CHAPTER VIII The Codified Law of the Saṅgha
Pācittiyas 56 and 61 have a similar appearance.2
Oldenberg also raises the question of a contradiction in the relationship of the traditions of the Pātimokkha to those of the Vibhaṅga.3 Here too, we are compelled to say that this contradiction vanishes when we view the problem from a different angle. Oldenberg has already taken up the position that the Pātimokkha and the Vibhaṅga are from the very beginning two distinct units which stand apart. We have shown why we refuse to accept this position. The contents of what is spoken of here as the Pātimokkha are the rules governing the conduct of the members of the monastic community which had acquired, very early, an unalterably fixed character. Flexibility in the application of this legal system was the theme of the living tradition which grew on and around it and was considered so essential from the earliest times (Ubhayāni kho pana'ssa pātimokkhāni vitthārena svāgatāni honti suvibhattāni suppavattīni suvinicchitāni suttato anuvyañjanaso. Vin.I.65).
The changing pattern of monastic organization would have necessitated a corresponding change in the monastic administration. There is clear evidence of such changes, particularly in the acts of Pabbajjā and Upasampadā.1 The responsibility that was once the right of individual Bhikkhus had to be latterly vested in the collective organization of the Saṅgha. With every such change it was not possible to alter the structure of the rules of the Pātimokkha. On the other hand, the living traditions which accompanied it closely from the very beginning and constituted the contents of the Vibhaṅgas stood up to serve as a complement to the Pātimokkha. These are the changes which the Suttavibhaṅga shows in relation to the Pātimokkha and we have no doubt that they would have been smoothly effected through a sensible acceptance of the traditions of the Suttavibhaṅga.
The sikkhāpada which constitute the Pātimokkha have a new emphasis and are very different in character from advice and counsel given in the Dhamma under the category of sīla. They are at times restatements of items of sīla, increasing in number and diversity according to the needs of the monastic organization of the Saṅgha.2 Besides these, a number of regulations governing residence, food and clothing of the members of the Saṅgha as well as series of rules covering monastic propriety and procedure, and communal harmony of the society of the Saṅgha are also found in the Pātimokkha. However, as a code for the guidance of monks in their pursuit of religious development, these sikkhāpada are far more exacting and obligatory than the sīla.
The sīla concept, for example, of abstaining from destruction of life includes within it non-injury and the love and protection of life of every sort, both human and animal (Pāṇātipātaṃ pahāya pāṇātipātā paṭivirato hoti nihitadaṇḍo nihitasattho lajjī dayāpanno sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampī viharati. D.I.63). But in the sikkhāpada of the Pātimokkha where both prosecution and punishment are contemplated, the gravity of the offence of killing is fixed at different levels, drawing a distinction between human and animal life. The destruction of human life is classed among the Pārājika offences, the four greatest crimes under the monastic discipline which involve expulsion and complete loss of monastic status. Pārājika No.3, which covers this subject of homicide, also regards other conditions such as aiding and abetting which would contribute to the commission of the crime of suicide, as being equally reprehensible.1
There is a further rule pertaining to destruction of life, other than human, included under the lesser offence of Pācittiya. (Pāc.61: Yo pana bhikkhu sañcicca pāṇaṃ jīvitā voropeyya pācittiyaṃ - Vin.IV.124.) Both the Old Commentary in the Suttavibhaṅga which defines pāṇa in this context as tiracchānagatapāṇa and the history of the sikkhāpada narrated there just before the text of the rule establish the fact that this rule concerns itself with the destruction only of animal life.1 Thus we notice that considerations which under the category of sīla had moral values are now, as sikkhāpada, forced into a legal frame-work, involving at times a sacrifice of the spirit in which they were originally introduced. Another clear instance of this is Pārājika No.2 which deals with stealing. Under the category of sīla theft meant the appropriation of whatever was not given and the scheming to obtaining the same (Adinnādānaṃ pahāya adinnādānā paṭivirato hoti dinnādāyī dinnapāṭikaṅkhī athenena sucibhūtena attanā viharati. D.I.63). But as a Pārājika rule, the regulation against stealing seeks further, backing from the law of the land, coupling together as it were both moral and legal considerations. The Buddha is in fact seen consulting a former Minister of Justice, who was now ordained as a monk, on this matter (Yo pana bhikkhu gāmā vā araññā vā adinnaṃ theyyasaṅkhātaṃ ādiyeyya yathārūpe adinnādāne rājāno coram gahetvā haneyyuṃ vā bandheyyuṃ vā pabbājeyyuṃ vā coro'si bālo'si mūḷho'si theno'sī'ti tathārūpaṃ bhikkhu adinnaṃ ādiyamāno ayam'pi pārājiko hoti asaṃvāso. Vin.III.45).
