CHAPTER XI Additional Punitive Regulations

CHAPTER XI
Additional Punitive Regulations

1. Tajjaniya kamma : Act of Censure

2. Nissaya kamma : Act of Subordination

3. Pabbājaniya kamma : Act of Banishment

4. Paṭisāraṇiya Kamma : Act of Reconciliation

5. Ukkhepaniya Kamma : Act of Suspension

A. 1. When a Bhikkhu is a maker of strife, quarrelsome, a maker of disputes, given to idle talk, and raises legal questions in the Saïgha.

2. When he is ignorant, unaccomplished, full of offences and heedless of injunctions.

3. If he lives in company with householders, in unbecoming association with householders.

2. If in regard to good habits, he comes to have fallen away from good habits.

3. If in regard to right views, he comes to have fallen away from right views.
C. 1. If he speaks dispraise of the Buddha.

2. If he speaks dispraise of the Dhamma.

3. If he speaks dispraise of the Saïgha.
If a Bhikkhu is marked by the qualities of any one of the above groups, the Sṅgha may subject him to any one of the five kammas mentioned earlier, barring the Paṭisāraṇiya. The Pabbājaniya-kamma has besides these a few additions of its own which may be summed up as frivolity and misdemeanour through word and deed.¹

The Paṭisāraṇiya-kamma or the Act of Reconciliation is in a class by itself, in that it concerns itself solely with the relations of the monk with the laymen so far as he tends to damage the interests of the laymen and abuses the Buddha, Dhamma and the Saṅgha in their presence. This punishment may be carried out on any monk who is guilty of any one of the offences mentioned in the two following groups:²

D. 1. If he tries for non-receiving of gains by householders.

2. If he tries for non-proflting by householders.

3. If he tries for non-residence for householders.

4. If he reviles and abuses householders.

5. If he causes householder to break with householder.
E. 1. If he speaks dispraise of the Buddha to householders.

2. If he speaks dispraise of the Dhamma to householders.

3. If he speaks dispraise of the Saïgha to householders.

4. If he jeers at a householder with a low thing, if he scoffs at him with a low thing.

5. If he does not fulfil a promise made in accordance with the rules to the laymen.
Some of these vicious aspects of character for which these punishments are laid down are, however, not unknown to the Pātimokkha where they are recorded with a different emphasis in relation to its own regulations. These, when viewed in their entirety, are weaknesses which would possibly arise among the members of the Saṅgha and are harmful to their religious perfection as well as the solidarity and well-being of their communal life against which not only the Vinaya but also some of the Suttas are eloquent.

Of these, the first and the most outstanding is the group of faults consisting of making strife, quarrels and disputes, and raising legal questions in the Saṅgha. These are listed among the conditions which justify prosecution under four out of the five kamma. Monks who are makers of strife seem to have been a positive danger both to the religion and to the monastic organization not only among the Buddhists but in other religious groups as well. It is recorded in the Sāmagāma Sutta that soon after the death of Nigaṇṭhanātaputta, his disciples were divided and they quarrelled and disputed and reviled each other on what they called differences of opinion with regard to the teachings of their master (Tena kho pana samayena nigaṇṭho nātaputto pāvāyaṃ adhunā kālakato hoti. Tassa kālakiriyāya bhinnā nigaṇṭhā dvedhikajātā bhaṇḍanajātā kalahajātā vivādāpannā aññamaññaṃ mukhasattīhi vitudantā viharanti na tvaṃ imaṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānāsi ahaṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānāmi......niggahīto'si cara vādappamokkhāya nibbeṭhehi vā sace pahosī'ti. M.II.243). Thus they completely lost favour with their lay-followers. (Ye pi nigaṇṭhassa nātaputtassa sāvakā gihī odātavasanā te'pi nigaṇṭhesu nātaputtiyesu nibbinnarupā virattarūpā paṭivāṇarupā yathā taṃ durakkhāte dhammavinaye... bhinnathūpe appaṭisaraṇe. Ibid.244).

