We survey three distinct types of financial crises which took place in the 1990s and the 2000s: 1) The credit implosion leading to severe banking crisis in Japan; 2) The foreign reserves’ meltdown triggered by foreign hot money flight from frothy economies with fixed exchange rate regimes of developing Asian economies, and 3) The 2008 worldwide debacle rooted in financial institutional opacity and reckless aggregate demand management, epi-centered in the US, that spread almost instantaneously across the globe, mostly through international financial networks.
Financial Crises: 1990-2010
Financial institutions, banks and shadow-banks (financial institutions providing credit through the derivative trade) are typically arbitrageurs. They borrow short at low rates, lending money long for higher returns. Many also offer a wide range of fee generating services, including packaging and distributing derivatives.1 Like any other business, their fortunes are affected by fluctuations in aggregate demand and supply; flourishing in good times, and floundering in bad. Their health in this way partly depends on the prosperity of others, but the relationship is asymmetric because financial institutions together with monetary authorities determine the aggregate supply of money and credit. Financial institutions are special. They are strategically positioned to directly and indirectly lever more than most other businesses, expand the aggregate money and credit supplies, create debt and speculatively affect stock, commodity and real estate prices. Self-discipline and competent regulation are essential, but are too often compromised by the lure of easy profits, and a regulatory desire to foster financial innovation. Financial crises contract aggregate money and credit, diminish the income velocity of money, and jeopardize the profitability, solvency and survivability of firms throughout the economy. In the direst cases, they can wreck national economic systems (what U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke calls "systemic risk").
Financial crises vary in frequency and intensity. There were three major events during the last twenty years: the Japanese "zombie bank" debacle, the 1997 Asian financial crisis (broadened to include Russia 1998-9, and Argentina 2001-2), and the global financial crisis of 2008. The first two were respectively local and mostly regional, the third worldwide. Two were exacerbated by Keynesian liquidity traps, and debased sovereign debt (as tax revenues dropped and bailout money surged) and all were severe, but none approached the 1929 Great Depression's ferocity. They provide interesting clues about how a Black Swan catastrophe (Taleb, 2007) might have unfolded, but are more useful for learning how to deter and mitigate future financial crises and recessions(depressions) in perpetually changing technological, regulatory, developmental, transitional, and psychological environments.
This broad perspective is essential because although historical patterns are instructive, they cannot be relied on entirely either to accurately identify causes, or predict future events. Things never are completely the same (continuity), as human societies change, learn, adapt and evolve.
On one hand, recent crises have much in common with the Great Depression. All followed asset bubbles. They started in the financial sector and gradually spread to the real sector. During these crises, many financial institutions either defaulted or had to be bailed out. The Japanese and 2008 global crises appear to have begun with burst bubbles that dried up credit and drove short term interest rates toward zero.
On the other hand, the crises of the 1990s and 2000s displayed even more differences judged from the Great Depression benchmark. Institutions, policies, financial innovation, globalization (versus autarky), regulation, deregulation, floating exchange rates, and reduced financial transparency have profoundly altered potentials, conditions, dynamics and rules of the game. Domestically, nations have established and expanded an alphabet soup of oversight and regulatory agencies including the 1932 Glass-Steagall Act (repealed 1999), 1933 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the 1934 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Internationally, the world today is still being swept by a wave of globalization, characterized by rapidly growing foreign trade, capital movements, technology transfer, direct foreign investment, product and parts outsourcing, information flows, improved transport and even increased labor mobility. This contrasts sharply with a post World War I universe in retreat from the prewar globalization wave which began in the 1870s, and the protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbor, isolationist and autarkic tendencies of the 1930s. The pre-Great Depression international exchange and settlements mechanism underpinning the old regime has vanished. The gold standard, and 1944 Bretton Woods system [which established the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank Group] fixed, and adjustable peg exchange rate mechanisms are no long with us, replaced since the early 1970s by flexible exchange rates exhibiting a distinctive pattern of core-periphery relations that some describe as Bretton Woods II.2 Free trade globalization has been evangelically promoted by the 1947 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), its 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) successor, and diverse regional customs unions, while the IMF provided currency and crisis support, and the World Bank development assistance. Many claim that as a consequence of these institutional advances, emerging nations including China and India have not only been able to rapidly catch up with the west, but in the process accelerated global economic growth above the long run historical norm, buttressing prosperity and dampening business cyclical oscillations.