There is no doubt that it was soon felt that the four items of discipline brought under the category of Pārājikā and stated in legal phraseology were necessarily circumscribed in relation to the moral well being of the true pabbajita. Thus while the greatest respect was shown to the codified monastic law an attempt was made to infuse into these four major items of discipline the spirit of sīla which comes in the earlier Sutta tradition. We find expression given to this in the declaration of Cattāri Akaraṇiyāni which are mentioned in the Mahāvagga.2 These are given there as four major items of discipline which no monk who has gained higher ordination shall transgress. He shall guard himself in terms of these all his life. Thus it is required by law that these should be made known to a Bhikkhu soon after the conferment of upasampadā or higher ordination on him.
The wider field of control of the Akaraṇīyāni in marked contrast to the Pārājikas is particularly evident in the items 2 and 3 which deal with theft and destruction of life respectively. It is these two, as we have shown above, which underwent serious contraction in the process of legalization. Under the category of Akaraṇīyāni the spirit which they lost appears to be restored. Note the wider applicability of the Akaraṇīyāni 2 and 3 which are given below.
Upasampannena bhikkhunā adinnaṃ theyyasankhātaṃ na ādātabbaṃ antamaso tiṇasalākaṃ upādāya.1 i.e.
No Bhikkhu who is an upasampanna shall take in theft what is not given to him, even as much as a blade of grass.
Upasampannena bhikkhunā sañcicca pāṇo jīvitā na voropetabbo antamaso kunthakipillikaṃ upādāya.2 i.e.
No Bhikkhu who is an upasampanna shall destroy the life even of an ant.
Sukumar Dutt makes a suggestion which gives the impression that the Cattāri Akaraṇīyāni were the precursors of the four Pārājikas.3 But a closer examination of the Vinaya texts would reval the fact that this assumption lacks historical support. In the text of the Akaraṇīyāni we find the precisely worded clauses of the Pārājikas embedded almost in their entirety. They also show an awareness of the incidents which are related in the Suttavibhaṅga connected with the promulgation of the rules.4 Akaraṇīyāni are obviously the result of a fusion of the legal statements pertaining to the Pārājikas from the Suttavibhaṅga with the general spirit of the sīla from the Sutta Piṭaka. This establishes beyond doudt the vital position which the items of discipline included under the four Pārājika came to occupy in Buddhist monasticism.
Let us examine further the relationship of the Pārājika rules to the lists of sīlas. The first thing that strikes us is the difference in the order of these items in the two groups, i.e. sīlas and the sikkhāpada of the Pātimokkha. The sīlas commence with abstinence from destruction of life. Considerations regarding theft come second and the vow of celibacy is listed as the third item. Under the Pārājikas, on the other hand, celibacy takes the first place. Destruction of life, which is now restricted to destruction of human life alone, stands as the third item. These two items have thus changed places in the two groups. Regarding these discrepancies1 we would make the following observations:
Sīla, at least in part, remain the common property of both monks and laymen. The laymen are capable of keeping some of them. With the addition of abstinence from intoxicants2 a list of five items of sīla is constituted for the guidance of the daily life of lay persons. On special occasions, they observe three additional sīlas, thus making a total of eight. It is on those occasions alone that the laity take the vow of celibacy temporarily [ for a specific duration of twenty-four hours ]: abrahmacariyā veramaṇī. At all other times the sīla of the laity specifies this as the vow of chastity, i.e. restraint in the enjoyment of sex pleasures: kāmesu micchācārā veramaṇī. Commentaries repeatedly explain kāmesu here as methuna-samācāre. Monks alone take the vow of complete celibacy to be observed all their life. Hence we would regard this virtue of celibacy as one of the primary distinguishing features which marks out the monk from the layman. It is also clear from the history of the Pārājikas that nothing else seems to have run so contrary to the spirit of pabbajjā as the violation of this virtue of celibacy. For Sudinna, who is presented as the first miscreant who violated this virtue, is accused of having directly contradicted the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. (Tattha nāma tvam āvuso bhagavatā virāgāya dhamme desite sarāgāya cetessasi visaṃyogāya dhamme desite saṃyogāya cetessasi anupādānāya dhamme desite saupādānāya cetessasi.... Nanu āvuso bhagavatā anekapariyāyena kāmānam pahānaṃ akkhātaṃ kāmasaññānaṃ pariññā akkhātā kāmapipāsānaṃ paṭivinayo akkhāto kāṃavitakkānaṃ samugghāto akkhāto kāmapariḷāhānaṃ vūpasamo akkhāto. Vin.III.19f.). Hence we would regard the prominence given to this rule pertaining to the virtue of celibacy in the codified law of the Saṅgha as being quite legitimate. It savours of the very essence of nekkhamma or renunciation which is the basis of pabbajjā.1