The arrogance and intolerance with which the fellow-religionists despised the views of one another seems to have been the cause of most of these contentions. The Bahuvedaniya Sutta gives a very realistic analysis of the cause of such disputes.¹ There the Buddha says that as far as his teaching is concerned, one should respect and endorse another's views if they conform to the proper canons. In the absence of such mutual respect and tolerance, the inevitable result would be strife and disunity, and people would go about attacking one another with pungent words. The Upakkilesa Sutta records one such instance where disturbances took place in alarming proportions during the life-time of the Buddha himself (Ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā kosambiyaṃ viharati ghositārāme. Tena kho pana samayena kosambiyaṃ bhikkhū bhaṇḍanajātā kalahajātā vivādāpannā aññamaññaṃ mukhasattīhi vitudantā viharanti. M.III.152). The Buddha, being unable to settle the dispute, leaves Kosambi in despair and comes to Pācīnavaṃsadāya where the three disciples Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila are living in perfect concord (Taggha mayaṃ bhante samaggā sammodamānā avivadamānā khīrodakībhūtā aññamaññaṃ piyacakkhūhi sampassantā viharāmā'ti. Ibid.156). They tell the Buddha that the secret of their success is mutual respect and consideration, and their determination to eliminate the spirit of self assertion. `We value the company of our fellow-celibates ', each one of them says, and we bear nothing but love towards them in thought, word and deed at all times. We willingly fall in line with their likes and dislikes, and thus though we are many in body are only one in mind (So kho ahaṃ bhante sakaṃ cittaṃ nikkhipitvā imesaṃ yeva āyasmantānaṃ cittassa vasena vattāmi. Nānā hi kho no bhante kāyā ekañ ca pana maññe cittan'ti. Ibid.) We also find this story recorded in the Vinaya Piṭaka.¹

Speaking of the danger of disputes among the members of the Saṅgha, the Buddha says in the Sāmagāma Sutta that he considers the disputes over disciplinary matters (ajjhājīve vā adhipātimokkhe vā) to be trifling when compared with possible disputes about the teaching or the religious life (magge vā paṭipadāya vā) which would lead to the detriment and degeneration of great many beings.² There is little doubt that the Buddha considered complete discipline in thought, word and deed as essential for all progress. But the above comments clearly show the relatively secondary importance which the Buddha attached to discipline in its mere outward form in contrast to the more fundamental teachings of the doctrine and their practice in the religious life. The Sutta makes a plea, and no legislation, for the elimination of the causes of these disputes which it analyses as consisting of the following:³

1. 
   Anger and ill will: kodhano hoti upanāhī
   
2. 
   Hypocrisy and malice: makkhī hoti palāsī
   
3. 
   Jealousy and envy: issukī hoto maccharī
   
4. 
   Deceit and fraud: sañho hoti māyāvī
   
5. 
   Evil intentions and false beliefs: pāpiccho hoti micchādiṭṭhī
   
6. 
   Obstinacy and dogmatism: sandiṭṭhaparāmasī hoti ādhānagāhī duppaṭinissaggī
   

The perpetuation of such vicious traits by those leading the monastic life, it is said, leads to their lack of respect and regard for the Buddha, Dhamma and the Saṅgha and also to the neglect of their own religious life. It is in such a state of affairs that disputes and quarrels would arise among the members of the Saṅgha (Yo so ānanda bhikkhu kodhano hoti upanāhī ... so satthari'pi agāravo viharati appatisso dhamme'pi ... saṅghe'pi ... sikkhāya'pi na paripūrakārī hoti ... so saṅghe vivādaṃ janeti. M.II.245f.). Thus we see that the Suttas approach the problem from a different angle. Leaving it to the Vinaya to legislate against such indiscipline the Suttas analyse the causes of these and attempt to remedy them by advocating personal inner development.

There are some items in the Pātimokkha which seem to be related in some ways to those monastic failings, viz. disputes etc., referred to above.¹ Their inclusion in the Pātimokkha reveals the fact that they were not only prevalent in the early days of the Sāsana when the Pātimokkha was being evolved, but that they were also considered serious enough in their day to be legislated against. Thus a number of minor regulations which are calculated to arrest such indiscipline expressing itself in different ways have come to be laid down. Although the violation of most of these regulations entail no serious punishments, they certainly reveal a stricter and sterner attitude to monastic indiscipline than the Suttas, which counted more on appeals and admonitions for ethical re-orientation. In addition to these disputes which are referred to both in the Vinaya and in the Suttas as bhaṇḍana, kalaha, and vivāda, we find litigiousness (saṅghe adhikaraṇakāraka) too, added to this group at times.² The need for this addition evidently arose as a safeguard against the abuse of the machinery which is set up for the maintenance of monastic discipline. The history of Saṅghādisesa 8 clearly shows how jealous and embittered persons within the monastic community may, in a spirit of revenge, misuse the law.¹