Scholarly and governmental attitudes toward managing financial crises and their consequences likewise bear little resemblance to those prevailing after World War I and through the early years of the Great Depression. Back then, Say's law, and government neutrality were gospel. What goes up must and should come down. If financial and related speculative activities raised prices and wages excessively, it was believed that the government should let those responsible reap what they sowed by allowing prices and wages to freely adjust downward, and firms go belly up. There was some, but very little room for stimulatory monetary and fiscal policy. The Keynesian revolution as it has gradually unfolded and evolved radically altered priorities and attitudes toward macro causality and appropriate intervention. Its seminal diagnostic contribution lay in showing the decisive roles of price rigidities, and credit crises in causing and protracting depressions. Sometimes, depressions began when real wages were too high, inducing output and credit to fall. On other occasions depressions were engendered by financial crises [sharp contractions in loanable funds (credit), and consequent liquidity crises], and then inured by "sticky wages and prices." Regardless of the sequencing, Keynes claimed that two gaps, the first a supply shock, the second impairments of the Walrasian automatic wage and price adjustment mechanism (invisible hand), created double grounds for fiscal intervention. Policymakers accordingly made the restoration of full employment and economic recovery their priorities, dethroning neutrality in favor of activist fiscal and supportive monetary intervention. Where once it was resolutely believed that eradicating anticompetitive practices and empowering the market were the best strategies for coping with financial crises and their aftermaths, Keynesians, neo-Keynesians and post-Keynesians all now believe that fighting deflation and stimulating aggregate effective demand are highest goods, even if this means rescuing those who cause crises in the first place, and tolerating other inefficiencies. These attitudes are epitomized by Ben Bernanke's unflagging commitment to bail out any institution that poses a "systemic threat," and to print as much money as it takes [quantitative easing (QE)],(Bernanke, 2004) while governments around the world push deficit spending to new heights (sometimes passively due to unexpected slow economic and tax revenue growth), tempered only by looming sovereign debt crises. They also are evident in growth accelerating excess demand strategies, and prosperity promoting international trade expansion initiatives.
This characterization of novel aspects of the post Great Depression order would have been complete two decades ago, but is no longer because it conceals a penchant among policymakers to square the circle. Governments today are intent on restoring aspects of pre-Great Depression laissez-faire, including the financial sector liberalization and decontrol, at the same time they press disciplined, globally coordinated monetary and fiscal intervention. One can imagine an optimal regime where regulatory, simulative, and laissez-faire imperatives are perfectly harmonized, but not the reality. Consequently, the most novel aspect of the 1990s and 2000s may well be the emergence of a global economic management regime built on contradictory principles that can be likened to stepping full throttle on the accelerator, while intermittently and often simultaneously slamming on the regulatory brakes.
Which subsets of these factors, including the null subset appear to best explain the Japanese, Asian and 2008 world financial crises and their aftermaths? Let us consider each event separately, and then try to discern larger, emerging patterns.
Japan's Financial Crisis: The Lost 1990s and Beyond
Japan was lashed by a speculative tornado 1986-91, commonly called the baburu keiki (bubble economy). It was localized, brief, and devastating, with allegedly paralytic consequences often described as ushiwanareta junen (two lost decades). The phenomenon was a selective price bubble, disconnected from low and decelerating GDP inflation, as well as more vigorous, but diminishing rates of aggregate economic growth converging asymptotically toward zero, or worse (1982-2010). The bubble was most conspicuously manifested in rabid land and stock prices speculation, but also affected Japanese antiques and collectibles (like high quality native ceramics and lacquer ware). The Nikkei 225 (Neikei Heikin Kabuka) stock market index rose from below 7,000 in the early 1980s to 38,916 on December 29, 1989, plummeted to 30,000 seven months later, continuing to fall with fits and starts thereafter before reaching a 27 year low March 10, 2009 at 7,055. It currently (January 2011) hovers around 10,000. At its height, Japan's stock market capitalization accounted for 60 percent of the planetary total, now its worth is a pale shadow of its former glory. The real estate story was similar. Condo prices increased 140 percent between 1987 and 1991, on top of already globally sky high values, then plummeted 40 percent by 1994.3 At the bubble's apex, the value of a parcel of land near the Emperor's Tokyo imperial palace equaled that of California. By 2004, prime "A" property in Tokyo's financial district had slumped to less than 1 percent of its peak, with the total destruction of paper wealth mounting into the tens of trillions of dollars. The speculative frenzy, predictably ended badly, but also displayed uniquely Japanese characteristics.
