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14 Schiller provides a simple example: “By stretching out my arm to receive an object, I am carrying out a purpose, and the movement that I make is prescribed by the goal that I want to achieve thereby. But which path I want to let my arm take to the object and how far I want to let the rest of my body follow--how swiftly or slowly and whether with much or little exertion I want to perform the movement, I do not engage in this precise calculation at that moment, and thus something is left here to my nature. But yet somehow that which is not determined by the purpose must be decided, and therefore here my sentiment can be the decisive factor and, through the tone it sets, determine the manner of the movement.” Id. at 255.

15 See, e.g., Id. at 281.

16 Id. at 283.

17 See id. at 286-87.

18 Acknowledging this element of interstitial expression of ethical sensibilities in judging therefore should not and need not entail commitment to any particular view in the debate about legal positivism.

19 See Alec Stone Sweet, European Integration and the Legal System, in 6 The State of the European Union 18, 24 (Tanja A. Börzel and Rachel A. Cichowski, eds., 2003) (quoting Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, eds., Special Issue, The Politics of Delegation: Non-Majoritarian Institutions in Europe, 25 West European Politics (2002)).

20 Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in The Evolution of EU Law, supra note 1, at 321, 327.

21 See, e.g., Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaugher, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L. J. 273, 298 (1997); J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26 Comp. Pol. Stud. 510 (1994). For a more general development of the idea of global networks, see Anne Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, Foreign Aff., Sept.‑Oct. 1997, 183, 189.

22 The classic account is Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 Am. J. Int. L. 1 (1981).

23 See Stein, supra; Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 63, 75 (1998).

24 Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe 45 (2001).

25 See, Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, supra note 7, at 72.

26 See Jason Coppel and Aidan O’Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seiously?, 29 C.M.L.R. 669 (1992). Perhaps in a similar vein are also portions of Hjalte Rasmussen’s famous study. See Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice 12 (1986).

27 Cf. Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Human Rights Convention, [1996] E.C.R. I‑1759.

28 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust, 61 Wash. L.R. 1103, 1106 (1986).

29 See cases cited supra notes 9-10.

30 See, e.g., Van Gend, supra note 9, at 12.

31 Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 European Law Rev. 155, 158 (1983).

32 Id.

33 Id. at 157.

34 C-302/87, European Parliament v. Council, [1988] E.C.R. 5615.

35 Id. at para. 18.

36 Id. at para. 23.

37 C-294/83, Parti-Ecologiste >Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339.

38 For a very brief description of this development, see J.Abr. Frowein, Note, Solange II (BVerfGE 73, 339). Constitutional Complaint Firma W., 25 Comm. Mkt. L. Rev. 201 (1988).

39 See Brunner v. European Union Treaty, 89 BVerfGE 89, 155 (original), [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (English translation).

40 See Frowein, supra.

41 See generally Paul Craig and Gránne de Búrca, EU Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials 319-327, 337-349 (2003).

42 See, e.g., C-5/88, Wachauf v. Germany, [1989] E.C.R. 2609, at para. 17; C-22/84 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, at paras. 18-19; C-44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, ar para 14-15. This approach yields rejection of a member state’s higher level of protection, see T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v. Commission, [2001] E.C.R. II-729, at para. 84, as well as a member state’s lower level of protection, see, Case 137/84, Ministère Public v. Mutsch, [1985] E.C.R. 2681, 2690 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz), if that level conflicts with what Community law protects.

43 See generally, Siofra O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship 23-30 (1996).

44 Article 18 EC confers the “right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States,” but makes this right “subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give them effect.”

45 See Article 18, para. 2 EC; David O’ Keeffe, Union Citizenship, in Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty 94 (David O’ Keeffe and Patrick M. Twomey, eds., 1994) (“it will only be if the legislator uses Article 18 as the basis for further legislation that anything new will be added”).

