Wrestling with law


) WRESTLING WITH LAW: GEOGRAPHY AS INSURRECTION



Download 140.56 Kb.
Page2/2
Date30.04.2018
Size140.56 Kb.
1   2

3) WRESTLING WITH LAW: GEOGRAPHY AS INSURRECTION
Considering these geographer's attempts to grapple with law as a body of literature one is struck at once by the diversity of approach. Some of the contributors have chosen to give primary emphasis to law as an instrumentality, others accord significance to legal institutions and yet others conceive of law as being mostly (or, entirely) about ideology, culture, discourse, or discursive practices and struggles. The particular categories of law which are of primary interest to these scholars include penal, regulatory, constitutional, and administrative.
Yet, despite this apparent dissensus as to what exactly law is (and what is important about it) each of these geographer's approaches is thoroughly distinct from traditional notions of law and legality reflected in the bulk of legal writing. These unique emphases render this a "body" of literature which is both important for legal scholars and deeply subversive of law as we know it. To the extent subversion is a necessary consequence of "geo-jurisprudence" it should be welcomed by lawyers, legal scholars and citizens for it is a subversion which is deeply humanizing in its demand that society be recognized as something more than "a homogeneous plain peopled by an abstract homo juridicus" (Blomley and Clark, m/s 19).
The common threads which run through these essays are many. Each author specifies that a thorough appreciation of "context" is an important prerequisite to developing any plausible analysis whatsoever. There is a repeated emphasis on the importance of recognizing not only historical specificity but also the multiple specificities of territory, locality, community, place. Not surprisingly perhaps geographers emphasize diversity, variation, spatiality ("its geographic variations, its complexity, its scattered and often unconnected populations" - Kirby, m/s 12) in contrast to the lawyers' two-dimensional world of a-social, rational economic maximizers acting in a placeless, cultureless environment.
These emphases produce a further consequence for the geographical conception of law: geographers are much more likely than lawyers to resist the temptation to reify law. The above essays employ a wide range of metaphors to emphasize the fluidity and socially contested nature not just of legal rules or legal systems but, indeed, of the idea of law itself. Hence, law is variously conceived of by geographers as a contested terrain, a fluid embodiment of ideology, a form of discourse, or discursive struggle. The lawyer's common insight that words contain a necessary "open texture" (Hart) and that this creates a degree of discretion in the exercise of judicial decision-making is quickly superseded in geographical research by the more profound perception that more is at issue than just the interpretation of words: lawyer's word games are merely components of a larger process of the working-out of social meaning, the attribution of significance, the development of the foundational categories which permit us to understand, the rendering visible or invisible of issues, peoples, problems. The practice of law is truly about cultural practice. Lawyers are "conceptive ideologists" (Cain, 353; see also Pue, 1989b, 180) whose lives are imbricated with the places in which they live and work; organic intellectuals constituted, constitutive, constantly making, remaking and being remade.
It follows from this - though it is not always acted upon in geographical scholarship about law - that the very language which permits us to speak of "law," "legal scholarship," or a developing field of "law and geography" misleads. Categories such as "law/non-law," "geography/other" must be transcended in what Audrey Kobayashi (in another context) has called the "quest to overcome Cartesian dualism, and to interpret the world through synthetic understanding... to recognize the fundamental recursiveness of social conditions and to transcend the simplistic dualisms" that allow us to create knowledge yet trap us within their logic (Kobayashi, 1989, 165). Like all categories of thought, the radical separation of legal from non-legal deceives. Categorizations "cabin and distort our immediate experience, and they do so systematically rather than randomly" (Kennedy, 1979: 215). If neither law nor legal practice can be taken for granted then, I think, geographers must go further than they have to date in embracing legal pluralism (Pue, 1990). A geo-jurisprudence cannot consistently confine itself to study of state institutions or privileged legal discourses amputated from others. "Legal doctrine" must be studied but must not be allowed to constitute a categorical quagmire from which the geo-jurisprudential researcher cannot escape. Courts are important but perhaps only superficially so.
There is a need to study the workings-out of state law not just in London, Toronto, Ottawa and New York, but in Idaho and in Alberta; in Calgary and Edmonton, Lac La Biche, Smoky Lake and Kikino: the economies, people, and cultures are widely varied and legal texts will not be imbricated in diverse local societies in the same way. Peripheries as well as metropolitan "cores" need to be studied.
If geographical work touching on "law" is to take account of the emphasis contemporary social theory places on the processes by which "knowledge" is constructed, diffused, and reconstructed it is necessary to go the next step of recognizing that all social actors - whether they know it or not - are producers as well as "readers" of legal knowledge. It is necessary of course to focus attention on the work of actors who are traditionally privileged in the creation and dissemination of legal knowledge - judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, legal scholars. Their work-a-day worlds must be accessed as well as the most obvious judgments/ articles/ briefs. If "law-in-action" (as opposed to "law-in-the-books") is honestly of concern it is important to expand the range of actors studied beyond the "great-men" and women of law to consider the practices of magistrates, small-town lawyers, and individuals marginalized in the professional mainstream by place, gender, class origins, "race," language, religion, education, political affiliation, sexual orientation, etc. Beyond this, it is important to direct attention to the victims, subjects, or audiences of the state's law: Dworkin's liegemen as well as the oracles must be heard in scholarship. This is not a call for the employment of any crude "conflict" theory of legal knowledge (though that may be helpful at particular times and places) as a plea that the multiple levels and many tongues of legality be recognized as research agendas are formulated. In the "street theater" of law the audience is the play. (Cf. McLaren, 1989).