A close scrutiny of the details of these kamma show that they give to these Acts the widest scope and unrestricted authority for prosecution and punishment in the interests of the religion and the monastic organization. Development of character and cultivation of the religious life, fitting into the harmonious life of the community, maintaining proper relations with the laymen, all these come within the jurisdiction of these Kamma. They also watch over the loyalty to the religion and the Order to which the members belong. The Paṭisāraṇiyakamma makes special provision to safeguard the interests of the laymen in the hands of the monks. The monks are forbidden to do anything which damages the interests of the laymen or to bring about a cleavage between the religion and its lay patrons.

These seven modes of Adhikaraṇasamatha are referred to both in the Suttas and in the Vinaya. (Satta kho pan' ime ānanda akhikaraṇasamathā uppannuppannānaṃ adhikaraṇānaṃ samathāya vūpasamāya. Sammukhāvinayo dātabbo sativinayo dātabbo amūḷhavinayo dātabbo paṭiññāya kāretabbaṃ yebhuyyasikā tassa pāpiyyasikā tiṇavatthārako. M.II.247. See also D.III.254; A.IV.1.44; Vin.II.73-104; IV.207). We shall first examine them as they are presented to us in the Vinaya Piṭaka.¹ The first of these, the Sammukhāvinaya, recognises the principle that no penalties or punishments should be imposed on an offender in his absence (Na bhikkhave asammukhībhūtānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ kammaṃ kātabbaṃ tajjaniyaṃ vā nissayaṃ vā pabbājaniyaṃ vā paṭisāraṇiyaṃ vā ukkhepaniyaṃ vā. Yo kareyya āpatti dukkaṭassa. Vin.II.73). Paṭiññātakaraṇa which appears as the fourth in the Vinaya text provides that such disciplinary action should also be taken with the acknowledgement of the guilty monk. (Na bhikkhave apaṭiññāya bhikkhūnaṃ kammaṃ kātabbaṃ tajjaniyaṃ vā... ukkhepaniyaṃ vā. Yo kareyya āpatti dukkaṭassa. Vin.II.83). Both these conditions are regarded as essential to give validity to the daṇḍakamma or acts of punishment which are outside the regulations of the Pātimokkha in their origin and character. Failure to comply with these requirements would render such an act invalid.¹ In the fourfold division of the adhikaraṇas, this latter form of samatha, namely Paṭiññātakaraṇa seems also to be made use of in the settlement of Āpattādhikaraṇa which is almost entirely based on the Pātimokkha.² Sammukhāvinaya, on the other hand, is a pre-requisite in the settlement of all the four forms of adhikaraṇa.

On the other hand, Sativinaya and Amūḷhavinaya provide against any possible miscarriage of justice in the monastic administration. The legal machinery it to be operated with humane considerations and it is not to be abused through malice, jealousy or prejudice. Sativinaya is intended for the exoneration of a guiltless monk who is falsely accused by malicious parties.¹ This absolution from guilt is to be conferred, relying on the mental alertness of the person concerned (Sativepullappattassa sativinayaṃ dadeyya. Vin.II.80). According to the Samantapāsādikā, this is then applicable only to the Arahants and to none below that level of perfection and reliability (Ayaṃ pana sativinayo khīṇāsavass'eva dātabbo na aññassa antamaso anāgāmino'pi. VinA.VI.1192). It is to be carried out by a competent body of monks at the request of the aggrieved person.² The Amūḷhavinaya seeks exemption for offences committed in a state of unsound mind. The Bhikkhu who is guilty of such an offence, on regaining his mental equilibrium, confesses to the Saṅgha the circumstances under which the offence came to be committed and states that he does not remember it thereafter. Inspite of this consideration, it is added, he may be wrongfully prosecuted for the same. The Amūḷhavinaya provides the exoneration of such a monk from the guilt of an offence committed in a state of unsound mind. But it is to be applied only in bona fide cases and the Vinaya legislates against offenders taking shelter under this, claiming falsely a lapse of memory or pretending to be of unsound mind.³ Under such circumstances the exercise of this power is declared to be illegal.⁴

