The Prehistory of Corporate Social Responsibility: Why did Paternalism Failed in France?



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The Prehistory of Corporate Social Responsibility: Why did Paternalism Failed in France?
Hubert Bonin, professor in economic history, Institut d’études politiques de Bordeaux & Gretha research centre-Bordeaux University) [www.hubertbonin.com]

Conversely with a large majority of European countries or regions, what has been called “paternalism” or “social patronage” did not benefit from a main extension among French companies and did not become an essential piece of the building of companies’ life during the maturing of the first industrial revolution (till the 1880s) or during the whole second industrial revolution (till the 1970s). Beyond the class struggle mindset, it seems that some kind of a “divorce” between companies and their workforce can be detected. Against a background favouring the development of corporate social responsibility, one has to keep in kind that every social or economic “model” has to be “accepted” by public opinion – depending mainly on the “perception” of capitalism (and even sometimes of market economy) by people, of its degree of “acceptability”, and above all during booming times (when inequality usually progresses) or during bursts (because of redundancies). We only intend here to develop an essay trying to elaborate an understanding of such a French peculiarity, and to determine why the State was promised to play such a comprehensive role to balance the lack of commitment of corporations to social investments. Let us precise that, despite the recognised dimension of the “French school of social history”, paternalism and its various types still lack a thorough synthesis covering modern times and that we shall therefore only aggregate there fragmentary studies to try to reconstitute the three stages which we identify: first, true and short-cut paternalism, but acting through dispersed initiatives; then a trend towards a structured social neo-liberalism attempting to conceive a comprehensive social system based on companies’ structured and “professionalised” initiatives; last, its limits and the irresistible State’s social intermediation since WWII.