Its technical cause was financial; an institutional willingness to accommodate domestic hard asset speculation in lieu of low, zero and even negative returns on business investment and consumer savings accounts. Corporations and households having piled up immense idle cash balances during the miraculous "Golden Sixties," and subsequent prosperity through 1985,(Johnson, 1982) encouraged to believe that the best was yet to come despite diminishing returns to industrial investment, seized on stock and real estate speculation as the next great investment frontier. They succumbed to what savvy Wall Streeters call a "bigger pig" mentality, persuading themselves that fortunes were at their finger tips because whatever price little pigs paid today for stocks, real estate and collectibles, there always would be bigger pigs tomorrow willing to pay more. Banks capitulating to the frenzy began binge lending; rationalizing that clients always would be able to repay interest and principle from their capital gains, until one fine day they ruefully discovered that there were no bigger pigs at the end of the rainbow. This epiphany, coupled with a panic driven free fall in assets values and capitalization, left bankers both in a predicament and a quandary.
The predicament was that slashed asset values by regulatory rule required them to contract loan activity, and force borrowers to meet their interest and principal repayment obligations even if this meant driving clients into bankruptcy. The quandary was that Japanese cultural ethics strongly proscribe maximizing bank profits at borrowers' expense.(Rosefielde, 2002) Through thick and thin, Japanese are trained from birth to communally support each other, subordinating personal utility and profit seeking to the group's wellbeing. Watching out first for number one is never the right thing to do, as it is in competitive, individualistic societies. Tough love isn't an option; burden sharing is the only viable course,4 which in this instance meant refusing to "mark capitalizations to market," seeking government assistance, and stalling for time hoping that with patience, clients' financial health eventually would be restored. This judgment wasn't wrong. Japanese corporations operating under the same cultural obligation immediately began earmarking revenues from current operations for debt reduction at the expense of new capital formation, and refrained from new borrowings to cover the gap. Banks for their part, not only maintained the fiction that outstanding loans were secure, but provided cash for current corporate operations and consumer loans at virtually no cost above the bare minimum for bank survival. Moreover, they kept their lending concentrated at home, instead of seeking higher returns abroad.
These actions averted the broader calamities that typically accompany financial crises. Japan didn't swoon into hyper depression (GDP never fell, growing 1.7 percent per annum 1990-93),5 or experience mass involuntary unemployment. The country wasn't swept by a wave of bankruptcies. There was no capital flight, sustained yen depreciation, deterioration in consumer welfare,(Sawada et al., 2010) or civil disorder. There was no need for temporary government deficit spending, long term "structural deficits," "quantitative easing," comprehensive financial regulatory reforms or high profile criminal prosecutions. Interest rates already were low, and although the government did deficit spend, arguably it didn't matter in a Keynesian universe because Japanese industrial workers in large companies were employed for life (shushin koyo). For pedestrians on hondori (Main Street) who blinked, it seemed as if nothing had happened at all beyond a moment of speculative insanity.
However, matters look very differently to western macro theorists and Japanese policymakers, particularly those who erroneously believe that structural deficits, and loose monetary policy are the wellsprings of sustainable rapid aggregate economic growth(as distinct from recovery). Their prescription for Japan's "toxic asset" problem was to bite the bullet, endure the pain, and move on swiftly to robust, ever expanding prosperity. Given ideal assumptions, biting the bullet is best because it doesn't sacrifice the greater good of maximizing long term social welfare for the lesser benefits of short term social protection. Advocates contend that the Japanese government fundamentally erred in condoning bank solicitude for the plight of endangered borrowers, and abetting banks with external assistance because these actions transformed otherwise healthy institutions into "zombie banks"(the living dead),6 unable to play their crucial role in bankrolling investment, technology development and fast track economic growth.
Their claim has some disputed merit,7 but also is seriously incomplete. It is true that Japanese growth has been impeded by "zombie banks, "deflation, the "liquidity trap" conjectured by Paul Krugman in the 1990s,8 faulty banking policy,(15) and the aftermath of stock and real estate market speculation, but its should have done much better because its competitiveness has substantially improved. Stock market and real estate values denominated in yen are where they were three decades ago, while prices elsewhere across the globe have soared. Japan is more competitive now on inflation and exchange rates bases against much of the world than it was in 1990. Moreover, the government has tenaciously pursued a zero interest, loose money policy, in tandem with high deficit spending that has raised the national debt to 150 percent of GDP. If Japan's growth retardation were really primarily due to insufficient "zombie bank"
business credit, government stimulus should have mitigated much of the problem.