46 See, e.g., O’Leary, supra at 136 (noting rejection of broader proposals regarding rights of free movement).

47 See C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, [1998] E.C.R. I-2691.

48 For early assessments, see Siofra O’ Leary, Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship, 24 European L. Rev. 68 (1999); Jo Shaw, The interpretation of European Union Citizenship, 61 Mod. L. Rev. 293 (1998). Subsequent cases quickly confirmed this broad suggestion in Sala. See, e.g., C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Social D’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve (CPAS), [2001] E.C.R. I-6193.

49 Maurizio Ferrera, European Integration and National Social Citizenship: Changing Boundaries, New Structuring?, 36 Comparative Pol. Stud. 611, 643 (2003).

50 See, e.g., C-1/72, Rita Frilli v. Belgium, [1972] ECR 457. See Josephine Steiner, The Right to Welfare: Equality and Equity under Community Law, 10 Eur. L. Rev. 21 (1985). In justifying its decision the Court appeared to rely on Advocate General Mayras assessment of the growing European wide “tendency” to “guarantee a minimum income” as a matter of social security. C-172, AG Opinion, at para.. Cf. C-172, Frilli, at paras. 13-15. Cf. Steiner, supra at 27.

51 Ferrera, supra, at 636.

52 C-182/78, Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v. G. Pierik, [1979] ECR 1977, at para. 13.

53 Council Regulation 2793/81/EEC, 17. September 1981, amending Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community and Regulation (EEC) 574/71 fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) 1408/71, OJ L 275/ (1981).

54 See, e.g., V.G. Müller-Fauré and onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, Judgment of Court (13 May 2003) (relying on Articles 49 (formerly 59) and 50 (formerly 60) EC); C-158/96, Kohll and Union des Caisses de Maladie, [1998] ECR I-1931 (relying on Articles 59 and 60 TEC (now 49 and 50 EC); C-120/95, Nicolas Decker and Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés [1998] ECR I-1831 (relying on Articles 30 and 36 TEC (now 28 and 30 EC)).

55 See, e.g., Müller-Fauré, supra, at paras 89-90, 93.

56 C-138/02, Collins and Secretary for Work and Pensions, Judgement of the Court (23 March 2004)

57 The Laeken Declaration was ambiguous on this score, noting that the Convention “will draw up a final document which may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved.” See http://european‑ Giscard, however, quickly made it public that he would insist on the production of a draft constitution, i.e. a single “recommendation” adopted by consensus.

58 See generally Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in Deliberative Democracy 97 (1998). See also id. at 98.

59 See Paul Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaidis, The European Convention: Bargaining in the Shadow of Rhetoric, 27 West European Politics 381 (2004).

60 See Simon Hix, Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam, 32 British J. Pol. Sc. 259 (2002).

61 See Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland, Power to the Parties: Competition and Cohesion in the European Parliament, 1979‑2001, British Journal of Political Science, 34(4), 767‑93. See also, Simon Hix, Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting‑Defection in the European Parliament, 56 World Politics 194‑223 (2004) (available at ).

62 See Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland, Politics Like Any Other: Dimensions of Conflict in the European Parliament, research paper available at‑Politics_Like_Any_Other.pdf .

63 See European Parliament, Resolution on the Compulsory Publication of Information, OJ C 172/176 (1984). See e.g., id. at para D(1) “the European Community should have its own legislation on openness of government of Community affairs,” id. para. D(6) “every citizen should have access to any studies, research, statistics, etc., on which a Directive or Regulation is based.”

64 See, e.g., Bo Vesterdorf, Transparency--Not Just a Vogue Word, 22 Fordham Int'l L. J. 902 (1999).

65 See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Human Rights Convention, [1996] E.C.R. I‑1759.

66 See Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article I-7, para. 2.

67 See, e.g., Udo DiFabio, A European Charter: Towards a Constitution for the Union, 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 159, 162 (2001).

68 Moravcsik, Democratic Deficit, supra note 5, at 362.

69 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (2001).

70 Moravcsik, Democratic Deficit, supra note 5, at 350.

71 Id.

72 Moravcsik, Reassessing Legitimacy, supra note 5., at 608.

73 Id.

74 For an examination of some of the potential consequences of these differences, see Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in The Federal Vision 213 (Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse, eds., 2001).