The Yebhuyyasikā as described in the Khandhakas is perhaps the most complex of all the Adhikaraṇasamathas. It is worked out in a rather protracted manner and is resorted to only after the failure of other methods. When it has been found that it is not possible to settle a monastic dispute within the confines of the monastery where it occurred by the method of Sammukhāvinaya, the Khandhakas suggest that those Bhikkhus who are connected with it should take the matter to the members of another monastery who are greater in number, and by mutual agreement the monks who are the hosts would settle the dispute.² However, it is added that such a large group might possibly become unweildy and that no useful purpose would be served by deliberations in such an assembly. In such a situation the monks are empowered to refer the matter to a select committee (ubbāhikā) for a settlement (Sammato saṅghena itthannāmo ca itthannāmo ca bhikkhū ubbāhikāya imam adhikaraṇaṃ vūpasametuṃ. Vin.II.96). Ten qualifications are insisted on for consideration for membership in such a committee. These cover not only good and virtuous conduct but also a thorough knowledge of the Dhamma and the Vinaya. Every member of such a committee had also to be a good judge and authority on the exercise of disciplinary powers.¹ If it is discovered that the dispute cannot be settled in this manner, it must be referred back to the whole Saṅgha for settlement by the decision of the majority (yebhuyyasikā). In the description of the Adhikaraṇasamatha in the Khandhakas we fine that the Yebhuyyasikā assumes a more restricted connotation in contrast to its description in the Sutta version.² It is claimed to be an act whereby the Saṅgha assures itself that, at the time of a division, the righteous monks would be in the majority.³ Thus it is not a decision arrived at by merely taking a vote. The Samantapāsādikā reiterates the same idea (Yebhuyyasikāya vūpasametun'ti ettha yassa kiriyāya dhammavādino bahutarā esā yebhuyyasikā nāma. VinA.VI.1192). By the method of direct and indirect canvassing the Saṅgha must assure itself of a majority for the righteous cause.

The Samantapāsādikā seems to know a great deal more about the art of securing a majority for what it calls the just cause. It allows a fresh vote to be taken up to a third time with the hope of securing a majority, dismissing the former on grounds of incorrect procedure. But if no majority is secured as desired even at the third voting, the assembly should then adjourn with the idea of meeting again the next day. This would give time and opportunity to the righteous monks to canvass support for their cause before the next vote is taken and be able thereby to shatter the opposition (Atha yāvatatiyam'pi adhammavādino bahutarā'va honti ajja akālo sve jānissāmā'ti vuṭṭhahitvā alajjīnaṃ pakkhaṃ vibhedatthāya dhammavādipakkhaṃ pariyesitvā punadivase salākagāho kātabbo. VinA.VI.1198). Under the Sakaṇṇajappaka form of voting too, the Samantapāsādikā has a very similar comment which reflects the same spirit of defending by all possible means what is chosen to be the righteous position. Gahite vattabbo of the text quoted above¹ which is applicable in general to all monks of the assembly during the Sakaṇṇajappakasalākagāha is commented on in the Samantapāsādikā as referring to a specal situation, viz. the vote of the Saṅghatthera or the president of the assembly. It is said that if he chooses to vote on the side of the unrighteous monks, it should be pointed out to him that it is not in keeping with his age or seniority. Thereafter, if he decides to vote with the righteous monks, a voting-stick of the right kind should be provided. If he does not change his mind, on the other hand, he should be asked to keep his decision a secret.

