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v. Cox, 3 1.1. & S. 114, 105 Eng.Rcp. 553 (1814); Ex

parte Pain, 5 B. & C. 251, 108 Eng.Rep. 94 (1826):

Alabama: Anniston Electric & Gas Co. v. Rosen.

159 Ala. 195, 48 So. 798, iSa Am.StRep. 32 (1909);

Birmingham, By. Light & Power Co. v. Nicholas, 181

Ala. 491, 61 So. 361 (1913); Illinois: Parsons v.

SmIth, 164 I1l.App. 509 (1903); Maine: Maeurda v.

Lewiston Journal Co., 104 Me. 554, 72 A, 494) (1908);

Minnesota: Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries

Co., 124 Mian. 117, 144 NW. 450, 51 L.R,A. (N.S.) 640

(1913); Wisconsin: Zeidler v, Johnson, 38 Wis. 335

02. Earl of Kerry v. Baxter, 4 East 340, 102 Eag.Rep.

801 (1803).

93. Grlffiths V. Eyles, 1 Bce. & P. 413, 126 Eng.Rep.

083 (1790),

$4. King ~. nrcreton, S Mod, ~ s~ Eng.Bep. 236 (1721).

Alternative or Hypothetical pleading is a Defect in Form, objectionable on Special De­murrer only.°5

72. Duplicity, or Double Pleading, consists in alleging two or more distinct grounds of Complaint or Defense for a single object, when one only would be sufficient. The fault may exist in, and the Rule therefore applies to
(I) The Declaration; and

(II) The Subsequent Pleadings.
THE requirement of the Common Law that Pleadings shall not be Double has for its object the Attainment of the Singleness or Unity of the Issue between the Parties, which it is the aim of all Pleadings to pro­duce. It precludes both plaintiff and defend­ant, in their respective Pleadings, from stat­ing or relying upon more than one matter, constituting a sufficient Ground of Action in respect to the Same Demand, or an effective Defense to the same Claim, or an adequate Answer to the Preceding Pleading of the op­ponent.°6 The Rule in its terms points to
~ Oglethorp v, Hyde, Cro.Eliz, 233, 78 Eng.Bep. 488 (1594); Hodgeon v. East India Co., S TB. 280, 101 Eng,Rep. 1389 (1799); Taylor v. Needham, 2 Taunt, 278, 127 Eng.Rep. 1084 (1810).
Cases arise where the plaintiff is uncertain against which of several persons he Is entitled to relief, as where several corporations operate a line of track, or where a defendant may have been acting either as an agent or as a principal. In such cases some Modern Rules of Procedure allow the plaintiff to join any or all of them as defendants in the alter­native. It is also deemed convenient under Modern Rules to allow a Party to include in his Pleading two or more alternative sets of Material Facts. even tbough inconsistent, and to claim Belief there­under in the alternative, upon an alternative con­struction or ascertainment of his Cause of Action, without the necessity of making an election.
96. English: Rumphreys v. Bethily, 2 Vent, 198, 80

Eng.Rep. 391; Gaile v. Eetts, 3 Salk. 141, 911 Eng.

Rep. 740; Butcher v, Stenart, 9 M. & W. 404, 152

Eng.Rep. 171 (1842); Illinois: Calhoun v. Wright,

3 Scam. (Ill.) 74 (1841); Burrass v. Hewitt, 3 Scam.

(Ill.) ¶224 (1841); Chicago W~ I). By. (Jo. v. Ingraham,

131 Ill. 659, 23 N.E. 350 (1890); Maine: Scott v.

Whipple, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 425 (1830); Massachusetts:



Cli. 6

Doubleness only, as if it prohibited only the use of Two Allegations or Answers; but its meaning, of course, extends equally to the case of more than two, the term “Double­ness” or “Duplicity” being applied, though with some inaccuracy, to either case. The ef­fect of the Rule is thus to avoid confusion and a multiplication of Issues in the Action, and it is in all cases founded on the principle that it would be unnecessary and vexatious to cause the Adverse Party to litigate and prove two or more Facts or Propositions, when one alone would sufficiently establish the Matter in dispute,
Duplicity in a Declaration consists in join­ing, in one and the same Count, different Grounds of Action to enforce a single Right of Recovery.97 This is a Fault in Form, be­cause it tends to prolixity and confusion and a Multiplicity of Issues.
Parker v. Parker, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 236 (1835); New

Hnlnpshire: Tebbets v. Tilton, 24 N.H. 120 (1851);

New York: Connelly v. Pierce. 7 Wend. (N.Y.) 129

(1581); Ohio: Rumbarger v. Stiver, 6 OhIo 99 (1833).

