International political economy



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POIR 670 (former IR541) Spring 2014

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Tuesday 2:00 pm - 5:00 pm Saori N. Katada
SOS B43 Office: VKC 309
Tel. 213-740-8542
Fax. 213-742-0281
Office Hours: W 10 to noon and by appointment skatada@usc.edu

Course Objectives

This is an advanced graduate course on international political economy. The course is designed to introduce students to scholarship on international political economy and to guide students’ own reading and inquiry and to develop critical faculties. We focus on the behavior of markets, states and other institutions, and their interactions. Through a combination of lectures and discussions, the course explores the central theoretical perspectives, debates, and findings in political economy. Coverage does not include every issue and approach, but it addresses many of the core problems and perspectives animating international political economy. Enrollment by students who are not PhD students in the POIR program must be approved in advance by the instructor.



Pre-requisites

  • Good understanding of international economics is strongly recommended before taking this course.

  • Interest in and knowledge of current discussions on international affairs, international business, and political economy in general.

Official Note


Students requesting academic accommodations based on disability are required to register with Disability Services and Programs (DSP) each semester. A letter of verification for approved accommodations can be obtained from DSP when adequate documentation is filed. Please be sure the letter is delivered to me (or to TA) as early in the semester as possible. DSP is open Monday-Friday, 8:30-5:00. The office is in Student Union 301 and their phone number is (213) 740-0776.

Course Structure and Assignments

Participation and preparation for each class, as well as two critical literature reviews are important in this seminar. The students will also complete a written final exam. The assignments and work requirements for the students are as follows:



(1) Class discussion leader, and class participation:

  • A few questions are provided to all the students prior to each class about the week’s reading to think and evaluate. If you miss a class, you will not receive any credit for that week for class participation.

  • Students are assigned to lead discussions. Discussion leaders will look up certain technical terms previously specified and provide the first cut into addressing important issues and questions.

  • Students who have never taken economics courses are expected to read the assigned parts of the International Economics text book (Reinert) carefully each week to work on key concepts, while those who are very familiar with these concepts can skip this book.

(2) Two critical literature reviews:

  • Students are to write two critical literature reviews (10 double-spaced pages each) analyzing the reading assigned in a particularly week of your choice. First one must be completed before February 25, and the second one before April 15. See appendix for more information.

  • Please do not review the same week of reading as the week you serve as a discussion leader.

(3) Final take-home exam:

  • A take-home exam with question and instruction will be distributed on the last day of class (April 29). Students should set aside one day to work on the exam, and turn it in by May 8 (Thursday) noon via email.

Books Ordered (available at USC Bookstore; and on reserve at Leavey Library)

Tim Buthe and Walter Mattle. 2011. The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy. Princeton University Press.

Benjamin J. Cohen. 2008. International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton University Press.

Barry Eichengreen. 2008. Globalizing Capital (2nd ed) Princeton University Press

Avner Greif. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge University Press.

** Kenneth Reinert. 2012. An Introduction to International Economics: New Perspectives on the World Economy. Cambridge University Press.



Course Grades

During the course, students are expected to do the following:



(1) Lead a class discussion and class participation 30%

(2) Two critical literature review papers 40%

(3) Final take-home exam 30%

Course Schedule:

Readings noted (BB) will be posted on Blackboard. The rest should be available online.

1. January 14 Introduction: IPE Issues

No Reading Assigned



2. January 21 Intellectual History of IPE

Benjamin J. Cohen. (2008). International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 1-65; 142-178.

Jeffry Frieden and Lisa Martin (2002) “International Political Economy: the State of the Sub-Discipline” in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Norton). 118-146. (BB)

Keohane, R. O. (2009). “The old IPE and the new.” Review of International Political Economy 16:1 February 2009: 34–46

Lake, David. (2009). “Open Economy Politics: A critical review.” The Review of International Organizations 4 (3):219-44.

Oatley, Thomas (2011). “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy.” International Organization 65 (2): 311-341.

Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons. 2010. Introduction: The Case for Constructivist Political Economy. In Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons, eds. Constructing the International Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). (BB)

Waylen, G. 2006. “You Still Don’t Understand: Why Troubled Engagements Continue between Feminists and (Critical) IPE.” Review of International Studies, 32(1), 145-164.



3. January 28 Emergence of Capitalism I: States, Class and Ideology

Avner Greif. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 8 (217-268)

Tilly, C. (1990), “How War Made States, and Vice Versa,” in Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990: 67-95. (BB)

Spruyt, H. (1994), “Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order,” International Organization. 48: 527-558.

Marx, K. Capital vol. I, part. 8 “The So-called Primitive Accumulation”, chaps. 26-32 (pp. 713-764). (BB)

Weber, M. (1976), The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, pp. 1-31, 47-78, 155-183. (BB)

Polanyi, K. (1944), The Great Transformation, pp. 3-30; 130-150; and 223-248. (BB)

4. February 4 Emergence of Capitalism II: Capitalism and Imperialism

Avner Greif. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-5 (pp. 1-152) and 10-12 (pp. 305-405).