Some at least (I think all) of these consequences flow from the very idea of producing a geographically informed legal studies. If this is so, geography is tantamount to insurrection in the "legal" world (meaning here the world of law schools, courts, legislatures, and law offices). It is central to the "rule of law" that like cases should be treated alike, that legal rules applied in one context should be applied with similar effect in analogous cases (Fuller xxx; Dicey, xxx; Hart, xxx; Waddams, 10). The trouble, as R. v. Dudley and Stephens shows, is that lawyers can be total idiots in determining what constitutes analogous circumstances. Although any reasonably informed commentator knows that analogies are not naturally occurring (e.g. Harari, 5-18), in a world where the rule of law(yers) is taken for granted pointing this out passes for radical political activity (Kelman, 1984).


Geography as insurrection occurs in several ways. First, in its insistence on place, context, locality, spatiality, geography is the very denial of any abstract principles of the type that the formal legal rationality of modernity presumes (Weber, xxx; cf. Kirby, m/s, 15). "Geography" is, in this sense, fundamentally corrosive of "law" and implies both a rejection of totalizing legal systems8 (cf. Arthurs) and a transcendence of limited visions of legal order.
Less dramatically, geography's insistence on the specificity of context raises inherent challenges to the continuance of any number of abstract legal "rules" in particular fields. A thousand lights will shine as geographers confront legislators and judges with an aggressively put demand that spatiality be heeded in areas as diverse as gun-control, water law, local government law, zoning, federalism and economic union, gender equality, racism and so on. This is tantamount to a geo-jurisprudential practice of insurgency (see Brickey and Comack) if not full-fledged insurrection.
Third, geography is insurrectionist in the context of legal education by its insistence that relevant legal knowledge is context-specific rather than "given" within a professional sub-culture. All of the hall-marks of professional training in common-law countries would be swept away if this geographical whisper were taken to heart by legal educators: gone would be the case-method, Socratic teaching, obsession with judge-made law, the myopic focus on courts (and appellate courts), contempt for the work-a-day world of "law"; the public-private distinction, the over-emphasis on commercial law subjects, the transmogrification of humans into mere self-interested maximizers of personal wealth, the privileging of "law in the books," denial of "law in action," denial of history and place, the amputation of law from social sciences (and social discourses), the denial of humanity, and all of the spoken and unspoken cues in "training for hierarchy" (Kennedy, 1982).
The fourth and most important point follows from this. Geography raises fundamental challenges to claims of "legal" expertise as a distinct form of knowledge deserving of public deference. Emel's arguments in this journal in the area of "water law" can and must be taken further. All assertions of "expertise", privileged knowledge and the like barely conceal the professional's central claim: "don't bother me; don't tell me who you are or what you think or know or feel; I know best and will do it to you. Be my subject, not my coequal." Lawyers, whose daily work is the normative languages of state, whose work reflects and constitutes knowledge of what it means to be human, who exercise and influence the exercise of power, whose mundane labor is politics in action make shockingly anti-democratic claims to deference (Ericson and Baranek; Rosenthal; Mandel, ix). Geography stands in fundamental opposition to this antinomy of "placeless power and powerless places" (Kirby, m/s, 21, drawing on Henderson).
By demanding that geography be taken account of, geographers deny the central claim to expertise which underpins the legal profession, courts and the legal academy. Specificity wrestles with abstraction and citizens, localities, and "place" win when specificity is victorious. Geography empowers the "liegemen" of law by demanding that they be taken account of, heard; by insisting on a developed "geography of the mundane" (Kobayashi, m/s, 2).