1. Islands and archipelagos of corporate social responsibility (mainly 19th century and afterwards)
Classically, when the industrial revolution gathered momentum, companies felt the need to stabilise their workforce, generally reluctant to accept bad conditions of work and low wages: favouring better conditions of life would help to get faithful employees – and such pragmatism was explicated and shared by numerous businessmen, all the more because junior rural inhabitants had to be drawn from villages to reach collieries or mills, which constituted a disruption of way of life. Also classically, family business led to paternalism and patronage, as a company was to become a large “family” taking care of its “children” – and Christian morale inspired such initiatives. A few “models” of paternalism can thus be précised. First, islands of philanthropy were constituted around companies and manufactures which were isolated in the countryside in little town: Schneider (steel and mechanics) at Le Creusot (in Burgundy)1, a few collieries2, numerous textile or metalworking mills built their own universe, comprising a church, schools, household teaching to women, and investments in housing, either little buildings, or little homes, often with gardens. One linchpin was for example Denys and Charles Benoist d’Azy at Forges & fonderies d’Alais (in Southern France)3. During the first stage of the second industrial revolution, Michelin tire company4, Peugeot car manufacturer5, or steel makers (Schneider in its Mayville city in Normandy, or else) epitomized similar initiatives.They were well praised and publicized by booklets or articles, and even by Jules Verne’s novel Les 500 Millions de la Begum6, but they constituted only islands in the ocean of industrial growth.
A systematised philanthropic philosophy was to be set up therefore, and the influence of Alsatian manufacturers played a considerable role on that way. Inspired by Christian (often Protestant, but also Catholic) social philosophy, businessmen in textile and mechanics defined the concept of a systematic and comprehensive investment in social township to avoid the destruction of morality among bad-living workers and to balance stiff conditions of work by a healthy way of life. Such a corpus of issues and methods were argued and detailed by the Société industrielle de Mulhouse7, which was some kind of a think tank for Alsatian businessmen who discussed there of innovative schemes either in technology or in social issues. The (then commonplace) concept of “social city” was developed in Eastern France, but rapidly adopted afterwards by collieries, railway companies, or textile firms (in Troyes-Champagne, for example: Hoppenot, Gillier, Doré, Poron, Valton, influenced by social-christian theorician Léon Harmel, himself a businessman. Beyond the immediate needs of a stable and healthy workforce, the very future of society as a whole amidst the social revolution caused by industrial growth and urbanisations was at stake, and the “mission” of enlightened businessmen was to alleviate pains and to rebuild a social stuff able to avoid drifting into what was perceived as “the threat of the British crisis”, with huge, miserable, and revolting cities. Some French model had to be drawn, and the social responsibility of businessmen had to take such issues in charge.
This social philosophy was frequently promoted through the local, national and international exhibitions8 where a few enterprises or their industrial associations enhanced, through pictures and documents, the philanthropic achievements, alongside what would be called today corporate communication. There where even “competitions” among firms and “prizes” were granted to the best beacons for social investments and innovations as well as for technological innovations: A positive corporate image was then highlighted. Last, on a local scope, businessmen often supported Savings Banks, because they complied to their philosophy that individuals had altogether to be “helped” through paternalist policies and to assume by themselves the responsibility of they fate and family, through savings: about 400 Savings Banks had been founded all over France and were called “Caisses d’épargne et de prévoyance”, thus insisting on the moral education of people, invited to anticipate on the difficulties of life9.
2. Towards a French model of social liberalism (1880s-1930s)
But the ability of savings and foresight (prévoyance) to alleviate the working classes’ dire way of life remained limited, and the paternalist programs remained sparse: they were concentrated mainly in a few regional or industrial areas, along parallel by not comprehensive schemes, whereas what was called the “industrial city” gathered momentum at the turn of the 20th century and gathered huge amounts of rural, immigrated and young layers of population, thirsting for lodging and better conditions of life. This led to further collective studies about the “urban crisis”, first because of health concerns (“hygienism”), second because of social risks, that is social unrest, progress of socialism, and intense turnover of workforce10.
Enlightened businessmen, spurred sometimes by Protestant and Alsatian groups having fled Alsace in 1871, and scholars (from a few Paris and Lyon institutions) tackled the issue of welfare: instead of direct and local patronage initiatives developed by each firm in parallel (thus our phrase: “islands of paternalism”), big companies of intensifying industrialisation ought to launch comprehensive policies. They could benefit from experiments completed in Great Britain (garden cities, condominiums of social housing) and from a fresh philosophy of corporate philanthropy which had taken shape in the United States and which had been discovered through travels abroad by experts and industrialists (even trade unionists), for instance at the Chicago exhibition in 1898. Such social theories could be shaped as “social liberalism”: Companies had to grapple the social issue – called in France in the 19th century: “la question sociale” (social issues) – and develop systematic and comprehensive programs of welfare, for housing, health, education, sports, youngsters’ entertainment, music, etc. Not only Christian values inspired such moves, because numerous businessmen were not involved in religious schemes to re-organize the society; they were merely enticed by some type of “citizen commitment” to a “social Republic” which could put brakes on the progress of socialism, short-circuit emerging trade-unionism, prevent strikes, etc.; and sometimes they were inspired by what they perceived as an “American model” of paternalism11 through journalists’ or experts’ reports, or even by what we could call “the German challenge”, because arguments about the strengthes of German society were used as leverage to French reforms12.
The society Le Musée social13 (created in 1894, with go-between linking experts and businessmen, like Émile Cheysson or Charles Georges-Picot, etc.), the journal La Réforme sociale (1880-1930), and the society Office central des oeuvres de bienfaisance (1890)14 became plat-forms for such arguments among experts and businessmen15, and several books and studies promoted such overall social philosophy, expecting a spillover move throughout French capitalism, which ought to establish a “French model of capitalism” of social liberalism balancing individual responsibilities of workers and social integration through companies’ systematic investments into welfare. And that could prevent French capitalism (neo-capitalism?) from any intervention from the State, which had been always feared as a risk of disrupting the freedom of manoeuvre of capitalists attached to liberalism against interventionism.
A new type of managers – either in family or in management-led corporations – had to assume a “function” of social commitment16, beyond the day to day management of workforce, along with a global citizen responsibility; and a large majority of politicians supported it to fill the gap between “classes” and to contain the progress of the socialist parties. Leaders among the business community – by example from collieries, along with Peyerimhoff17, the head of Comité central des houillères de France, and Mines de Lens led the move18, or from metal industries (“les maîtres de forges19), for instance at Aciéries de Longwy20 – which in 1908 dedicated 13.5 per cent of wages and 46.5 per cent of dividends to social action – or at Pont-à-Mousson21, expressed and promoted such a philosophy in favour of a “modernised paternalism”. It respected the individual choices of workers – conversely with the first type of paternalism, which intended to forge their political opinion and their way of life as forms of “social control” –, but it intended to take in charge part of the reins of social progress without the intermediation of the State22. Numerous anniversary books commemorating in the interwar period the creation of companies in the 19th century (because of their 50th or 75th anniversary) highlighted each one’s social policy through several pages and pictures.
Five key paths were followed to complete such a philanthropic program and create “corporate welfare”.