The Rule as to Duplicity finds its analogy in Equity in the prohibition against Multifariousness, or the improper Joinder of two Causes cf Action in one statement And the fault is also recognized and condemned in Code Pleading. Pierce v. Carey, 37 IVis. 232 (1875); Brown v. Nichols, Shepard & Co., 123 ImI. 492, 24 N.E. 339 (1890).
97. As to Duplicity in the Declaration, see also, Corn­wallis V. Savery, 2 Burr. 773, 07 Eng.Rep. 555 (1759); Manser’s Case, 2 Co. 4, 76 Eng.Rep. 395 (1608); Lit­tle v. Perkins, 3 N.H. 469 (1608).
For a Count seeking to recover Damages as in an Ac­tion on the Case for Deceit, and also for a Breach of Contract, see Noctling v. Wright, 72 Ill. 390 (1874); People’s Nat. Bank v. Nickerson, 106 Me. 502, 76 A. 937 (1910).
On negligent Damages to person and property from the same act, see Chicago W. D. By. Co. v. Ingra­ham, 131 Dl. 059, 23 N.E. 350 (1890). See, also, Kin­ney v. Turner, 15 Ill. 182 (1853); Wilson v. Gilbert, 161 Ill. 49, 43 N.E. 792 (1896).
On Duplicity, see $chwindt v~ Lane~Petter Lumber Co., 40 Mont 537, 107 P. 818 (1910); Gore v. Condon, 87 Md. 308, 39 A. 1042 (1898); Creen v. Michigan Cent.

B. Co., 168 Mich. 104, 133 NW. 956 (lOll); Fergu­son v. National Shoemakers, 108 Me. 189, 79 A. 469 (1911), involvIng several independent breaches of duty. Laporte v. Cook, 20 RI. 261, 38 A. 700 (1897).

73. No Matter will operate to make a Plead­ing flouble that is Pleaded only as Necessary Inducement to another Allegation.
THUS, it may be Pleaded, without Duplic­ity, that after the Cause of Action accrued the plaintiff (a woman) took a husband, and that the husband afterwards released the de­fendant; for though the eoverthre is itself a Defense, as well as the release, yet the Averment of the coverture is a necessary in­troduction to that of the release.98 This Ex­ception to the Genera] Rule is prescribed by an evident principle of Justice; for the Par­ty has a Right to Rely on any single matter that he pleases, in preference to another, as, in this instance, on the release in preference to the coverture. But if a Necessary Induce­ment to the matter on which he relies, when itself amounting to a Defense, were held to make his Pleading Double, the effect would be to exclude him from this right, and com­pel him to rely on the Inducement only.


74. Duplicity is a Fault in Form, and can only be objected to by Special Demurrer.
THIS Rule results necessarily from the Nature of the Fault, which is not in the Sub­stance of the Matter Pleaded, but in the Statement of Matter in excess of what is nec­essary to constitute a valid Claim, or An­swer. Being thus a Defect only in Form, ad­vantage must be taken of it, under the Stat­ute of Elizabeth, only by Special Demurrer, in which the particular Duplicity must be
93. Bacon’s Abr., “Pleas” etc. K,2 (London, 1778); Comyn’s Dig., “Pleader” E.2 (Dublin, 1793).
A. Plea by an Executrix in Abatement was not sub­ject to the charge of Duplicity In Alleging the Facts showing that the Action did not survive against de­fendant as Executor; where, if the Action survived, those Facts were necessary under the Illinois Abate­ment Act, § 25, to make the plea good. Genmill V. SmIth, 274 Ii]. 87, 113 N.E. 27 (1910).

clearly pointed out.°° If the Party Demur Generally, the objection cannot afterwards be raised. Where the Opposite Party, In­stead of Demurring to a Pleading which con­tains two distinct and sufficient Matters, im­properly joined, Pleads Over instead, the weight of authority seems to be that he must answer both Matters, or the one passed over will remain decisive against him.t In such case, an Answer to each Matter, single in it­self, does not constitute Duplicity; but it must still be remembered that each Separate Answer, as to its own Allegations, is subject to the full operation of the Rule.