Because "law" matters it is crucially important that geo-jurisprudence not only develop within the academic discipline of geography but that it penetrate deeply into legal scholarship. The inherent insurrectionism of geography will be welcomed by much of the new legal scholarship and is similar in emphasis to portions of the new legal history and critical legal studies which have begun to take hold in the sanctuaries of law. As a lawyer I implore geographers to pursue geo-jurisprudence as an area of inquiry, to do so in a fashion that is informed by social theory and to take their work on evangelizing missions to the seminaries and sanctuaries of LAW! Be aggressive. Be demanding. We need to hear you.






WRESTLING WITH LAW
(footnotes)




BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexander, Gregory S., "The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800-1914," 5 Law and History Review, 303-350.

Arthurs, H.W. (1985) `Without the Law' Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)



Baker Lake [Hamlet of], Baker Lake Hunters and Trappers Association, Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, et. al. v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development [1980] 1 F.C. 518 (Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, MAHONEY J.)

Bartholomew, Amy and Susan Boyd, (1989) "Toward a Political Economy of Law," in Wallace Clement and Glen Williams, Eds., The New Canadian Political Economy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press), 212-239.

Bartholomew, Amy and Alan Hunt, "What's Wrong with Rights?" (Ottawa: Carleton University, Jurisprudence Centre Working Papers, 1990)

Binnie, Susan, (1988) "Some Reflections on the `New' Legal History in Relation to Weber's Sociology of Law," in W. Wesley Pue and Barry Wright, Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in Legal History (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), 29-42.

Blacksell, Mark and Kim Economides, (1990) xxx

Blacksell, Mark, Kim Economides, and Charles Watkins (1986) Solicitors and Access to Legal Services in Rural Areas: Evidence from Devon and Cornwall (Exeter: University of Exeter, Access to Justice in Rural Britain Project Working Paper 6)

Blomley, Nicholas K. and Gordon L. Clark, (1990) "Law, theory and geography" Urban Geography pn.xxx

Brickey, Stephen & Comack, Elizabeth (1987) "The Role of Law in Social Transformation: Is a Jurisprudence of Insurgency Possible?" 2 Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 97.

Cain, Maureen, (1979) "The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical Conception," 7 International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 331-354.
Carrington, Paul D., (1984) "Of Law and the River," 34 J. Leg. Ed., 222-228 [suggesting CLS and other "nihilists" shouldn't be allowed to work in law schools.]

Cassels, Jamie and Maureen Maloney, (1989) "Critical Legal Education: Paralysis with a Purpose," 4 Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 99-138.

Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (1983) Law and Learning (Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada)

Coombe, Rosemary, "Room to Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies," (1989) 14 LSI, 69-121. [Includes portion on reconstituting subjectivity.]

Dicey, Albert Venn, (1885) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan)

Dworkin, Ronald, (1977) Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth)

Dworkin, Ronald, (1985) A Matter of Principle (xxx)

Dworkin, Ronald, (1986) Law's Empire (London: Fontana Press)

Economides, Kim and Mark Blacksell, (1986) "Law and Geography," 13 Journal of Law and Society, 161; subsequently published as "Human Geography and Law: a Case of Separate Development in Social Science," 10 Progress in Human Geography, 371.

Economides, Kim, and Mark Blacksell, (1987) "Access to Justice in Rural Britain: Final Report," 16 Anglo-American Law Review, 353-375.

Emel, Jody, (1990) "Resource Instrumentalism, Privatization, and Commodification" Urban Geography pn.xxx

Ericson, Richard V. and Patricia Baranek, (1982) The Ordering of Justice: A Study of Accused Persons as Dependants in the Criminal Process (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)

Finman, Td, (1985) "Critical Legal Studies, Professionalism, and Academic Freedom: Exploring the Tributaries of Carrington's River," 35 J. Leg. Ed., 180-207.

Fitzpatrick, Peter, (1987) "Racism and the Innocence of Law" 14 Journal of Law and Society 119-32.