  • First, progressive companies opened retirement funds to collect premiums aid by their employees and their own subsidies, in order to guarantee their workforce with a strong leverage to social stability. Most of the funds thus set up used the State-owned institution Caisse des depôts & consignations to guarantee a relevant management through the affiliate Caisse nationale de retraites pour la vieillesse. For instance, Société générale, the second-ranking French bank, started its retirement fund in 1897, and banks highlighted their commitment to company welfare23.

  • Second, in the interwar period, numerous firms, especially those employing female workers, chose to support the repopulationnist campaign – because French population was enduring malthusianism and a predominant death rate – and to distribute family allocations (bonus payments) along a spontaneous and philanthropic policy. That was the philosophy for example of the Consortium de l’industrie textile de Roubaix-Tourcoing, gathering northern textile firms (Motte in Roubaix, etc.) needing female workforce.

  • Third, a pressure group took shape in the 1880s-1890s to canvass in favour of a policy of massive social housing: private companies ought to be created by businessmen to invest into “Habitations à bon marché24 (Hbm or low cost rented flats and houses, even in garden cities alongside the British model25); it succeeded in getting the Siegfried Act in 1894 – from the name of Jules Siegfried, a cotton industrialist in Normandy, a mayor of Le Havre and a senator – which authorised social housing institutions to benefit from tax deductions on revenues26. The move of such private housing companies started slowly before WWI (with about 20,000 units, epitomized by those achieved by the Rothschild Foundation in Paris27), but was developed successively in the interwar period28, all the more because large collieries and railway firms29 used such statutes to reinforce their housing policy30. A beacon for such a policy could be the Bordeaux case where Fernand Philippart, a member of local big business as the head of Grande Huilerie bordelaise (groundnut oil), was elected as a mayor (1919-1924) and created a city Office public de Hbm de Bordeaux to start projects of social housing: benevolent capitalists were keen on “interclassism” and on a decentralised way of spreading and managing welfare. In northern areas, as soon as November 1943, the businessmen’s associations even pleaded in favour of an allocation of 1 per cent of turnover to be dedicated to social housing (through the Comité interprofessionnel du logement-Cil), because textile workers suffered from worst conditions than the of heavy industries, and the Christian dynasties which controlled textile firms there had mixed for long their morale and social responsibilities into extended patterns of organised philanthropy31.

  • Fourth, classically, the way of life of employees was eased, with in-house shops, sports, education, etc. Even Citroën32, who relucted at such policies, rallied them in the 1920s to defuse social unrest.

  • Fifth, within companies, social services33 were developed to cope with the welfare and personal concerns of employees, in the name of their healthy employability, especially about female workers34.

“Social liberalism” had thus reached a structured dimension, and ideology had paved the way to actual achievements. This undoubtedly helped French society to face the high rhythm of the second industrial revolution in the first third of the 21st century. All in all a cohesive system had aroused, which intended to express the will of businessmen to prove that class struggle and State interventionism were useless prospects. Such a stance was legitimized during the decade when a project of law was discussed at Parliament to establish in France a German-like comprehensive and compulsory system of social welfare for health coverage. Harsh arguments and to successive acts were necessary to draw the outlines of a balanced scheme where corporate social responsibility would get a large room (successive laws in 1928, 1930 and 1932): in each local district (département), funds would to be set up, in each industry, collecting employees and employers’ monthly fees; they would be managed mutually by representatives of both sides, without the intervention of trade-unions and the State. Such “mutual funds” were created all over the country, and business organisations campaigned to convince the whole business community not to fail to rally this new system, because of the alternative solution was only the management of the health welfare by another types of funds, managed by the State on a local interprofessional basis. Business-led mutualism gathered momentum throughout the 1930s and functioned all in all till the end of the 1940s, which crowned the historical process of establishing social liberalism through welfare institutions initiated and managed by the business community, therefore systematising corporate social responsibility...