The Rule requiring the Demurrer for Du­plicity to be Special, finds no application in the case of Misjoinder of Causes of Action, since a plaintiff who joins in the same Dec­laration different Counts, containing sepa­rate and incongruous Causes of Action, as distinct Grounds of Recovery, commits a radical Fault, and his Declaration is bad, either on General Demurrer or in Arrest of Judgment or on Writ of Error.2

2. Alabama: Pharr v. Bachelor, S Ala. 237 (1841);

Illinois: McGinnity v. Laguerenne, 5 Gil. (III.) 101

(1845); Mayer v. Lawrence, 58 Ill.App. 194 (1894);

Indiana: Bodley v. Roop, 6 Black!. (md.) 158 (1842);

New York: Cooper r. Bissell, 10 Jobns. (N.Y.) 140

But a Demurrer for Misjoinder must be to thc Whole Declaration, and not merely to the Defective Count or Breach. lUngdoin v. Nottle, 1 Maine & S. 355, 105 Engllep. 133 (1818); Fernald v. Garvin, 511 Me.

414 (1867). And the plaintiff cannot, If a Demurrer is Interposed, Aid his Mistake by entering a Nolls Prosequi, so as to prevent the operation of the Be.


75. Every Pleading should state only such Facts as are True and Capable of Proof, avoid­ing False and Frivolous Allegations tending to deceive the Court and the Adversary, and to delay the progress of the Trial.
AT Common Law, while it is a principle that Pleadings ought to be true, yet there are no means of enforcing the Rule. Thus the Common-Law Pleadings fail to uncover the Real Issues in dispute. The Illinois Practice Act (Section 52) made provision that the Denial of the Execution or Assignment of an Instrument in Writing, when a copy is filed with the Pleading, must be Verified by Affidavit. The Illinois Practice Act (Sec­tion 55) gave the plaintiff the option in Ac­tions on Contract for the payment of money to file an Affidavit as to the amount due, and thereby require the defendant to file with his Plea an Affidavit of Merits which must specify the Nature of the Defense. The pur­pose of this is to give the plaintiff notice of the Real Defense to be presented and to limit the Issues to be tried.
It is usually provided in Reformed Sys­tems of Pleading that the plaintiff may Ver­ify his Complaint, and then the Denials of the Answer must be Specific, and must also be made Under Oath with the Penalties of Perjury for Falsehood. This requires the defendant to put in Issue only the Points on which he means to Rely. Thus, in a Suit on a Fire Insurance Policy, there may be no dispute as to the Execution of the Contract sued on; but the company may expect to avoid liability by showing in Defense some Excuse, such as Breach of Warranty by the insured. Accordingly, if the Complaint be Verified, the company cannot deny the sig­nature or due execution of the policy, of
murrcr. Bose v. Bowler, 1 nfl. 110, 120 Eng.Bcp. 60 (1789); though an Amendment by striking out the objectionable Counts may be allowcd, Jennings v. Newman, 4 Tn. 348, 100 Eng.Rcp. 1057, (1791); Fei-nald v. Garvln, 55 Me. 417 (1567); Noble’s Adm’r. v. Laley, 50 Pa. 281 (1865).



99. Humphreys v. Bethily, 2 Vent. 108, 86 Eng.Rep.

39i; Saunders v. crawley, 1 Bolle, 112, 81 Eng.

Rep. 366; Seymour v. Mitehcl, 2 Root (Conn.) 145,

(1714); Onion v. Clark, 18 Vt. 363 (1546); flriggs V.

Grand Trunk By. Co., 54 Me. 375 (1880); Carpenter

v. McClure, 40 Vt. 108 (1868); Franey v. True, 26

III. 154 (1861); Armstrong v, Webster, 30 Ill. 333

(1803); Kipp v. Bell, 86 Ill. 577 (1877); flare! v.

Harber Bros., 106 fli.App. 410 (1902).