Frank, Jerome, (1976) Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (Ithaca: Princeton University Press) [first published, 1949]

Gabel, Peter and Paul Harris, (198xxx) "Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law," 11 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 369-412

Gall, Gerald L., (1983) The Canadian Legal System (2d edition) (Toronto: Carswell)

Harari, Abraham, (197xxx) The Place of Negligence in the Law of Torts (Sydney: Law Book Co. of Australia)

Harris, Phil, xxx (Carleton University: Jurisprudence Centre Working Papers)

Hart, H.L.A., (1961) The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press)

Hunt, Alan, (1986) "The Theory of Critical Legal Studies," 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1-45.

Hunt, Alan, (1987) "The Critique of Law: What is `Critical' about Critical Legal Theory?" 14 Journal of Law and Society 5-19.

Hutchinson, Allan C. (1984) "From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction" 94 Yale Law Journal, 209-237.

Johnston, R. J., (1990) "The Territoriality of Law: an Exploration" Urban Geography pn.xxx

Kairys, David, Ed., (1982) The Politics of Law (New York: Pantheon Books)

Kalman, L. (1986) Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press)

Kaye, Harvey, The British Marxist Historians: An Introductory Analysis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984)

Kelman, Mark, (1984) "Trashing," 36 Stanford Law Review, 293-348.

Kelman, Mark, (1987) A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)

Kennedy, Duncan, (1979) "Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries" 28 Buffalo L.R. 205-382.

Kennedy, Duncan, (1982) "Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy," 32 Journal of Legal Education, 597.

Kirby, Andrew, (1990) "Law and Disorder: Morton Grove and the Community Control of Handguns" Urban Geography pn.xxx

Kobayashi, Audrey, (1989) "A Critique of Dialectical Landscape," in Audrey Kobayashi and Suzanne MacKenzie, Eds., Remaking Human Geography, (Boston: Unwin Hyman), 164-183.

Kobayashi, Audrey, (1990) "Racism and the Law in Canada: A Geographical Perspective," Urban Geography pnxxx

Lloyd, Dennis, (1964) The Idea of Law (London: Penguin)

Mandel, Michael, (1989) The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall and Thompson)

Marquis, Greg, (1988) "Doing Justice to `British Justice': Law, Ideology and Canadian Historiography" in W. Wesley Pue and Barry Wright, Eds., Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in Law and History (Ottawa: Carleton University Press), 43-69.

Martin, P.W., (ed.) (1985) "`Of law and the River,' and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom," 35 J. Leg. Ed., 1-26.

Matas, Roy J. and Deborah McCawley, Eds., Legal Education in Canada (Montreal: Federation of Law Societies of Canada).

McLaren, John P.S., (1987) "The History of Legal Education in Common Law Canada", in Matas, Roy J. and Deborah McCawley, Eds., Legal Education in Canada (Montreal: Federation of Law Societies of Canada).

McLaren, John P.S., (1989) "Historical Context of and Perspectives on Law as a Social Phenomenon," [Report to Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Re: Proposed Strategic Research Program on `Law as a Social Phenomenon,' August, 1989)

Miliband, Ralph, (1979) "Political Action, Determinism and Contingency," in Ralph Miliband, Class Power and State Power: Political Essays (London: Verso Books), 131-153.

Mohr, Johann W., (1987) "Law and Learning Revisited: Discourse, Theory and Research, 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 671-700.

Priest, George L. (1983) "Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The law School as University," 33 Journal of Legal Education, 437-441.

Pue, W. Wesley (1988a) "Theory and Method in the History of Law," in W. Wesley Pue and Barry Wright (Eds.) Canadian Perspectives on Law & Society: Issues in Legal History (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), 23-28.

Pue, W. Wesley (1988b) "Issues in Social Welfare and Labour Relations," in W. Wesley Pue and Barry Wright (Eds.) Canadian Perspectives on Law & Society: Issues in Legal History (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), 151-155.

Pue, W. Wesley (1988c) "Non-professional Legal Studies in Canada," Focus, 2, 9.

Pue, W. Wesley (1989a) "Guild Training versus Professional Education: The Department of Law at Queen's College, Birmingham in the 1850's" July 1989, 33 The American Journal of Legal History, 241-287.

Pue, W. Wesley (1990) "What is Law? Preliminary Thoughts on Geo-Jurisprudential Perspectives" in Chand Wije and Gary Thompson (Eds.) An Invitation to Law and Geography (forthcoming, 1990))

Pue, W. Wesley, (1989b) "Rethinking `Professionalism': Taking The Professions in Early Modern England Seriously," 4 Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 175-187.