3. The State and cities short-circuiting corporate social responsibility (from the 1920s to the 1980s)
Against such a background in favour of modern standards of paternalism and almost the concept of corporate social responsibility, why did such a model hurt an invisible ceiling and was put to a halt at the end of the 1940s? We shall emit hypothesis which would fuel arguments.
One first key cause might be found in the process of “dechristianisation” which early characterized France. The Révolution française deprived the Catholic Church of its assets (about 10 per cent of French property in 1789) and of its central part in social welfare, rubbing off its networks of social influence, conversely with a majority of countries, which condemned the commonplace circuits of “charitable care” like those active in the Rhenan, Danubian or Italian areas – and such a peculiarity was reinforced when congregations were expelled from France in the 1900s. Companies could not rely therefore on the relay of charity and benevolence managed by religious institutions elsewhere. They could not “hide” behind them to distribute their grants, and they had to act in favour of social welfare in direct, which often hurt their employees. Moreover, they could not rely on the concourse of social-christian trade unions to elaborate a co-operative mindset favouring social investments from companies to complement wages: such French trade-unionists (organised around Cftc-Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens since 1919) could be found out only in a very few areas, in the northern textile and mining districts or (after 1918) in Alsace, and Cftc remained till now a much minor force (far less than 5 per cent of members).
The very second reason was that the revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes had favoured an intense centralisation of public management, at the expense of local authorities. Councils of municipalities and Départements were mere representative institutions, and the executive power was exerted by the Préfet as a mere relay of the Paris ministers and government. This could have deprived local powers of the margin of manoeuvres which allowed so many local authorities to get direct granting from companies in the Rhenan, Danubian or Italian areas, or in the US. State oriented systems of social welfare more and more prevailed against for example “the German model” based on partnership between local authorities, middle business, labourers’ associations, philanthropic economic and finance entities (savings banks, Reiffeisen structures), and often too family foundations (Stiftungen). Centralisation could have been a genuine obstacle to paternalism, which demanded decentralised circuits of action. And this trend was enhanced when leftist Republicans conquered power ower rightist Monarchists at the end of the 1870s because they feared that their adversaries would use philanthropic tools to draw large segments of opinion to them, and they founded State-controlled forms of mutual credit (Crédit agricole mutuel), to undermine Reiffeisen-like mutualism, supported by philanthropic catholic rightists, to get roots among peasants…
A third explanation has been put ahead by French social historians: the reluctance of individual workers or of the labourers’ organisations to admit companies’ tutelage over welfare. The predominant ideology of the first trade unionist organisations promoted “revolution” and even “anarcho-syndicalisme” (Cgt-Confédération générale du travail, 1895), fighting any attempt of patronage either from business or from the State; and even when Cgt became “social-democrat” in the 1910-1920s, it stuck to its opposition to modernised types of paternalism and company welfare, all the more because it had to compete against communist trade union Cgtu35. Class struggle schemes predominated over “interclassicism” philosophy – but on the other side, a huge majority of businessmen steadfastly opposed against conceiving processes of negotiating with representatives of their workforce, in the name of the independency of firms in their decision-making. One could pretend that the “French social model” rejected any form of social “integration”, which therefore fixed limits around the progress of company welfare.
This leads logically to a fourth explanation and to define French patterns for a new social order. Conversely with the social democrat standards adopted in Belgium and Germany (with the socialist party supporting trade-union action for the creation of co-operatives and for investments by socialist-controlled local authorities into welfare), French leftists and center-leftists (the French leading party, Parti radical, with social theory: “solidarisme”, to promote popular classes into middle classes and to provide them welfare and education) demanded that the State itself, in direct (through national laws, and under the patronage of Ministry of Labour, established in 1906) or through local authorities (applying these laws), conceived and achieved “welfare State” instead of “company welfare” to avoid business tutelage and to assert “egalitarism”, that is to insert the whole waged workforce into systematic and equal preserve standards of welfare – conversely with the inequal “archipelagos” or “islands” of welfare resulting from paternalism.
The French modus operandi throughout the 20th century has thus ever extended positive ground initiatives from benevolent pathbreakers to systematic rules to be applied everywhere, without pocket of inequalities or different rhythms or patterns. In the interwar period, several laws fixed rules for social housing policies with the State financing and local authorities managing public organisations: public Hbm social housing competed harshly against private Hbm social housing liked to philanthropic business organisations. The same path was followed for hospitals (welcoming only individual donations after death). The argument about health welfare led to a dual opportunity to workers: those accepting co-operation with business and joining social insurance entities managed by business organisations, or those preferring joining State-controlled welfare entities, at the call from Cgt, or mutual institutions set up in several industries. It can thus be well understood that distrust against paternalist schemes predominated from the 1880s to the 1940s, even if paternalist businessmen were free to achieve their initiatives – even if a comprehensive assessment of their achievements has not yet been reached by historians.
A fifth explanation can be found after WWII. State interventionism then prevailed for long: welfare State triumphed (Social Security act in 1945-1947) and welfare was somewhat “nationalised” by State institutions, extending financing and managing networks deeply into society – with State Caisse des dépôts (Cdc) as a key leverage for social housing and city developments, as it provided cash to local authorities through the collection of the whole amount of assets gathered by Saving Banks36. The process of “nationalising” social policy was also fuelled by the nationalisation of collieries and railways, because the various affiliates coping with social housing in each company were amalgamated into one single subsidiary of the new firms (Sncf for railways; four regional collieries37), and social housing was now onwards included within the “package” of social advantages due to public employees. Moreover, an atmosphere of suspicion surrounded business initiatives in favour of social and cultural expenses: because the tax system became more and more sophisticaded, tax avoidance became its target, and this could explain why the State (the ministry of Finance) relucted at the very principle of “foundations”, perceived a risk of tax loopholes. Conversely with the commonplace US practice or the German Stiftungen habit, France did not favour philanthropy till the turn of the 21st century.
Also about the post-WWII period, a sixth explanation of the weakness of paternalism can be found in the promotion of trade unions as direct managers of company welfare. Rules set up in the 1940s established “comités d’entreprise” (company social commitees)38 to which firms had to remit part of the overall amount of wages (even as far of 1 per cent in energy industries) and then to leave elected representatives of labourers to manage these assets freely, either to invest into health or entertainment equipments, or to subsidisze families for the child-breeding or else. Businessmen were thus almost thoroughly short-circuited, as an ultimate proof of the rejection of paternalism in France – and either Gaullist39 (1958-1974) or leftist (1981-2002, with short rightist breaks) France maintained such mindset.
But, all in all, firms were involved into “social policies”40 because law demanded them to subsidize social housing (from 1953: 1 per cent of overall wages to be cashed to private social housing companies), mutual welfare entities, or comités d’entreprise (to complement required amounts); but such social policies were generally negotiated with trade-unions within the frameworkd of continuous bargaining, and they cannot be assimilated to paternalism.
Conclusion