1. See, Bolton v. Cannon, 1 Vent. 272, 86 Eng.Rep.

182; Eeynolds v. Blackburn, 7 Ado!. & F. 161,

112 Eng.Bep. 432 (1837). And see Gould v. Bay, 13

Wend. (N.Y.) 633 (1885); Blome v, Wah-J-Ienius In~

stitute of Fermentology, 150 IlI.App. 164, 168 (1909).



Ch. 6

which the proof might be difficult for the plaintiff to obtain and produce.3

76. Pleadings should observe the known and ancient expressions as contained in approved

precedents. When there has been a long.estab.

lished Form of Pleading, containing Allega­tions of Frequent and Ordinary Occurrence applicable to the Facts of a Particular Case, it should in general be adopted for the sake of Uniformity and Certainty.
THIS Rule is not to be taken as an imper­ative one, except in certain cases where pre­cise technical expressions or terms are re­quired to be used. At the same time it is safer to follow approved precedents, other­wise there is danger of omitting an Aver­ment which might, on account of precedent, be considered essential to the particular Pleading.
The General Issues are examples of forms

of expression, fixed by ancient usage, from which it is improper to depart. And another illustration of this Rule occurs in the follow­ing English case: To an Action on the Case, the defendants Pleaded the Statute of Limi­tations, namely, “that they were Not Guilty within six years,” etc. The Court decided, upon Special Demurrer, that this Form of Pleading was bad, upon the ground that “from the passing of the Statute to the pres­ent case the invariable Form of Pleading the Statute to an Action on the Case for a wrong has been to allege that the Cause of Action

3. Bliss, Code Pleadings §~ 135, 422. See Higgins Carpet Co. v. Latimer, 165 Pa. 617, 30 At!. 1050 (1895); English order 21, rule 9. By the rules 33 of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Allegations and Denials, made without reasonable cause and found untrue, subjected the Party Pleading them to the payment of such reasonable expenses caused to the Other Party by such Untrue Pleading.

did not accrue within six years,” etc.; and that “it was important to the Administra~ tion of Justice that the usual and establish­ed Forms of Pleading should be observed.”

The Rule stated is of rather uncertain ap­plication, for it must be often doubtful whether a given form of expression has been so fixed by the course of precedent as to ad­mit of no variation. In a New York case the Lower Court held a Declaration in Case for Deceit in the sale of property bad, even after Verdict, because it failed to allege the scien­ter on the part of the defendant in making the sale, which was in accordance with prec­edent, and was deemed essential. “To dis­pense with the Rule,” said Kent, C. J., “would be a dangerous relaxation, and might lead to the loss of Certainty and Precision in Plead­ing. General Rules will sometimes appear harsh and rigorous in their application to particular cases; but I entertain a decided opinion that the established principles of pleading, which compose what is called its science, are rational, concise, luminous, and admirably adapted to the investigation of truth, and ought, consequently, to be very cautiously touched by the hand of innova­tion.” ~ On Writ of Error, this decision was reversed on the ground that the Defect was Aided or Cured by Verdict.°
4. Oyster v. Battye, 3 Barn. & Ald. 443, 106 Eng.Rep.

725 (1820). And see slade v. Dowiand, 2 Bbs. & P.

570, 126 Eng.Rep. 1444 (1801); DaIly v. King, I H.

B]. 1, 126 Eng.Rep. 11; Dowland V. Slade, 5 East

272, 102 Eng.Rep. 1074 (1804). See 11 Ill.L.Rev. 56

(1016). Note: ‘pleading—Statute of Limitations— Permanent or Temporary Injury—Plea of Non-Ac­crevit.”

5. Bayard v. Malcolm, 1 Iohns. (N.Y.) 453, 471 (180W.
C. Bayard v. Malcolm, 2 Johns. (N.Y.) 550, 3 Am.Dec. 450 (1807). And see, to the same effect, Beebe V. Knapp, 28 Mich. 53 (1873).






Scope of the Action.

Forms of the Declaration,

79. Declaration in Trespass—Essential Allegations:

(1) In General.

80. Declaration in Trespass—Essential Allegations:

(2) The Plaintiff’s Right, Title, Interest or Possession.

81. Declaration in Trespass—Essential Allegations:

(8) The Defendant’s Wrongful Act.

82. Declaration in Trespass—Essential Allegations:

(4) The Damages.