It is true that Japan than "zombie banks," deflation, the "liquidity trap" Paul Krugman conjectured in the 1990s, allegations of faulty banking policy(Leigh, 2009), and the hangover from the excesses of accommodatively financed stock market and real estate speculation. Stock market and real estate values denominated in yen are where they were three decades ago, while prices elsewhere across the globe have soared. Japan is more competitive on inflation and exchange rate adjusted basis against much of the world than it was in 1990. Moreover, the government has ceaselessly pursued a zero interest, loose money policy, in tandem with high deficit spending that has raised national debt to 150 percent of GDP. If Japan's growth retardation were really primarily due to insufficient "zombie banks" business credit, government stimulus should have mitigated much of the problem.
There is a better explanation for Japan's two lost decades that has little to do with two concurrent, and isolated speculative incidents, one in the stock market, the other in real estate with scant sustained effects on production and employment. The advantages of Japan's postwar recovery and modernizing catch up diminished steadily in the 1980s and were fully depleted by 1990, when its per capita GDP hit 81 percent of the American level. Thereafter, Japan's culturally imposed, anticompetitive restrictions on its domestic economic activities became increasing pronounced, causing its living standard to diminish to 73 percent of America's norm.9 Japan, at the end of the 1980s was poised to fall back, with or without a financial crisis, and it is in this sense that the two lost decades are being erroneously blamed on the bubble, and its "zombie banking" aftermath.10 Yes, there were eye-popping speculative stock market and real estate price busts, but they weren't the national economic debacles they are usually painted to be, either in the short or intermediate term.
This interpretation raises a larger issue that cannot yet be resolved, but nonetheless is worth broaching. Does Japan's fate, presage China's future? When the advantages of catch up are depleted, its population grays,11 and the delusion of permanent miraculous growth subsides, will the end of days be punctuated with a colossal, accommodatively financed speculative bust, followed by uncountable lost decades? Perhaps not, but still it is easy to see how history may repeat itself.
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Out of Region Spillovers
The Asian financial crisis which erupted in 1997 was a foreign capital flight induced money and credit implosion.12 It began as a run on Asian banks by foreign short term depositors, and expanded into an assault on government foreign currency reserves, sending shock waves as far as Russia's and Argentina's shores.13 Banks were decimated by acute insolvency. They didn't have the cash on hand to cover mass withdrawals of short term deposits because these funds had been lent long, sparking asset fire sales, slashed capitalizations and credit and money contractions, which in turn triggered widespread business failures, depressions and mass unemployment. Thailand's GDP plummeted 8 percent, Indonesia's 14 percent and South Korea's 6 percent 1997-98.14 Foreign capital flight(repatriation of short term deposits), compounded by insufficient government foreign currency reserves, soon compelled steep devaluations that increased import costs, reduced "command national income,"(domestic purchasing power including "command" over foreign imports), disordered balance sheets, and otherwise diminished real national consumption.
These events, unlike Japan's financial crisis eight years earlier, were triggered by foreign capital flight rather than domestic stock and real estate meltdowns, and weren't quarantined. The crisis started in Thailand, spreading rapidly to Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong,15 Malaysia, and the Philippines, with lesser reverberations in India, Taiwan, Singapore, and Brunei, but fledgling market communist regimes in China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were spared runs on their banks and foreign currency reserves by stringent state banking and foreign exchange controls. They experienced secondary shocks from diminished regional economic activity, but otherwise escaped unscathed.
The root cause of the runs on Asia's banks and foreign reserves lay in foreign financed Asian economic development, and east-west interest rate differentials. After World War II Asia became a magnet for both foreign direct and portfolio investment, driving foreign debt-to-GDP ratios above 100 percent in the four large ASEAN economies (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) 1993-1996, and local asset market prices to soar(real estate and stocks). Rapid, near double digit GDP growth contributed to the asset boom, inspiring confidence that investments were safe because Asia's miracles were expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Thailand's, South Korea's, and Indonesia's GDP growth rates during the decade preceding the Asian financial crisis respectively were 9.6, 8.2 and 7.2 percent per annum.16 At the same time, Asia's high interest rates attracted the "carry trade;" short term borrowing of low yielding currencies like the Japanese yen, and their subsequent short term investment in high yielding foreign bank deposits and similar liquid debt instruments. Short term "hot" money(including large sums from Japanese financial institutions searching for positive returns on near money instruments well after Japan's financial crisis ended) poured into the region, creating what increasingly came to be perceived as a pan-Asian bubble economy, exacerbated by "crony capitalism,"17 severe political corruption and instability(especially Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia).