75 See European Commission, General Budget of the European Union for the Financial Year 2004, SEC(2004)500.

76 The Economist, Pocket World in Figures 230 (2004).

77 Theodore Georgakopoulos, Economic Integration and unequal development: the experience of Greece, in Economic Integration between Unequal Partners 98, 100 (Theodore Georgakopoulos, Christos C. Paraskevopoulos, and John Smithin, eds, 1994).

78 Michael Hennigan, Ireland Tops Cash per Head Income Aid from European Union,, available at .

79 Id.

80 See OECD Standardized Unemployment Rates (April 2003), available at .

81 Stephen J. Silvia, The Causes of Declining Unemployment in Germany:

Can the Schröder Government Take Credit?, at p. 3, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Paper Series: Germany 2000BTen Years of Unity (citing Deutsche Bundesbank statistics), available at .

82 See Hennigan, supra.

83 See OECD, Analysis of the 2003 CAP Reform, at p. 39, available at .

84 See C-43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne (Sabena), [1976] E.C.R. 455, 464-465 (Report for the Hearing).

85 Id.

86 See British Chamber of Commerce, Response to: Trade and Industry Committee: Inquiry into UK Employment Regulations (June 2004), available at ; British Chamber of Commerce, Red Tape Costs Spiral to £30bn (March 8, 2004), available at’BEP1_pressrel_0000063093 . This is close to the ex ante cost estimate of the UK government, which put compliance costs at roughly ,1.9 billion per year. See Working Time Regulations Regulatory Appraisal, at par. 18.

87 See U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament andOf the Council on Working Conditions for Temporary Agency Workers - Regulatory Impact Assessment, at p.2, available at .

88 See U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Implementation of the Regulations on European Works Councils ‑ Regulatory Impact Assessment,‑ria.pdf .

89 See U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Full Regulatory Impact Assessment for Race, available at .

90 AWorking Conditions: Commission Launches Consultation on Working Time Directive,” European Report, January 7, 2004 (No. 2832). See also, “Court ruling to cost employers millions,”, September 10, 2003.

91 U.K. Health and Safety Executive, Amendments to the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations and the Control of Lead at Work Regulations: Regulatory Impact Assessment, available at .

92 U.K. Department for Transport, Regulatory Impact Assessment ‑ European Directive 2003/17/EC, available at .

93 Slawomir Tokarski and Alan Mayhew, Impact Assessment and European Integration Policy, Sussex European Institution Working Paper No. 38, at p. 38 (2000), available at .

94 David Litvan, Les coûts de la réglementation environnementale, Regards Sur L’actualite No. 231, at pp. 41, 42 (May 1997). Figures in text are recalculated in 2003 Euros.

95 For a review of these measures, see Damian Chalmers, Constitutional Reason in an Age of Terror, in The Constitutional Challenge in Europe and America: People, Power and Politics (Daniel Halberstam and Miguel Maduro, eds., forthcoming Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also Statewatch, “ ‘Scoreboard’ on post-Madrid Counter-Terrorism Plans” (March 2004), available at (visited Oct. 1, 2004); E.U. Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), The Balance Between Freedom and Security in the Response by the European Union and Its Member States to the Terrorist Threats” (March 2003), available at (visited Oct. 1, 2004).

96 Council Directive 2004/82/EC, of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, OJ L 261, p. 24 (2004).

97 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, of OJ L 164, pp. 3-7 (2002).

98 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003, on combating corruption in the private sector, OJ L 192, 54 (2003).

99 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002, on the European Arrest Warrant and surrender procedures between the Member States, L190, p.1 (2002).

100 See Chalmer, supra.

101 Cf. Chalmers, supra (noting that this “Europeanisation took on a new scale following the bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004.”).

102 Balance between Freedom and Security, at 9.

103 Id. See also, European Parliament Resolution of 7 February 2002 on Council Decision of 27 December 2001 on fighting terrorism, OJ C 284, p. 313 (2002). Cf. Statewatch, EU-PNR: JHA Council to Agree the Surveillance of Airline Passengers, available at (April 2004) (visited Oct. 1, 2004) (noting that “The European Parliament has rejected the proposal and national parliaments were given no time to scrutinise the radically changed proposal.”).