83. Status Under Modern Codes, Practice Acts and Rules of Court.

NOW that we have considered in general what facts must be stated in a Declaration in order to make out a good cause of action, we come to the problem of stating a cause of Action in terms of the Ordinary, Specific

1. In general, on the history and development of the Action of Trespass at Common Law, under Modern Codes, Practice Acts and Bules of Court, see;
Treatises: Waterman, Trespass, the Wrong and the Remedy (2 vols. New York 1875); Holmes, The Com­mon Law, Lecture I, Early Forms of Liability (Bos­ton, 1881); Id., Lecture III, Trespass and Negli­gence 74, 100—101; Street, The Foundations of Le­gal Liability, c. XVII, 223, Action of Trespass {Northport 1906); Id., C. XX, 278, The Remedy of Distress; Jenks, Short History of English Law, c. IV, 39, 52, Improved Legal Procedure (Boston 1913); Itt, c X, 238, Contract and Tort; Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Lecture IV, 56, Trespass De flonis Asportatis (Cambridge 1913); Id., Lecture XIX, 219, Injuries to Realty piueltnett, Statutes and Their Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century, Pt. II, c. XI, 1, 128, The Relation of

Common Law Actions, eleven in number.

First we shall discuss the Allegations essen­tial to establish liability in the Tort Actions,

Trespass, Trespass on the Case, Trover,

Ejeetment, Detinue and Replevin, after
Trespass to Rep]evin (Cambridge 1922); 2 Holds-worth, History of English Law, c. IV, 358—305 (4th ed. Boston 1931); 3 Id. c. II, 316—320; Maitland, Equity and the Forms of Action, Lecture VI. 65, Trespass (Cambridge 1948); Morgan, The Study of Law, c. V. 102, Trespass (Chicago 1948); Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law, c. III, 44 Trespass (London, 1949); Id., e. VIII, 165, Negli­gence; Id. c. IX, 184, Trespass and Case.
Articles: Stance, The Venue of the Action of Trespass to Land, 27 W.Va.L.Q. 301 (1921); Woodbine, The Origin of the Action of Trespass, 33 Yale L.J. 798 (1924): 34 Id., 343 (1925); Winfleld and Goodheart, Trespass and Negligence, 40 L,Q.Rev. 359 (1932); williams, A Strange Offspring of Trespass Ab Ini­tb, 52 L.Q.Rev. 106 (1936).
Comment: Injunetlons—Contiuuing Trebpass—Trial by Jury. 23 CoI.L.Rev. 590 (1923).






Ch. 7

which we shall consider the allegations nec­essary to show liability in the Contract Ac­tions, Debt, Covenant, Account, Special As­sumpsit and General (Indebitatus) Assump­sit.

The typical elements or grounds constitut­ing a cause of action differ With the differ­ent Forms of Action, whether in Tort, Con­tract or Property. And in Common Law Pleading the Declaration must state a cause of action in the particular form or theory of action selected. And, in order to do this, the plaintiff must state facts in his declaration that will (1) meet the test of a General De­murrer; and (2) which he can Prove at the Trial; for it will do the pleader no good to get by the Shoal of Demurrer if he is going to wreck on the Rock of Variance.
In Tort Actions

IN Tort Actions the plaintiff is, in general, to allege and prove merely the nature of the harm and defendant’s share in causing it. Matters of Justification and Excuse, as self-defense, leave and license, contributory neg­ligence, consent or privilege, are put on the defendant to plead and prove, since it is un­fair to assume that any of them are present or to require the plaintiff to disprove the existence of each. But in Malicious Prose­cution the plaintiff must negative defend­ant’s good faith and reasonableness by show­ing malice and lack of probable cause as part of his prima facie case, though in the nature of excuse for the defendant, who is relieved on grounds of public policy, to protect prose­cutors from the burden of attack, which might hamper public justice. In Slander and Libel, on the other hand, the plaintiff is re­lieved from the burden of showing the falsi­ty of the defamatory words, and the defend­ant must prove the truth of his slanderous utterance in defense—a rule well calculated to give a man pause in making slanderous statements about his neighbors.

As the first of the Tort Actions, let us now consider the Action of Trespass, keeping in mind that one of our principal considerations is always, what facts must be alleged in or­der to state a good cause of action?