But we are aware of the fact that the Pārājikas have been assessed differently by some scholars. This is what Dr. Nagai has to say regarding the first Pārājika: `With regard to the problem of inhibitions for priests, one that will remain perplexing for a long time to come is the inhibition concerning sexual relations. To me it appears that the problem of inhibitions for the Buddhist priests of the present day (except those belonging to the Shinshū Sect) depends upon the manner of interpretation of this particular inhibition. If it is interpreted as one requiring all Buddhist priests to observe celibacy, I fear that very few priests will be found living in Japan who are really worthy of the name bhikkhu.'2 There is no doubt that it is the bold venture of Shinran in the 13th century which led to this state of affairs in Japan. It is not possible to undertake a full analysis of this in the present study. However, unless it is admitted that the concepts of bhikkhu and priest in this context are incomparably different, one from the other, we are not in a position to concede this magnanimity in the interpretation of the first Pārājika rule. The early history of the religion and the nature of its fundamental teachings do not seem to allow it.
We should here refer the reader to the observations of Miss Horner on the regulations governing the lives of the Buddhist disciples. `If monks behaved in a way that was censurable in monks, this does not necessarily mean that their conduct was wrong in itself. Various activities were not only permissible for lay-people, but were fully accepted to be such as could be unquestionably pursued by them. Marriage, negotiating for parties to a marriage, trading, the owning of possessions, are cases in point.... I think it very likely that some of the courses of training for monks that are included in this volume were formulated as a result of this bringing over of lay-life into the religious life; for a difference between the two had to be made, and then maintained.'1 We feel that these remarks are obviously the result of a thorough understanding of original authoritative texts which deal with Buddhist monasticism.
In the evaluation of the Pārājikas, however, the fourth Pārājika seems to have confronted Miss Horner with some serious difficulty. For she says: "The curious fourth Pārājika, concerned with the offence of `claiming a state of quality of further-men' (uttarimanussadhamma), seems to have been fashioned in some different mould, and to belong to some contrasting realm of values."1 This attitude towards the fourth Pārājika has made her evaluate the four Pārājikas from a new angle. She remarks: `For I think it possible that the Pārājikas are arranged in an ascending scale of gravity, in which the offence held to be the worst morally, though not legally, is placed last.'2 We find it difficult to agree with this. In an attempt to regard the fourth Pārājika as supremely important it is hardly possible to consider the first Pārājika as being the least offensive morally. We would regard it to be undoubtedly the worst, for it runs contrary to the basic teachings of Buddhism, whose main theme is virāga, visaṃyoga etc.3 We have already shown above what we consider to be the significance of this sikkhāpada which gives it the pride of place among the Pārājikas.
Let us now examine the fourth Pārājika, which is said [by Miss. Hornert] to rival the first in moral value. The text of the sikkhāpada is as follows: "Whatever monk should boast, with reference to himself of a state of further-men, sufficient ariyan knowledge and insight, though not knowing it fully, and saying: This I know, this I see, then if later on, he, being pressed or not being pressed, fallen, should desire to be purified, and should say: `Your reverence, I said that I know what I do not know, see what I do not see, I spoke idly, falsely, vainly,' apart from the undue estimate of himself, he also is one who is defeated, he is not in communion."4 This sikkhāpada provides that no monk shall make false claims (anabhijānan'ti asantaṃ abhūtaṃ asaṃvijjamānaṃ ajānanto apassanto attani kusalaṃ dhammaṃ atthi me kusalo dhammo'ti. Vin.III.91) to spiritual attainments except under the pain of being expelled from the Order. The sikkhāpada refers to such attainments under the terms iti jānāmi iti passāmi.