R. v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D., 273.

Rawls, John, (197) Theory of Justice xxx



Ref. Re: Constitution of Canada (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1.

Rich, Robert M. (1978) "Sociological Paradigms and the Sociology of Law: A Historical Analysis," in Charles Reasons and Robert Rich, The Sociology of Law: A Conflict Perspective (Toronto: Butterworths), 147-189.

Rock, Paul (1974) "The Sociology of Deviancy and Conceptions of Moral Order," 14 British Journal of Criminology, 139-149.

Rosenthal, Douglas E., (1974) Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? (New York: Russell Sage)

Schlegel, J.H. (1985) "Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor," 35 Journal of Legal Education, xxx

Schlegel, John Henry, (1979-80) "American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience" 28 Buffalo Law Rev. 459.

Schlegel, John Henry, (1980) "American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore", 29 Buffalo L. Rev., 195

Schuck, Peter H. (1989) "Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?" 39 Journal of Legal Education, 323-336.

Simpson, A. W. B. (1984) Cannibalism and the Common Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)

Stevens, Robert, (1983a) Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850's to the 1980's (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press)

Stevens, Robert, (1983b) "American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intellectual Conceptualism" 33 Journal of Legal Education, 442-448.

Sugarman, David, (1981) "Theory and Practice in Law and History," in B. Fryar et. al., Eds. Law, State and Society (London: Croom Helm), xxx.

Sugarman, David, (1983a) "Introduction and Overview" in David Sugarman, Ed., Legality, Ideology and The State (London: Academic Press), 1-10.

Sugarman, David, (1983b) "Law, Economy and The State in England, 1750-1914: Some Major Issues" in David Sugarman, Ed., Legality, Ideology and The State (London: Academic Press), 213-266.

Sugarman, David, (1986) "Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition" in William Twining (Ed.) Legal Theory and Common Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell)

Sugarman, David, and G. R. Rubin, (1984) "Towards a New History of Law and Material Society in England, 1750-1914," in David Sugarman and G. R. Rubin, Eds., Law, Economy & Society: Essays in the History of English Law, 1750-1914 (Abingdon: Professional Books)

Summers, Robert S., (1971) "The Technique Element in Law," 59 California Law Review, 733-751.

Symposium, "Place of Economics in Legal Education", (1983) 33 (2) Journal of Legal Education [Symposium issue].

Symposium, "Response to the Efficiency Symposium," (1980) 8 (4) Hofstra Law Review.

Symposium, "Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern," (1980) 8 (3) Hofstra Law Review.

Thomson, Alan, (1987) "Critical Legal Education in Britain", 14 Journal of Law and Society, 183-197.

Thompson, E. P., The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London: Merlin Press, 1979)

Tomlins, Chris, (1989) "xxx" (mimeograph. Paper presented to the Jurisprudence Centre, Carleton University, December, 1989)

Trubek, David M. and John Esser, "`Critical Empiricism' in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora's Box," (1989) 14 LSI, 3-67.

Trubek, David M. (1984) "Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism" 36 Stanford Law Rev., 575.

Unger, Roberto (1983) The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)

Waddams, S. M., (1983) Introduction to the Study of Law, 2nd edition (Toronto: Carswell)

Watkins, Charles, Mark Blacksell and Kim Economides (1986a) The Use of the Law List to Assess the Distribution and Characteristics of Solicitors in England and Wales (Exeter: University of Exeter, Access to Justice in Rural Britain Project Working Paper 1)

Watkins, Charles, Mark Blacksell and Kim Economides (1986b) The Distribution of Solicitors in England and Wales (Exeter: University of Exeter, Access to Justice in Rural Britain Project Working Paper 12)

Watkins, Charles, Mark Blacksell and Kim Economides (1986c) The Role of Citizens' Advice Bureaux in Rural Areas (Exeter: University of Exeter, Access to Justice in Rural Britain Project Working Paper 12)

Watkins, Charles, Mark Blacksell and Kim Economides (1986d) The Use of Legal Services in Three Remote, Rural Parishes (Exeter: University of Exeter, Access to Justice in Rural Britain Project Working Paper 14)

Wije, Chand and Gary Thompson (Eds.) An Invitation to Law and Geography (forthcoming, 1990))

Woodward, C. (1972) "The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective" in H. P. Packer & T. Ehrlich, Eds., New Directions in Legal Education (New York: McGraw Hill)

Wright, Barry, (1988) "An Introduction to Canadian Law in History," in W. Wesley Pue and Barry Wright (Eds.) Canadian Perspectives on Law & Society: Issues in Legal History (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), 7-19.