104 See Council Directives 75/117/EEC, 76/207/EEC, and 79/7/EEC.

105 See, e.g., Rachel A. Cichowski, Judicial Rulemaking and the Institutionalization of European Union Sex Equality Policy, in The Institutionalization of Europe 113, 117 (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein, eds., 2001).

106 See, e.g., Case C‑285/98, Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2000] ECR I‑0069, holding that Germany’s blanket exclusion of women from the armed services contravened Directive 76/207/EEC.

107 Council Directive 96/34/EC.

108 Council Directive 92/85/EEC.

109 Article 13 EC provides: “Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits fo the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”

110 See U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Full Regulatory Impact Assessment for Sexual Orientation, at 1, available at .

111 See U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Full Regulatory Impact Assessment for Religion or Belief, at 1, available at .

112 See Directive 2000/43/EC, OJ L 180/22 (2000) (race directive).

113 See Directive 2000/78/EC, OJ L 303/16 (2000) (equality directive).

114 See Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems, 90 Virginia L. Rev. 732, 823-825 (2004) (discussing dynamics of multiple political disequilibria in democratic systems).

115 The status of the German Bundesbank, for example, is specially provided for in the German Grundgesetz. See generally Ingolf Pernice, Artikel 88, in 264 Grundesetz Kommentar (Horst Dreier, ed., 2000).

116 See, e.g., BverfGE 8, 274 (1958); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of Public Law in Germany and the United States 59 (1995). Cf. INS v. Chadha (striking down vetoes as violating the constitutional requirement of bicameralism and presentment); Michael Brenner, Michael Brenner, Article 80, in Das Bonner Grundgesetz: Kommentar 3:143, 185-86 (Hermann v. Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck, eds., 4th Ed. 2001).

117 See Article 80(2) GG. The requirement of Bundesrat approval in such cases is a default that may be overridden by federal statute passed with the consent of the Bundesrat.

118 See Rose-Ackerman, supra at 59.

119 See Brenner, supra, at 154.

120 See Id. at 184.

121 Michelle Everson, The German Federal Supervisory Authority for Insurance, in Regulating Europe 202, 207 (Giandomenico Majone, ed, 1996).

122 See id. at 210-11.

123 Id. at 213.

124 See Fabrice Demarigny, Independent Administrative Authorities in France and the Case of the French Council of Competition, in Regulating Europe, supra, at 157, 161.

125 See id. at 164-165.

126 See Everson, supra, at 225-228.

127 See Neil Komesar, Constitutionalism, Institutional Choice and the Supply and Demand of Rights, in The Constitutional Challenge, supra.

128 See Miguel Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What if this is As Good As It Gets?, Michigan Comparative & Interdisciplinary Papers on European Integration No. 02/01, available at .

129 See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873).

130 See C-85/96, Martinez Sala, [1998] ECR I-2691, at para. 15 (Opinion of AG La Pergola).

131 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.

132 See, e.g., EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos, eds., 1999).

133 See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, The Democratic Deficit In European Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment In Comitology, 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. 451 (1999).

134 See supra Part II B.

135 Cf. Halberstam, supra note 125.

136 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 229B31, E.U. Doc. CONV 850/03 (July 18, 2003), available at http://european‑

137 See Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, supra note 4; Moravcsik, Preferences and Power, supra note 4.

138 See Moravcsik, Reassessing Legitimacy, supra note 5.; Moravcsik, Democratic Deficit, supra note 5.

139 See, e.g., Kalypso Nicolaidis, “We the Peoples of Europe . . .”, Foreign Affairs Nov./Dec. 2004, at 97; Robert Howse, Association, Identity, and Federal Community, in The Constitutional Challenge, supra note 95.

140 The Hebrew “&$#1, '“ (“Ezer Kenegdo”) in Genesis 2.20 is translated in the King James version as “an help meet for him,” and in the Revised Standard version as “a helper fit for him.” Both translations elide the sense of opposition suggested by “&$#1,” Eve is as much a counterpart to Adam as she is there to help him.

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