It is clear that the state or quality of further-men (uttarimanussa-dhamma) referred to here pertains to the realm of emancipation and hence reckons exclusively with knowledge and insight. Uttarimanussadhamma also marks different stages in the process of spiritual development like the eight jhānas and the state of Saññāvedayitanirodha.1 The Suttavibhaṅga appears to take note of both these in its comment on uttarimanussadhamma. (Note: Uttarimanussadhammo nāma jhānaṃ vimokkhaṃ samādhi samāpatti ñāṇadassanaṃ maggabhāvanā phalasacchikiriyā kilesapahānaṃ vinīvaraṇatā cittassa suññāgāre abhirati - Vin.III.91). At the same time there is also reference to uttarimanussadhamma in association with less transcendental achievements like the ability to exercise miraculous powers. This is referred to as uttarimanussadhammaṃ iddhi-pāṭhāriyaṃ (Note: na bhikkhave gihīnaṃ uttarimanussadhammaṃ iddhipāṭihāriyaṃ dassetabbaṃ. Vin.II.112).
The spirit of this sikkhāpada seems to be made further clear in the Buddha's reference to the five great thieves who are identified with different types of monks which occurs in the introduction to the sikkhāpada. The fifth thief who is referred to here as the greatest of all is described in terms which coincide, more or less, with the text of the sikkhāpada. (Note: Ayaṃ aggo mahācoro yo asantaṃ abhūtaṃ uttarimanussadhammaṃ ullapati. Vin. III. 9). Thereafter, the Buddha proceeds to give a reason for the stigmatisation of such attempts. The reason is that the monks who do so subsist on what is collected by theft (Taṃ kissa hetu. Theyyāya vo bhikkhave raṭṭhapiṇḍo bhutto'ti. Vin.III.90).
This emphasis on the correctness of ājīva or the mode of earning a living is seen to be specifically so in the incident which led to the promulgation of the fourth Pārājika (Varaṃ tumhehi moghapurisā tiṇhena govikattanena kucchi parikanto natv 'eva udarassa kāraṇā gihīnam aññamaññassa uttarimanussadhammassa vaṇṇo bhāsito. Vin.III.89). Further, the text assures us that it was a false claim which they made before the laymen (Kacci pana vo bhikkhave bhūtan'ti. Abhūtaṃ bhagavā'ti. Vin.III.89).
At rhe same time we should also take note of the fact that Pācittiya 8 too, records the incidents of the fourth Pārājika almost in identical terms. The one point of difference, and that is vital here, is that the spiritual attainments of the Bhikkhus of which they give publicity to lay people are states to which they had genuinely attained. Hence there does not arise a question of dishonesty here and the offence is only the lesser one of Pācittiya.1
Apart from considerations of honesty and truthfulness of a monk in the mode of obtaining his requisites from the laymen there seems to be yet another associated idea in this sikkhāpada. To our mind it is the unscrupulous exploitation of the regard and the respect which the lay people of the time had for `these 'super-human achievements' which were generally associated with those who had renounced the household life.2 The Seṭṭhi of Rājagaha sums up this position beautifully when he says yo samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā arahā c'eva iddhimā ca, i.e. any monk or brahmin who is both an Arahant and one who is possessed of miraculous powers.1 People viewed such superhuman achievements with awe and credulity, with little scrutiny as to whether those claims were genuine or false. Hence a false claim would be deemed an act of meanness which is unworthy of a Buddhist disciple.