Reshaping paternalism into corporate social responsibility (from the 1990s)?
Our essay could therefore conclude that paternalism durably lacked of legitimacy in France, but that numerous companies in several industries conceived and completed thorough social policies, and thus built some kind of an archipelagoes of company welfare for the sake of “good capitalism”. Beyond individual undertakings among family business, intending to gather workforce under the protection of some “(god-)fathering” welfare umbrella, either for pragmatist motives (fixing workforce), or for moral and even religious motives, a genuine social philosophy took shape from the 1880s which aimed at building a type of “neo-capitalism” where the demands of productivity of labour and growth would be balanced by the achievements of “social liberalism”. A comprehensive comparison between European companies ought to be reached, and we have there only emphasized a few topics.
From the stiff crisis (mid-1970s/mid-1990s), the trend in favour of liberalisation, privatisation, and even deregulation contributed to rehabilitate the decentralised part of companies in prospecting fresh paths of growth and innovation in place of the State. Against “wild” capitalism, calls for “good capitalism” were heard41; and such arguments gathered momentum when experts tried to imagine “varieties of capitalism”42. Corporate social responsibility was praised43 and even put as a competitive edge by institutional economics44, whilst some of managerial consultants called for the rebuilding of firm as “collaborative community”45 for the sake of “loyalty”. France joined the fray, with the admission by the State of the opportunities provided by foundations: laws opened doors to tax cuts for social or cultural commitment by firms; numerous cases of “Csr commitment” can be studied through the “yearly social report” of companies (which a 2001 law made compulsory) or on companies’ websites, to define what could be “post-modern post-paternalism”, that is corporate social citizenship, either in favour of employees (with more peaceful industrial relations), or in favour of populations, in Europe or abroad46. But the present crisis could foster disappointment about the values of “good welfare capitalism”, for example when “balance cheat” trends prevailed here and there against the promises of “accountability” which had taken shape at the turn of the century: the focus on csr could be endangered by short-term concerns about firms’ survival (“business of business is business”), which could question the very legitimacy of capitalism and fostered once more anti-capitalist positions. Despite the crisis, csr has still to deepen its roots among companies to prevent it from being a mere device of corporate communication and instead to be used as a true leverage to good social practices and to employees’ commitment47, even if competing of social commitment are fastly raising through ngo or rank and file “civic ventures” for social entrepreneurship48.


1 Claude Beaud, “Les Schneider au Creusot : un modèle paternaliste en réponse aux impératifs du libéralisme et à la montée du mouvement socialiste”, in Erik Aerts, Claude Beaud & Jean Stengers.

(eds.), Liberalism and Paternalism in the 19th Century, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1990. Christian Devillers et Bernard Huet, Le Creusot, naissance et développement d’une ville industrielle, 1782-1914, Seyssel, Éditions Champ Vallon, 1981. Au pays de Schneider, special issue of Le Mouvement social, 1977. Schneider disposed of a park of 2,427 houses in 1912, that is only one-fifth of the housing park used by its employees.