77. The Action of Trespass lies for the re­covery of Damages for an injury to the person~ property, or relative rights of another:

(I) Where the injury was committed with force, actual or implied;
(IL) Where the injury was immediate, and not merely consequential;
(III) In case of injury to property, where

the property was in the actual or

constructive possession of the plain— tiff at the time of the injury.
THE term “Trespass”, in its broadest sense, includes any offense or voluntary transgression against the law of nature, of society, or of the country in which we live, whether such act relates to a person or to his property. In a more restricted sense, it. signifies an injury committed with violence, either actual or implied; and the law will imply violence though none is actually used, when the injury is of a direct and immediate character, and committed on the person or-on the corporeal and tangible property, real or personal, of the plaintiff. Of actual vio­lence, an assault and battery is an example; of implied violence, a peaceable but wrong-­ful entry upon another’s land.2
Where, however, the injury was indirect and consequential, the remedy was Trespass on the Case, and here it should be observed that the two delictual remedies of Trespass and Trespass on the Case have divided be­tween them the entire field of tort; they sup­plement each other in this respect. In con­sequence, if Damage occurs as a result of a wrongful act or omission other than a breach
2. 3 Blaekstone, Commentaries on the Laws of Eng­land, c. XII, Of Trespass, 208—209 (7th e& Oxford 1775).

Sec. 77



of contract, Trespass or Case become the accepted remedy,-if the act was of such char­acter as to constitute a wrong for which a civil action was available. There were other tort remedies such as Detinue, Replevin and Trover, but, broadly speaking, an act was not regarded as a tart except where it was remediable in Trespass or some Form of Trespass on the Case.3
The early history on the Writ of Trespass is of great significance to the legal scholar as the fountain source of our law of torts. It was long the only Common Law remedy based on the conception of giving compensa­tion for Damage resulting from wrongful acts. And prior to its emergence the law of torts was in a primative and confused state. As yet there was no distinction between pub­lic and private wrongs, and the rules applica­ble to crime were yet to be formulated into a separate body of law. And this explains why, in its origin, Trespass was dual in char­acter, being Part Criminal and Part Civil. Enforcement of such law of torts as existed was left to the Local Courts, of which the Written Records are few. When, however, the Writ found its way into the Royal Courts, the Common Law theory of tort liability gradually began to take definite form.4
According to Pollock and Maitland, the Action of Trespass was descended from the old Writ of breve de traits gressione; ~ and although in its settled form it was quite un­common in 1250, it had become common by 1272.6 By the reign of Edward I (1272— 3~ 3 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability; c. XVII,

The Action of Trespass, 223 (Northport 1906).

4. Id. at 225.
5- 2 Polkek and Maitlarni, History of English Law, c. VIII, Crime and Tort, 3, The Trespassers, 523— 529 (Cambridge 1805).

6. ‘The recorded Instances of Trespass in the Royal Courts prior to 1252 are very few. In the ‘Abbre­viatlo Placitorum’ some twenty.flve eases of appeals of different kinds are mentioned, belonging to the perIod 1104—1252, but not a single case of Trespass. In the year 37 Henry III (1252—1253) no fewer than

1307) the Writ of Trespass had found its Way into the Register of Writs.7 But the authorities have not been in agreement as to the origin of the action. Ames, Holmes and Maitland tell us that Trespass originat­ed from the Appeal of Felony, which lay far such crimes as homicide, mayhem, rape, wounthn~ and battery, or for property inju­ries, such as arson and larceny, or for rob­bery.8

Naturally, the earliest wrongs to call for remedy were those committed with force and violence, such as Trespass to real estate, accompanied by Damage to the defendant’s goods and chattels,° assault and battery, false imprisomnent, or abduction of the plaintiff’s wife. By authority of the Writ of Trespass a plaintiff was able to secure redress for Damage done to his person, his possession of goods or land, or his domestic relations, by direct physical interference.
A trespass may be committed either upon the person of another, as in the case of as­sault, assauit and battery, or false arrest or imprisonment; or upon his real or personal property, as where a person enters upon an­other’s land, or takes or merely injures his
twenty-live cases of Trespass are recorded, and from this time on the action is frequent, while ap­peals are rarely brought.” Amos, Lectures on Le­gal History, Lecture IV, Trespass Dc Bonis Asporta­Us, 56 (Cambridge 1913).

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