On the other hand, it is said that even where claims to such superhuman powers were real a true Buddhist disciple would not display them in public for the sake of worldly and personal benefits. The Vinaya Piṭaka tells us of the elder Piṇḍolabhāradvāja who was sternly rebuked by the Buddha for displaying his superhuman powers by performing miraculous feats in public for the sake of winning a sandal-wood bowl. Thereafter, the Buddha forbade such acts and decreed that one who did so was guilty of a Dukkaṭa offence (Na bhikkhave gihīnaṃ uttarimanussadhammaṃ iddhipāṭihāriyaṃ dassetabbaṃ Yo dasseyya āpatti dukkaṭassa. Vin.II.112). In the Saṃyutta Nikāya it is said that the venerable Mahaka once performed a similar miracle (uttarimanussadhammaṃ iddhipāṭihāriyaṃ) before Citta, the house-holder, but with no desire for personal gain. However, as a result of it when Citta invited him to stay in Macchikāsaṇḍa, promising to provide him with his requisites, he left the place never to return again.2 Perhaps he did so out of his conviction that if he remained to enjoy the hospitality which was offered he would be guilty of having `earned it' in the wrong way.
We would now sum up our observations on the fourth Pārājika as follows:
Claims to superhuman powers and attainments and to the title Arahant appear to have been part of the aspirations of most groups of religious men of India who had left the household life.
Judging by the great esteem in which such powers were held by the public there is no doubt that any such claim would have been received with great acclamation.
Thus, for the petty purpose of ensuring for oneself a `comfortable living' any false claim to superhuman powers and attainments would amount to a despicable form of lying. Hence the inclusion of the offence, like that of theft, in the category of Pārājika.
Where such powers and attainments were genuinely achieved, any public declaration, other than in the presence of monks and nuns, would amount to a vulgar display and is ranked in the Vinaya as an offence which is lesser in gravity than the former. It is a Pācittiya offence.
As such, we are unable to see how the fourth Pārājika could be morally more significant than the first.
It has also been generally assumed that the fourth Pārājika finds no parallel among the sīlas.1 But after the analysis we have made above of this Pārājika it becomes clear that the injunction against false claims to superhuman attainments is laid down because such claims are made with a view to gaining an easy livelihood in a manner which is unworthy of a monk. It is evidently for this same reason that Buddhaghosa introduces this Pārājika rule as one laid down for the guidance of ājīvapārisuddhi or purity of livelihood in his definition of Ājīvapārisuddhisīla (... ājīvapārisuddhisīle ājīvahetu paññattānaṃ channaṃ sikkhāpadānan'ti yāni tāni ājīvahetu ājīvakāraṇā pāpiccho icchāpakato asantam abhūtam uttarimanussadhammaṃ ullapati āpatti pārājikassa. Vism.I.22). It is also of interest to note that Buddhaghosa couples the six sikkhāpada which he introduces under Ājīvapārisuddhisīla with similar considerations on ājīvapārisuddhi which he derives from the category of sīla (...kuhanā lapanā nemittakatā nippesikatā lābhena lābhaṃ nijigiṃsanatā'ti evaṃ ādīnañ ca pāpadhammānaṃ vasena pavattā micchājīvā virati. Vism.I.16) These hint at both fraud and artful conversation as means of gaining an easy livelihood in an unworthy manner. These considerations are traceable to item 36 in the list of sīla (Yathā vā pan'eke bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā saddhādeyyāni bhojanāni bhuñjitvā te kuhakā ca honti lapakā ca nemittikā ca nippesikā ca lābhena ca lābhaṃ nijigiṃsitāro. Iti evarūpā kuhanā lapanā paṭivirato hoti. Idam pi'ssa hoti sīlasmiṃ. D.I.67. Sec.55)1 The scope of both Pārājika 4 and Pācittiya 8 seems to be within the range of this item of sīla. Thus we feel inclined to assume that the fourth Pārājika too, as much as the other three, is traceable to the broader basis of sīla which in the early history of Buddhist monasticism was the primary guide in the life of the pabbajita.
Further modifications which sīla underwent while they were expressed in the form of sikkhāpada are witnessed in Pācittiya 1 and 3 which deal with lying (musāvāda) and tale-bearing (pisuṇāvāca) respectively. Here, the original concepts which occur under sīla are narrowed down and are made more specific.
