. Lectures 111 and v, from Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford University

Press, Oxford).
Week 6: Intentionalism

D.M. Armstrong. 1968. ‘Perception and Belief’, from A Materialist Theory of the

J. McDowell. 1982. ‘Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge’, reprinted in J. Dancy

(ed.) Perceptual Knowledge (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988).

T. Williamson. 2000. ‘Factive Mental States’, from Knowledge and its Limits

(Oxford University Press, Oxford), §3, pp. 5-8. (See Week 3.)

J.L. Austin. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia, especially §5, pp. 79-83. (See Week 5.)

I. Kant. 1781. From The Critique of Pure Reason, reprinted in M. Huemer (ed.),

A.J. Ayer. 1936. ‘The A Priori’, from Language, Truth and Logic (Penguin,

Harmondsworth), pp. 45-8 and 96-115.

P. Kitcher. 1980. ‘A Priori Knowledge’, The Philosophical Review 89, 2-23; focus on

§§1-4 (pp.3-14) and §7 (pp. 21-3).

Module Outline

To introduce students to some key issues in epistemology.

This module covers some of the key debates in epistemology on a topic by topic, rather than an historical, basis. The emphasis is therefore on the issues, rather than who thought what. The module has three main parts:

• 
  First, we consider the nature of knowledge. We begin by considering whether knowledge can be analysed, and in particular whether knowledge can be analysed in terms of justified true belief. We then go onto to consider the structure of knowledge, paying particular attention to the question of whether there are any epistemologically basic beliefs.
  

• 
  This leads into the second part of the module, which is concerned with one of the most basic methods of acquiring knowledge: perception. We will consider three theories of perception that provide different ways of responding to the argument from illusion: the sense-datum theory, intentionalism (the specific form of this theory we will consider is sometimes called a ‘belief theory of perception’), and disjunctivism.
  

• 
  The third and final part of the module is concerned with a priori knowledge: knowledge that is, in some sense, independent of experience. Kant’s famous discussion of a priori knowledge will be compared and contrasted with two more contemporary accounts.
  

The topics and readings are all inter-related. Students are expected to think about the relations between material covered in different parts of the course. With this in mind, some of the readings are used more than once.

By the end of the module, students should be able to:

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  Describe and critically assess some accounts of the nature of knowledge
  
• 
  Describe and critically assess some accounts of the structure of knowledge
  
• 
  Describe and critically assess some ways of acquiring knowledge
  

Students will also develop some core philosophical skills, including the ability to:

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  define key terminology;
  
• 
  accurately describe the content of major works of philosophy;
  
• 
  distinguish different solutions to philosophical problems;
  
• 
  appraise the persuasiveness of arguments.
  

There will be 2 one-hour lectures and 1 one-hour seminar per week, Weeks 2-9.

Students are formally required to:

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  Attend lectures and seminars. If, for any reason, you are unable to attend a seminar, you must let your tutor know in advance.
  

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  Read the set texts each week and answer the study questions contained within this Reading Pack.
  
• 
  Submit two assessed essays, as described below.
  

Assessment for this module will be by two submitted essays. Essay questions will be distributed during lectures later in term; they will also be posted on my webpage (http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~ka519).

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  The first essay must be submitted by Friday 3 p.m., Week 5.
  
• 
  The second essay must be submitted by Wednesday 3 p.m., Week 10.
  

The word limits for both essays is 2000 words. Essays that are found to exceed the word limit will be penalised. For the Department’s policies on word limits, see: http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/phil/currentugrads/Word%20Limits.pdf.

All the required reading for this module is contained within this Reading Pack. Students are, however, encouraged to read more widely.

*Bernecker, S. and Dretske, F. (eds.) 2000. Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary

*Dancy, J. 1985. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell).

*Dancy, J. (ed.) 1988. Perceptual Knowledge (Oxford).

Dancy, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.). 1992. A Companion to Epistemology (Blackwell).

Greco, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.). 1999. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell).

Lehrer, K. 1990. Theory of Knowledge (Westview).

*Sosa, E. and Kim, J. (eds.). 1999. Epistemology: An Anthology (Blackwell).

Steup, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.). 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

(Blackwell).

Sturgeon, S., Martin, M.G.F., Grayling, A. 1998. ‘Epistemology’, in Philosophy 1: A