Zimring, Franklin E., (1983) "Where Do the New Scholars Learn New Scholarship?" 33 Journal of Legal Education, 453-458.


1 I am grateful to Dr. Tony Lemon for fostering my interest in geography and to a number of geographical colleagues at Carleton University, across Canada and in the U.S.A. and Britain for encouraging my preliminary explorations with regard to the overlap between law and geography as academic disciplines. Special panels on "Law and Geography" at the Canadian Law and Society Association Annual Meetings in Windsor, Ontario in 1988 and at the Canadian Association of Geographers in Chicoutimi in 1989 provided invaluable forums for the exchange of ideas. I am indebted to Nick Blomley, Tullio Caputo, and Gordon Clarke for comments on a draft version of this paper.

2 Dudley v. Stephens is in these respects only one manifestation of a larger nineteenth century attack on legal pluralism (or, the place of law) which is documented by Arthurs, 1985.

3 Consider also the geographical visions of the Supreme Court of Canada in constitutional adjudication: Harry Glasbeek and Michael Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism," in R. Martin, ed., 2 Socialist Studies, 84-124, at [xxx230; 237 of Elliott Public Law materials.]

4 It is not just the British who view law in this way. At the time of writing U.S.A. troops have invaded a sovereign state under the pretense that they are simply enforcing U.S. anti-narcotics legislation. They have invaded the embassy of a third state while assaulting another with continuous loud-speaker broadcasting of popular music including "I fought the law and the law won." The irony is lost on most U.S.A. citizens. It appears the invaders - acting in violation of innumerable standards of international law - view themselves as in some way upholding some homogeneous legality in this widely different place.

5 Amongst others, these include: Canadian Journal of Law and Society; Journal of Human Justice; Journal of Law and Society; Law and Social Inquiry; Law and Society Review; Journal of Legal History; Law and History Review; American Journal for Legal History; Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice; Canadian Journal of Women and the Law; Law in Context; The Journal of Legal Studies; Law and Policy; Internation Journal of the Sociology of Law; Australian Journal of Law and Society; The Journal of Law and Economics; International Journal of Law and Psychiatry; Oxford Journal of Legal Studies; Criminal Justice History.

6 Abel, Richard L. and Philip S. C. Lewis, "Putting Law Back into the Sociology of Lawyers," in Abel and Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 478-529, at 506: "Lawyers gain entry by their ability to distance themselves from ordinary common sense and ideas of fairness; they learn special techniques of reasoning and a `universalizing attitude'."

7 Sugarman and Rubin, 1984 at 107 argue that "...all research is dependent upon (frequently implicit) hypotheses and therefore theories, ... facts are categories at a lower level of generality than those composing the theory, ... the difference between theory and history becomes one of degree rather than kind; and both are inseparable." (As quoted in Binnie, 1988, at 38).

8 Focussing on the state legal system of Canada, two commentators have observed: "since courts must be neutral and vindicate rights instead of pursuing policies, they must justify their decisions on abstract, and not on concrete grounds. Therefore, they must typically deny the relevance of class, not as an empirical proposition, but as a matter of a priori assumption. The legalisation of political discourse, therefore, is the substitution of abstract for concrete justifications." (Glasbeek and Mandel, op. cit., at xxx239 of Elliot)

Directory: courses -> lawdemo -> FTP
courses -> Guide to Presenting, Preserving, and Gathering the Past on the Web
courses -> Français II mme Gyllenborg Affton High School 2013-2014
courses -> Lauri hellström content Chapter 1
FTP -> Wrestling with law
FTP -> Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in Legal History
FTP -> Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in Legal History
FTP -> Citation: Alex C. Castles and Michael C. Harris, Lawmakers and Wayward Whigs: Government and Law in South Australia, 1836–1986, (Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 1987), pp. 55-73 3 Juristic Wisdom in Solomon’s Theatre
FTP -> Citation: David Neal, The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Practice in Early New South Wales (Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 61-83 chapter 3 The Rule of Law
FTP -> Citation: E. P. Thompson, Customs In Common (New York: The New Press, 1991), pp. 159-175 V

Download 140.56 Kb.

Share with your friends:
1   2




The database is protected by copyright ©sckool.org 2020
send message

    Main page