Besides these sikkhāpada which are closely related to sīla or the personal moral well-being of the disciple, there are also a host of others in the Pātimokkha which attempt to maintain the concord and communal harmony of the Buddhist Saṅgha. A number of sikkhāpada of the Saṅghādisesa group aim at achieving this end.5
These may be broadly classified as calculated to suppress:
Attempts to despise and discredit fellow members of the Order by making false and unfounded accusations of a definitely serious nature against them with a view to damaging their spiritual life. Saṅghādisesa 8 and 9 appear to safeguard against such situations.
"Whatever monk, malignant, malicious and ill-tempered should defame a monk with an unfounded charge involving defeat, thinking: `Thus perhaps may I drive him away from this Brahma-life,' then, if afterwards he, being pressed or not being pressed, the legal question turning out to be unfounded, if the monk confesses his malice, it is an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order."1
Attempts to disrupt the united organization of the Saṅgha by canvassing public opinion against the Saṅgha and by instituting disciplinary action manoeuvered to cause disunity.2
"Whatever monk should go forward with a schism of the Order which is harmonious, or should persist in taking up some legal question leading to a dissension:.... there is an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order."3
Such tendencies were clearly manifest in the activities of Devadatta. The following remarks of Devadatta betray him completely:
"It is possible, your reverence, with these five items, to make a schism in the Order of the recluse Gotama, a breaking of the concord. For, your reverence, people esteem austerity."1
Attempts to resist, under various pretexts, correction of bad and unworthy behaviour which is justly undertaken by fellow members.2
" If a monk is one who is difficult to speak to, and if himself being spoken to by the monks according to dhamma concerning the courses of training included in the exposition, he reckons himself as one not to be spoken to, saying: `Do not say anything to me, venerable ones, either good or bad, and I will not say anything to the venerable ones, either good or bad; refrain venerable ones, from speaking to me'... there an offence entailing a formal meeting of the Order."3
There is yet another collection of 16 sikkhāpada (including rules from the Nissaggiya, Pācittiya and Pāṭidesanīya groups) whose purpose is to safeguard the mutual relations of the Bhikkhus and the Bhikkhunis.4 These must admittedly bear the stamp of relative lateness in that they pertain to Bhikkhunis, the members of the latterly established Order of nuns. Irregular performance of monastic duties and excesses in personal relationships which are detrimental to the progress of the religious life and also would provoke public censure come within the purview of these regulations.
Their distribution is as follows:
In the group of Pācittiya are found a number of rules which deal with matters of procedure and propriety to be observed within the monastic organization so that its collective honour and authority may in no way be undermined.1 A monk shall not maliciously challenge the validity of an expiatory act which has been properly carried out by members of the Saṅgha and urge for its performance again. (Yo pana bhikkhu jānaṃ yathādhammaṃ nihatādhikaraṇaṃ punakammāya ukkoṭeyya pācittiyaṃ - Vin.IV.126: Pāc.63). He should also not conduct himself in such a way as to reduce or nullify the effect of an act of punishment inflicted on an offender.2 Nor should he repudiate the authority or doubt the competence of his fellow members when they advise him on matters of discipline. (Yo pana bhikkhu bhikkhūhi sahadhammikaṃ vuccamāno evaṃ vadeyya na tāvā'haṃ āvuso etasmiṃ sikkhāpade sikkhissāmi yāva na aññaṃ bhikkhuṃ vyattaṃ vinayadharaṃ paripucchāmī'ti pācittiyaṃ. Vin.IV.141: Pāc.71). He is also not to underrate the value of the disciplinary measures agreed upon by the Saṅgha as being effective and essential for the well-being of the community. (Yo pana bhikkhu pātimokkhe uddissamāne evaṃ vadeyya kiṃ pan'imehi khuddānukhuddakehi sikkhāpadehi uddiṭṭhehi yāvadeva kukkuccāya vihesāya vilekhāya saṃvattantī'ti sikkhāpadavivaṇṇake pācittiyaṃ. Vin.IV.143: Pāc.72). These sikkhāpada show that the purpose of the Pātimokkha was not only to safeguard the outward conduct and the moral life of the disciple but also to protect the machinery which was set up to achieve this end.