2 René Beaubernard, Montceau-les-Mines. Un laboratoire social au xixe siècle, 1981 (also in Burgundy – with 1,200 company houses in 1900, against 2,000 miners owning their own house).

3 Robert Locke, Les Forges & fonderies d’Alais à l’époque des premiers chemins de fer, 1829-1874, Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1978.

4 André Gueslin (ed.), Michelin, les hommes du pneu, 1889-1940, Paris, Les Éditions de l’Atelier, 1993.

5 Jean-Louis Loubet, Automobiles Peugeot. Une réussite industrielle, 1945-1974, Paris, Économica, 1990. Nicolas Hatzfeld, Les gens d’usine. 50 ans d’histoire à Peugeot-Sochaux, Paris, Les Éditions de l’Atelier, 2002.

6 Verne imagined an Indian Begum (or rich local king) offering in her a huge amount of money to those building the best town, thus fostering a still struggle between a “bad” German team conceiving Stahlstadt and a “good” French team developing Bonheurville. Cf. also Hector Malot, En famille, 1893; or Émile Zola, Travail, 1902.

7 Florence Ott & Louis Bergeron, La Société industrielle de Mulhouse, 1826-1876 : ses membres, son action, ses réseaux, Strasbourg, Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 1999.

8 See for instance : Exposition internationale de Roubaix en 1911 : Chambres des Houillères du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais : exposition des compagnies houillères : atlas ; vues d’ensemble, photographies des stands, planches i à xxxiii ; oeuvres et hygiène sociales, planches xxxxiv à xvl ; exposition souterraine, planches xvli à lxvii, Roubaix, 1911.

9 Laure de Lamby, Les métamorphoses de l’épargne, Paris, Gallimard-Découvertes, 2003. Carole Christen-Lecuyer, Histoire sociale et culturelle des Caisses d’épargne en France, 1818-1881, Paris, Économica, 2004. Hubert Bonin, " Les Caisses d’épargne françaises (1914-1945) : une croissance mouvementée sans évolution stratégique", in L’histoire des Caisses d’épargne européennes. Tome 4. Conjoncture & crises, 1914-1945, Paris, Éditions de l'épargne, 1999, pp. 105-175. Hubert Bonin, "Las estrategias de expansion de las cajas de ahorros francesas durante los siglos xix y xx", Papeles de Economia espanola, 2005, 105/106, special issue: La historia economica de las cajas de ahorros : Raices profondas de una realidad pujante, pp. 93-108.

10 Catherine Omnès, Ouvrières parisiennes. Marchés du travail et trajectoires professionnelles au xxe siècle, Paris, Éditions de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1997.

11 Stuart Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940, University of Chicago Press, 1976. Andrea Tone, The Business of Benevolence: Industrial Paternalism in Progressive American, 1997. Sanford Jacoby, Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism since the New Deal, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. Margaret Crawford, Building the Workingman’s Paradise: The Design of American Company Towns, 1996.

12 See: Georges Blondel, Les transformations sociales de l’Allemagne contemporaine, conférence faite au Musée social le 18 mars 1898, Paris, Imprimerie nouvelle (association ouvrière), 1898.

13 Colette Chambelland (ed.), Le Musée social en son temps, Paris, Presses de l’École normale supérieure, 1998. Janet Horne, Le Musée social. Aux origines de l’État providence, Paris, Belin, 2004. Janet Horne, A Social Laboratory for Modern France. The Musée social and the Rise of Welfare State, Durham & London, Duke University Press, 2002. Musée social, Le Musée social. Inauguration, 25 mars 1895, Paris, Calmann Lévy, 1895.

14 Musée social and Office central des oeuvres de bienfaisance merged in 1963 into Cedias-Musée social ; see website [www.cedias.org].

15 Christian Topalov (ed.), Laboratoires du nouveau siècle. La nébuleuse réformatrice en France et ses réseaux, 1880-1914, Paris, Éditions de l’Éhess, 1999. Janett Horne, Le Musée social : aux origines de l’État Providence, Paris, Belin, 2004.

16 Auguste Detoeuf, "Le rôle social du patron", Nouveaux Cahiers, 1st June 1938, pp. 1-4. Georges Lamirand, Le rôle social de l’ingénieur, Paris, Plon, 1932 (reedition 1954).

17 Alain Chatriot, "Henri de Peyerimhoff (1871-1953), le ‘gentleman du charbon’", in Olivier Dard & Gilles Richard (eds.), Les permanents patronaux : éléments pour une histoire de l’organisation patronale en France dans la première moitié du xxe siècle, Metz, Centre de recherche Histoire et civilisation de l’Europe occidentale, 2005, pp. 45-73.