The interest in the Adhikaraṇasamathas as measures for the settlement of disciplinary matters in the Saṅgha is further enhanced when we compare and contrast the details regarding these in the Suttas and in the Vinaya. The lists of Adhikaraṇasamathas which are given in Pali literature, both Sutta and Vinaya, are identical in all cases. However, the descriptions of the Adhikaraṇasamathas given in the Sāmagāma Sutta¹ seem to be in marked contrast to the account in the Khandhakas.² One is immediately impressed by the simplicity of these disciplinary measures as they are described in the Sutta account. The monastic irregularities which come under review and the manner of dealing with them here are far from the complexity which one associates with these in the Khandhakas. Allusions to the imposition of daṇḍakamma are conspicuous by their absence in the Sutta account. It does not seem to portray such a phase of the Saṅgha when the imposition of formal acts of punishment on its members had become a regular feature. On the other hand, what appears to us from the Sutta account is the desire of the members to remedy and rectify any errors and irregularities that might appear in the Saṅgha and the frankness and willingness with which these are confessed and atoned for in the company of the fellow members. This difference in the enforcement of discipline comes out with marked emphasis on a study of the form of the Adhikaraṇasamatha known as Paṭiññātakaraṇa. The primary interest of the Khandhakas in this form is for the proper imposition of daṇḍakammas. The Khandhakas insist that under the Paṭiññātakaraṇa no punishment or penalty (i.e. the daṇḍakamma mentioned earlier) is to be imposed without the offender admitting his fault. It is essentially a matter of procedure in monastic disciplinary action. On the other hand, the Sutta account takes it as a way in which the repetition of monastic offences may be averted. It seems to provide adequately against what is described as Āpattādhikaraṇa or offences against the injunctions of the Pātimokkha. A monk who has committed such an offence, whether urged by others or not, recognises it and confesses his guilt. He is then asked to address himself to a senior member of the Order, and owning and admitting his offence, undertake to guard himself in the future. Thus the occurrence and perpetuation of monastic offences would be eliminated.

It is also with the same purpose in mind, as in the case of the Paṭiññātakaraṇa, that the Khandhakas take up the Sammukhāvinaya. Here too, it is the proper execution of the daṇḍakamma that seems to engage the attention of the Khandhakas. But the Sutta account, once again, has no reference whatwoever here to the daṇḍamma. It looks upon the Sammukhāvinaya as a disciplinary measure related directly to Vivādādhikaraṇa or disturbances in the monastic community arising out of disputes concerning the doctrine or monastic discipline. Under the Sammukhāvinaya, the Sutta recommends that in such a situation all monks should meet together and settle such disputes correctly in a way that would accord with the Dhamma, perhaps here in the broader sense which includes the Vinaya as well. The Sutta suggests that monks should, at such a meeting, apply the criteria of the Dhamma (dhammanetti) and straighten out the differences in conformity to it (Tehi ānanda bhikkhūhi sabbeh'eva samaggehi sannipatitabbaṃ sannipatitvā dhammanetti samanumajjitabbā dhammanettiṃ samanumajjitvā yathā tattha sameti tathā taṃ adhikaraṇaṃ vūpasametabbaṃ. Evaṃ kho ānanda sammukhāvinayo hoti. M.II.247.). The commentary on the above passage also takes this allusion to mean a careful and sensible scrutiny to the situation with the criteria of the dhamma (Dhammanetti samanumajjitabbā'ti dhammarajju anumajjitabbā ñāṇena ghaṃsitabbā upaparikkhitabbā.. MA.IV.48).

The Suta account recommends that this same method be adopted for the Yebhuyyasikā too. If the monks in a particular monastic residence are unable to settle a monastic dispute among themselves, then they are asked to seek the assistance of monks in another monastery where they are greater in number. However, the method of deciding such issues by voting as in the Khandhakas is not envisaged here. The limitations of such a routine method were perhaps too obvious. It is not the mere mechanism of procedure that is vital here. The monastic ideals are to be safeguarded at all costs. Once the method of voting is adopted, and this is the stage the Yebhuyyasikā has reached in the Khandhakas, one could not hazard any miscarriage of justice by relying solely on the externals of procedure. This naturally necessitated the practice of canvassing for the righteous cause, for the spirit of democracy in the Saṅgha, in ay case, had to be channelled for the achievement of its worthy ideals.

In the Sutta account both Amūḷhavinaya and Tassapāpiyyasikā bring before us miscreants who try to defend themselves by denying the charges brought against them. The Tassapāpiyyasikā in particular is calculated to tighten the ring round such evasive characters (Taṃ enaṃ nibbeṭhentaṃ ativeṭheti. M.II.248). Persuation and pressure are continuously applied until the offender stands condemned on his own admission. Here it gives no indication of a daṇḍakamma whatsoever. Under the Amūḷhavinaya a guilty monk may, under cross examination, adduce a stage of mental derangement as a mitigating factor. He may thereby be completely absolved. The Tiṇavatthāraka and the Sativinaya remain more or less the same in both the Sutta and the Vinaya accounts.