In the code of the Pātimokkha even the day to day life of the Buddhist monk is circumscribed within certain considerations relating to the articles of daily use such as his bowl and the robe, beds, seats, rugs etc.1 We notice that on account of certain abuses by monks they were forbidden the use of needle-cases made of bone, ivory and horn. In the evolution of monastic discipline such restrictions become general rules and through the code of the Pātimokkha govern the life of all members of the community. Likewise, the monks are forbidden the use of couches and chairs which are bolstered with cotton on account of the protests that they are like the luxuries enjoyed by laymen.2 The use and distribution of what belongs to the Saṅgha also needed to be done with sufficient caution.3 Neglect and damage of monastic property and misappropriation of what belongs to the collective organization of the Saṅgha for private ends are safeguarded against. A monk who places for his own use a couch or a chair or a mattress or a stool belonging to the Order in the open air, should either remove it or have it removed on departing, or should inform those concerned of his departure. If he does not do so, there is an offence of expiation - Pācittiya.1 It is also stated that a monk who knowingly appropriates for himself or fransfers to another individual a benefit which accrues to the Saṅgha is guilty of a breach of discipline. In the former case he is gulity of the more serious offence of Nissaggiya Pācittiya and in the latter of a Pācittiya.2 It is clear from these injunctions that the Pātimokkha also takes cognizance of a considerably settled monastic life.
Of the diverse monastic rituals witnessed in the Khandhakas the Pātimokkha has a few references to the kaṭhina ubbhāra, which is closely associated with the ceremony of the vassāvāsa or rains-retreat, and these too, are mainly in terms of the acceptance and use of robes.3 The sikkhāpada deal no more with it. On the other hand, Pācittiya 72 and 73 directly refer to the ritual of the Pātimokkha with a view to eliminate any irregularities and abuses which may occur in connection with the recital of the Pātimokkha.4 Saṅghādisesa 12 presupposes the existence of the Pātimokkha under the term uddesa. These rules which are contained in the text of the Pātimokkha clearly reveal the scope and function of the Pātimokkha and its recital as an instrument for detecting miscreants in the monastic circles and assisting them in their correction. Therefore we are compelled to observe that these sikkhāpada were latterly added to the collection of the Pātimokkha while the recital as a regular observance was acquiring a definite character.
Modelling the life of a monk in terms of the rules of the Pātimokkha marks the shift of accent from sīla to sikkhāpada as well as the change of responsibility for the maintenance of monastic discipline from the individual monk to the collective organization of the Saṅgha. Even the venerable Upasena Vaṅgantaputta who is distinguished as a forest-dwelling monk devoted to austere ways of living (āraññako piṇḍapātiko paṃsukūliko) seems to accept, as a member of the general corpus of the Saṅgha, the code of rules laid down by the Buddha, in its entirety, as the guiding factor in monastic discipline. (Na mayaṃ apaññattaṃ paññāpessāma paññattaṃ vā na samucchindissāma yathāpaññattesu sikkhāpadesu samādāya vattissāmā'ti. Vin.III.231). The Buddha heartily endorses this view. Sādhu sādhu upasena, says the Buddha in recognition of this attitude. We seem to hear the echo of this in the remarks of the venerable Mahā Kassapa at the First Council where arose the dispute about the abrogation of the minor rules.1
Thus it is clear that the sikkhāpada and the recital of the Pātimokkha are closely connected not only in their literary content but also in their aims and aspirations. Besides, in all the standard definitions of the virtuous monk, the virtue of his sīla is always coupled with the restraint he acquires through the discipline of the Pātimokkha and the sikkhāpada.2 This shows us that from early times in the history of Buddhism all possible criteria have been used for the maintenance of good discipline. In the Ākaṅkheyya Sutta the Buddha requests his disciples to go through this complete course of training which couples together sīla and the Pātimokkha. (Sampannasīlā bhikkhave viharatha saṃpanna-pātimokkhā pātimokkhasaṃvarasaṃvutā viharatha ācāragocarasaṃpannā anumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvī samādāya sikkhatha sikkhāpadesu. M.I.33). True to this tradition, the venerable Ānanda, in his admonitions to the Sakyan Mahānāma, describes in identical terms a worthy disciple who is a sīlasampanna. (Idha mahānāma ariyasāvako sīlavā hoti pātimokkhasaṃvarasaṃvuto viharati ācāragocarasaṃpanno anumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvī samādāya sikkhati sikkhāpadesu. Evaṃ kho mahānāma ariyasāvako sīlasampanno hoti. M.I.355)
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