18 « Trouver un personnel d’élite, se l’attacher pour le conserver ensuite, devient chaque jour de plus en plus difficile. La Société des mines de Lens a toujours été à la tête des oeuvres sociales. Toutes ces oeuvres, chez nous comme partout, répondaient à un but humanitaire, mais elles avaient comme corollaire celui d’attacher l’Ouvrier à la Mine. Je vis donc depuis longtemps au milieu des oeuvres. Je vois journellement les petites filles aller à l’école, à l’enseignement ménager, à l’ouvroir, aux ateliers de couture, aux réunions du dimanche. Je vois les petits garçons aller eux aussi à l’école, au jardin scolaire, aux sociétés sportives, théâtrales ou autres. Je vois les mères se rendre avec empressement aux consultations de nourrissons. Je vois les hommes cultiver leur jardin avec amour, tirer à l’arc, élever leurs pigeons et leurs coqs de combat. Je vois enfin les bonnes Soeurs gardes-malades panser et consoler bien des misères », the Head of Mines de Lens, 1900.

19 Jean-Marie Moine, Les barons du fer. Les maîtres de forges en Lorraine, Nancy, Éditions Serpenoise-Presses universitaires de Nancy, 1989.

20 “Chapter xxxii. Oeuvres patronales et sociales”, in Aciéries de Longwy, 1880-1930, Mulhouse, 1930, pp. 169-188.

21 Alain Baudant, Pont-à-Mousson (1918-1939) : stratégies industrielles d’une dynastie lorraine, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1980.

22 See Gérard Noiriel, “Du ‘patronage’ au ‘paternalisme’ : la restructuration des formes de domination de la main-d’oeuvre ouvrière dans l’industrie métallurgique française”, Le Mouvement social, n°144, July-September 1988, pp. 17-35.

23 See: “Banques françaises”, Exposition internationale des industries et du travail de Turin, 1911, catalogue published for the opening of the Pavillon des banques françaises.

24 Susanna Magri, Les laboratoires de la réforme de l’habitation populaire en France : de la Société française des habitations à bon marché à la Section d’hygiène urbaine et rural du Musée social, 1889-1909, Paris, Ministère de l’Équipement, du Logement des Transports & du Tourisme, 1995.

25 Ebezener Howard, Garden Cities of Tomorrow, a Peaceful Path to Social Reform, London, 1898.

26 See VIe Conférence nationale des sociétés d’habitations à bon marché, tenue à Paris au Musée social le 17 mars 1912. Rapports et comptes rendus des séances, Paris, Société française des habitations à bon marché, 1912.

27 M.-J. Dumont, La Fondation Rothschild et les premières habitations à bon marché de Paris, 1900-1925, Paris, Secrétariat de la recherche architecturale, 1984.

28 Françoise Choay, L’urbanisme, utopies et réalités, une anthologie, Paris, Seuil, 1965.

29 René Chavance, Les cités jardins de la Compagnie du Nord, Paris, Art & Décoration, 1922. Patrick Kalmoun, La brique et le rail. Des cités de cheminots pour tous, Paris, Éditions Public Histoire, 2007. Christophe Bouneau, “Le modèle paternaliste cheminot : la politique sociale de la Compagnie du Midi (1852-1937)”, Patronat & action sociale, Bulletin d’histoire de la Sécurité sociale, n°40, 2001, pp. 41-56. Armand Moreau, L’oeuvre sociale du Plm, Paris, Éditions & publications contemporaines, 1927.

30 Marcel Gillet, Les charbonnages du Nord de la France au xixe siècle, Paris-La Haye, Mouton, 1973.

31 See the special issue: Cent ans de catholicisme social dans la région du Nord, Revue du Nord, lxxiii, n°190-191, April-September 1991.

32 Sylvie Schweitzer, André Citroën, 1878-1936: le risque et le défi, Paris, Fayard, 1992.

33 Marie-Françoise Charrier & Élise Feller, Aux origines de l’action sociale. L’invention des services sociaux aux chemins de fer, Éditions Érès, 2001.

34 See Annie Fourcaut, Femmes à l’usine dans l’entre-deux-guerres, Paris, Maspero, 1982.

35 See Tony Judt, Marxism and the French Left. Studies on Labour and Politics in France, 1830-1981, Oxford, Clarendon Paperbacks, 1989.

36 Alya Aglan, Michel Margairaz & Philippe Verheyde (eds.), La Caisse des dépôts et consignations, la Seconde Guerre mondiale et le xxe siècle, Paris, Albin Michel, 2003. La Caisse des dépôts et consignations, 175 ans, special issue of Revue d’économie financière, Le Monde éditions, November 1991.