Wallerstein, I. (1974). “The Rise and Future Demise of The World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16(4), 387-415.

Skocpol, T. (1977), “Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American Journal of Sociology, 82: 1075-89.

Gallagher J. and R. Robinson (1953), “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” Economic History Review (2nd Series), 6: 1-15.

5. February 11 Hegemony, Collective Action and Cooperation

Benjamin J. Cohen. (2008). International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 66-94

Keohane, Robert. (2005). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (2nd ed), Princeton University Press. All the prefaces, chaps 3, 4 and 6 (pps. 31- 64 and 85-109) (BB)

Olson, M. (1977), The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, pp. 1-65. (BB)

Kindleberger, C. (1986), The World in Depression 1929-1939, chaps. 1 and 14, pp. 19-30; 291-308. (BB)

Snidal, Duncan. (1985) “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (4): 579-614.

Saull, Richard. (2012) “Rethinking Hegemony: Uneven Development, Historical Blocs, and the World Economic Crisis.” International Studies Quarterly, 56, 323–338.

6. February 18 Institutions

Cohen, Benjamin. (2008). International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, pp. 95-141.

Martin, L. and B. Simmons, (1998), “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,” International Organization, 52:729-58.

Ruggie, J. (1982), “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization. 36: 379-416.

Goldstein, J. and L. Martin (2000), “Legalization, Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics,” International Organization. 54 (3): 603-632.

Koremenos, B., C. Lipson, and D. Snidal. (2001). “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” International Organization. 55 (4): 761–799.

Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. (2007). "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." International Organization. 61 (1):37-67.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery. (2009). “Network Analysis for International Relations.” International Organization. 63(3):559-92.



7. February 25 Trade First Critical Review Due

Kenneth Reinert. 2012. An Introduction to International Economics: New Perspectives on the World Economy. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2 through 8 (pp. 20-116).

Rogowski, R. (1987), “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” American Political Science Review, 81: 1121-1137.

Bailey, M., J. Goldstein, and B. Weingast (1997), “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions and International Trade,” World Politics, 49 (3): 309-338.

James Alt and Michael Gillian 1994. “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problem, and Domestic Political Institutions.” Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (2): 165-192

Milner, Helen & David Yoffie (1989), “Between Free Trade and Protectionism,” International Organization, 43 (2): 239-272.

Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman. (1994). “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review 84 (4):833-50.

Hiscox, Michael. (2001). Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. International Organization 55 (1):1-46.

Gawande, Kishore, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2009. “What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade.” International Organization. 63 (3):491-532.

8. March 4 Regionalism and FTAs

Kenneth Reinert. 2012. An Introduction to International Economics: New Perspectives on the World Economy. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 8 and 19 (pp. 118-137; 332-349)

Moravcsik, Andrew (1997), “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization, 51 (4): 513-53.

Sandholtz, Wayne (1993). “Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht.” International Organization 47: 1-39.

Grieco, Joseph (1997), “Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas,” in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Miner (eds.), The Political Economy of Regionalism, Columbia University Press, p. 164-187. (BB)

Baldwin, Richard. (1997). The Causes of Regionalism. The World Economy 20 (7):865-88.

Pastor, M. and C. Wise (1994). “The Origins and Sustainability of Mexico's Free Trade Policy.” International Organization 3: 459-489.

Cooper, S. (2007). “Why Doesn't Regional Monetary Cooperation Follow Trade Cooperation?” Review of International Political Economy. 14(4), 626-652.

9. March 11 Foreign Direct Investment

Kenneth Reinert. 2012. An Introduction to International Economics: New Perspectives on the World Economy. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 10, 11 and 22 (pp. 160-188; 392-411).

Moran, Theodore H. (1978). "Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependentistas and Non-Dependentistas." International Organization 32 (1):79-100.

Kurth, J. R. (1979). “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes.” International Organization, 33(1), 1-34.



Scheve, K., & Slaughter, M. J. (2004). “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production.” American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 662-674.

Jensen, Nathan M. (2003) “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment,” International Organization 57 (3): 587-616.

Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., & Sturgeon, T. (2005). “The Governance of Global Value Chains.” Review of International Political Economy, 12(1), 78-104.

Tim Büthe and Helen V. Milner. (2008). “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?” American Journal of Political Science 52(4): 741-762.



No class on March 18 (Spring Break)

10. March 25 Development and Foreign Aid

Kenneth Reinert. 2012. An Introduction to International Economics: New Perspectives on the World Economy. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 12 (pp. 190-204); 20-21 (pp. 354-390) and 23 (pp. 424-434)

Gerschenkron, A. (1962), “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” in Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, pp. 5-30. (BB)

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2005). “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth.” The American Economic Review, 95(3), 546-579.

Olson, M. (1993). “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review, 87(3), 567-576.

Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (2012). “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule.” American Political Science Review, 106(3), 495-516.

Sokoloff, Kenneth, and Stanley Engerman (2000). “History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 3:217-32.

Ross, M. L. (1999). “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.” World Politics, 51(2), 297-322.