The Adhikaraṇasamathas, as part of the machinery for the maintenance of monastic discipline, concern themselves with all the four forms of adhikaraṇa including Āpattādhikaraṇa. Thus they embrace a wider field of activity than the Pātimokkha. Hence it is little wonder that the Pātimokkha, both as text and as ritual, appended to itself in course of time the Adhikaraṇasamathas, although as we have pointed earlier one cannot reckon these items of Adhikaraṇasamathas as sikkhāpada. Explaining the recital of the Adhikaraṇasamathas at the ritual of the Pātimokkha (Ime kho pana āyasmanto satta adhikaraṇasamathadhammā uddesaṃ āgacchanti. Vin.IV.207), Buddhaghosa says that they have to be recited in order to ascertain the purity of the Saṅgha both with regard to the transgressions listed under Āpattādhikaraṇa as well as those transgressions which bring about the other three adhikaraṇas (Uddesaṃ āgacchantī ti āpattādikaraṇasaṅkhātāsu avasesādhikaraṇa-ttayapaccayāsu ca āpattisu parisuddhabhāvapucchanatthaṃ uddisitabbaṃ āgacchanti. Kkvt.153). As a result of this very close associaton of the Adhikaraṇasamathas with the ritual of the Pātimokkha they evidently came to be identified, perhaps in some circles, as a part of the text of the Pātimokkha. Buddhaghosa's analysis of the contents of the two Vibhaṅgas in the Samantapāsādikā makes no discrimination against them.¹ However, in the Sumangalavilasini Buddhaghosa does not add the seven Adhikaraṇasamathas in totalling up the sikkhāpada of the Vibhaṅgas.²

Whatever might have been the original intention of reading out the list of Adhikaraṇasamathas at the Pātimokkha ritual the point of interest here is the manner in which this new addition is integrated to form a whole with the body of sikkhāpada which formed the contents of the early recital. At the ritual of the Pātimokkha, after the recital of the Adhikaraṇasamathas too, the question regarding the purity of the members of the assembly which had been asked with regard to each category of offences in the Pātimokkha is addressed to the Saṅgha once again: Uddiṭṭhā kho āyasmanto satta adhikaraṇasamathā dhammā. Tattha āyasmante pucchāmi kacci'ttha parisuddhā. Vin.IV.207.

These Adhikaraṇasamathas are clearly not offences but are only ways by means of which the collective organization of the Saṅgha may arrive at a settlement of monastic disputes and disturbances including the commission of offences (āpattādhikaraṇa). Hence we would normally expect the purpose of the above question to be to ascertain whether there has been any irregularity of procedure in the settlement of monastic disputes among the members of the Saṅgha. If that were so we would regard this extension of the process of questioning as an attempt to safeguard the machinery set up for the maintenance of monastic discipline. In this case it would be the Saṅgha as a whole and not individual monks who would be held responsible. On the other hand, it could also be a mere mechanical extension of the method of questioning which was applied to the earlier groups of sikkhāpada. The Mahāsaṅghikas show a further extension of this process of questioning. They go beyond the Adhikaraṇasamathas to apply the question of purity in terms of a new group of their own which they call dharma and anudharma.¹

However, in the absence of any conclusive evidence regarding the inclusion of Adhikaraṇasamathas in the recital of the Pātimokkha we have to fall back on the tradition of the commentators who preserve for us at least their view of contemporary trends. Buddhaghosa attempts to explain this final questioning at the end of the Pātimokkha recital as being calculated to cover all offences coming under the four adhikaraṇa (Tatthāyasmante pucchāmi kacci'ttha parisuddhā'ti tesu sattasu adhikaraṇasamathesu kacci'ttha parisuddhā. Natthi vo kiñci samathehi vupasametabban'ti pucchāmi etena sabbāpattīhi parisuddhabhāvo pucchito hoti. Kkvt.155f.). At the end of the process of detailed and specific questioning regarding the Āpattādhikaraṇa which takes place through the recital of each category of sikkhāpada in the Pātimokkha, Buddhaghosa regards this scrutiny under the Adhikaraṇasamatha as being the grand finale of the ritual of the Pātimokkha.