37 See: Houillères du bassin du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais, 270 ans d’histoire dans les mines du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais: Houillères du Bassin du Nord et du Pas de Calais, Douai, Les Houillères, 1991.

38 Georges Mouradian (ed.), L’enfance des comités d’entreprise. De leur genèse dans les conditions de la défaite de 1940 à leur enracinement dans les années 1950, Lille, Ifresi; Roubaix-Centre des archives du monde du travail, 1997. Maurice Montrichard, La dynamique des comités d’entreprise, Paris, Cnrs, 1963.

39 Marc Sadoun, Jean-François Sirinelli & Robert Vandenbussche (eds.), La politique sociale du général de Gaulle, Lille, Centre d’histoire de la région du Nord et de l’Europe du Nord-Ouest, 1990.

40 See: Centre Jacques Cartier & Sylvie Schweitzer (eds.), Logiques d’entreprises et politiques sociales des xixe et xxe siècles, Villeurbanne, Les Chemins de la recherche, 18, 1993.

41 Hubert Bonin, “Morale & entreprise dans l’histoire”, Le Débat (Gallimard), n°67, November-December 1991, pp. 167-185.C. Crook, “The good company”, The Economist, 374 (8410), 22 January 2005. Samuel Huntington & Lawrence Harrison (eds.), How Values Shape Human Progress, New York, Basic Books, 2000. Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, Corporate Social Responsibility. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, London, Edward Elgar, 2007. William Baumol, Robert Litan & Carl Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism ? The Economics of Prosperity and Growth, 2007.

42 Philip Auger, The End of Gentlemanly Capitalism, London, Penguin, 2000. Peter Hall & David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. Wolfgang Zank, Das rheinische Modell, Bonn, Inter Nationes, 1999. Bruno Amable, Les cinq modèles de capitalismes. Diversité des systèmes économiques et sociaux dans la mondialisation, Paris Seuil, 2005. Michel Albert, Capitalism vs. Capitalism: How America's Obsession with Individual Achievement and Short-Term Profit has led it to the Brink of Collapse, New York, Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993. Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre capitalisme, Paris, Seuil, 1991.

43 José Allouche, Corporate Social Responsibility, Basingstoke, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2006. J. Jonker & Marinus Cornelis de Witte, Management Models for Corporate Social Responsibility, Berlin, Springer, 2006. Frederick William Crittenden, Corporation, be good!: The story of Corporate Social Responsibility, Indianapolis, Dog Ear Publishing, 2006. Judith Hennigfeld, Manfred Pohl & Nick Tolhurst, The Icca Handbook on Corporate Social Responsibility, Chichester, England, J. Wiley & Sons, 2006. Steve May, George Cheney & Juliet Roper, The Debate over Corporate Social Responsibility, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. Chris Carter, Stewart Clegg, Martin Kornberger, Stephen Laske, Martin Messner, Business Ethics as Practice, London, Edward Elgar, 2007.

44 Michael Porter & M. R. Kramer, “Strategy and society: the link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility”, Harvard Business Review, 2006, 84 (12), pp.78-92. Michael Porter & M.R. Kramer, “The competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy”, Harvard Business Review, 2002, 80 (12), pp. 56-69.

45 Charles Heckscher & Paul Adler (eds.), The Firm as a Collaborative Community. Reconstructing Trust in the Knowledge Economy, Stuttgart, Stern Verlag, 2007.

46 Jacques Baratier, L’entreprise contre la pauvreté. La dernière chance du libéralisme, Paris, Autrement-Frontières, 2005. For example, see the International Cocoa Initiative, against children’s workforce in cocoa plantations [www.internationalcocoainitiative.com].

47 See Paul Detrié, L’entreprise responsable, Paris, Dunod, 2005. Roland Pérez, “Quelques réflexions sur le management responsable, le développement durable et la responsabilité sociale des entreprises”, La Revue des sciences de gestion, direction et gestion, January-February 2005, special issue Le management responsable, n°211-212. Benoît Chevalier, “Fondations philanthropiques et mondialisation : quels défis pour ce siècle ?”, in Rapport moral de l’argent dans le monde 2007, Paris, Association d’économie financière, 2007. Ian Wylie, “The new new philanthropists”, Management Today, October 2007.

48 Along the name of Civic Ventures, the name of the firm founded by Marc Freedman, also founder of Experience Corps; see Marc Freedman, Encore. Finding Work that Matters in the Second Half of Life, New York, PublicAffairs, 2007.



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