Easterly, W. (2003). “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(3), 23-48.

11. April 1 Money and Exchange Rate

Kenneth Reinert. 2012. An Introduction to International Economics: New Perspectives on the World Economy. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 13-16 (pp. 208-281)

Eichengreen, Barry. (2008). Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Whole book.

Broz, J. Lawrence and Jeffry Frieden. (2001). “The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science 4:317-43.

Singer, D. A. (2010). “Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World.” The American Political Science Review, 104(2), 307-323.



12. April 8 Finance and Financial Crises

Kenneth Reinert. 2012. An Introduction to International Economics: New Perspectives on the World Economy. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 17 (pp. 284-306) and 18 (pp. 308-329)

Andrews, D. (1994), “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, 38: 193-218.

Frieden, J. (1991), “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance.” International Organization. 45: 425-452.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey. (2007). “Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets.” International Organization 61 (2): 443-463.

Chinn, Menzie and Jeffry Frieden. (2011). Lost Decades: The Making of America’s Debt Crisis and the Long Recovery. New York: Norton. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 1-56). (BB)



Helleiner, E. (2011). “Understanding the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy.” Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 67-87.

Leblang, David. (2002). “The Political Economy of Speculative Attacks in the Developing World.” International Studies Quarterly 46 (1):69-91

13. April 15 Financial Regulation & Global Governance Second Critical Review due

Tim Buthe and Walter Mattle. 2011. The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy. Princeton University Press.

Stone, R. W. (2008). “The Scope of IMF Conditionality.” International Organization, 62(4), 589-620.

Quinn, D. (1997). “The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation.” The American Political Science Review, 91(3), 531-551.

Mosley, Layna (2010). “Regulating Globally, Implementing Locally: The Financial Codes and Standards Effort.” Review of International Political Economy, 17(4): 724–761.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2009. “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order,” Perspectives on Politics, 7:1, March, pp. 71-87.

14. April 22 Globalization and Policy Diffusion

Rodrik, D. (1997). “Has Globalization Gone too Far?” California Management Review, 39(3), 29-53

Garrett, Geoffrey. (2000). “The Causes of Globalization.” Comparative Political Studies 6/7:941-91.

Milanovic, Branko. (2003). “The Two Faces of Globalization: Against Globalization as We Know it.” World Development 31 (4):667-83.

Simmons, Beth and Zachary Elkins. (2004). “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy.” American Political Science Review 98, 1:171-89.



Solingen, E. (2012). “Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International Diffusion.” International Studies Quarterly, 56(4), 631-644.

Mireya Solís and Saori N. Katada (2014) “Unlikely Pivotal States in Competitive FTA Diffusion: The Effect of Japan’s TPP Participation on Asia-Pacific Regional Integration.” New Political Economy. (BB)

15. April 29 Power and Plenty Take Home Exam Distributed

Hirschman, A. (1945), National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, pp. 3-52. (BB)

Viner, J. (1948), “Power vs. Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics, Vol. 1, pp. 1-29.

Fearon, James. (1998). “Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation.” International Organization 52 (2):269-305.

Mansfield, E. M. and Jon C. Pevehouse, (2000), “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict,” International Organization. 54 (4): 775-808.

Drezner, Daniel W. (2003). “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.” International Organization 57 (3):643-59.

Fordham, Benjamin O. (2008). “Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention.” International Studies Quarterly 52 (4):737-58.

Aizenman, J. and Lee, J. (2008), “Financial versus Monetary Mercantilism: Long-run View of Large International Reserves Hoarding.” World Economy, 31: 593–611.



Take Home Final distributed on April 29. Students should set aside one day to work on the exam, and turn it in by May 8 (Thursday) by noon via email.

Appendix

GUIDELINES FOR WRITING A CRITICAL REVIEW ESSAY
(Prepared by Professor John Odell, School of IR)



Recommendations
First study some models, some good published essays reviewing a body of literature (not a single book). International Organization and World Politics, for example, publish them often.
As you read your books and articles and before beginning to write, decide on your answers to key general questions whose content will depend on your criteria. For example:


  1. What do these works have in common? Do all use the same set of concepts and assumptions, or do authors start with fundamentally different concepts?




  1. Is the purpose to explain? to interpret? What is the thing to be explained or interpreted, or the dependent variable?




  1. What is the central argument of each work? What causal or motivating factors are emphasized?




  1. How clear or confused is it? Are there any problems such as shifting meanings, ambiguous terms, inconsistency in the argument, or unintended circularity?




  1. How original or creative is its contribution, relative to what was known when it was published? Does it raise new questions or suggest interesting lines of new investigation?




  1. How valid or accurate are the claims in light of empirical evidence you can find? How rigorous or weak an empirical test has each hypothesis passed?




  1. Who in the world is harmed and who benefits if we think this way? What are the value implications of using this intellectual approach?




  1. Does the work point to or imply any line of practical action as being better than another? If it is right, what should one do? Does it have any practical value for any actor in today’s world political economy?




  1. Does this body of literature make any contribution to theory development? If so, in what sense?


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