Foreign investors steeled by their faith in Asian miracles at first weren't perturbed by the frothiness of the orient's markets, but the swelling bubble, compounded by surging current account trade deficits undermined their confidence. Speculators, hot money carry traders, and other investors gradually grasped that the high returns they were reaping could be wiped out by catastrophic devaluations, and began planning for the worst, realizing that those who fled early would preserve their wealth; those who dallied would be left holding an empty bag. The incentive to flee was increased further by developments outside the region. America's Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan began nudging U.S. interest rates higher to deter inflation, creating an attractive safe haven for hot money hedging, made more appealing by the prospect of an appreciating dollar.
The precise combination of factors that ignited full throttle capital flight is open to dispute. Southeast Asian export growth dramatically slowed in the Spring of 1996, aggravating current account deficits. China started to out-compete its regional rivals for foreign directly invested loanable funds. The domestic asset bubble began to pop with stock and land prices in retreat, forcing large numbers of firms to default on their debts. No doubt for these and many other reasons including asymmetric information,(Mishkin, 1999) opacity, corrupt corporate governance, and "crony capitalism;" foreign investors rushed for the exits in early 1997, symbolically culminating in the Thai government's decision on July 2, 1997 to abandon its fixed exchange rate, allowing the value of its baht to "freely" float. Over the course of the next year, the Baht's value fell 40 percent. The Indonesian, Philippine, Malaysian and South Korean currencies swiftly followed suit, declining respectively 83, 37, 39 and 34 percent.
Devaluation, stock and real estate market crashes, bankruptcies, mass unemployment, wilted interest rates, and heightened risk aversion dissolved the fundamental disequilibria that had beset the region before the fall, only to be immediately replaced by urgent new priorities. Downward spirals had to be arrested, economies stabilized, and steps taken not only to achieve rapid recovery, but to foster structural changes supporting long term modernization and growth. Thai economic planners and their counterparts elsewhere in the region had a coherent overview of what needed to be done (mundane partisan squabbles aside), but unlike the Japanese seven years earlier, sought external foreign assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and individual nations including China to finance balance of payments deficits and facilitate structural adjustment. Japan didn't run a current account deficit during its crisis, didn't need foreign exchange rate support, nor structural adjustment assistance funding, and so relied entirely on its own resources, whereas the dependency of noncommunist developing Asia on the developed west was placed in stark relief. The region of course could have gone it alone; however its aspirations for fast track convergence, and counter crisis stimulus were clearly tied to its integration into the global financial system, and perhaps acceptance of some bad IMF conditionality as the price for the good.
Much ink has been spilt over whether Washington Consensus style monetary and fiscal stringency, combined with mandated economy opening structural reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund helped or harmed Asia.18 This issue is important, but only so for present purposes insofar as structural reforms increased or diminished the likelihood of future crises. The evidence to date on balance, despite strong claims to the contrary, favors the regional decision to follow the IMF's tough love advice. Asia accepted fiscal austerity and monetary restraint. It liberalized, amassed large foreign currency reserves, maintained floating exchange rates and prospered. After enduring a protracted and perhaps excessively painful period of adjustment, Asia not only resumed rapid growth within the IMF's framework, but when push came to shove in 2008, weathered the global financial shock wave better than most. It appears that although global financial liberalization does pose clear and present speculative dangers as IMF critics contend, the risks can be managed with prudence and discipline.19
Some have suggested that Russia provides a cogent counter Washington Consensus example because having liberalized after its own financial crisis in 1997, and recovered, its economy was crushed by the 2008 financial crisis. The claim however is misleading on a variety of grounds. There simply are too many dissimilarities for the Russian case to be persuasive. Unlike Asia, Russia was mired in hyper depression when it defaulted on its sovereign Euro denominated debt in 1997. It never received significant sums of direct and/or hot money inflows into the private sector during the Yeltsin years, had a floating peg exchange rate, and received no IMF support after the ruble collapsed. Consequently, it is fatuous to lump Russia into the same basket with Asia.20 Asia's and Russia's systems and contexts are too disparate for them to be pooled. The same argument for different reasons applies to Argentina 1999-2001. Russia's and Argentina's crises were both linked to sovereign debt issues, but their problematic, and roles within the global economic and financial system place them in separate categories.
Clarity in this regard is essential for gauging the Asian financial crisis's historical significance. Some like Niall Ferguson contend that Asia's financial crisis was the first tremor of the second globalization age that emerged after the Bretton Woods international monetary and financial order collapsed in the late 1970s, early 1980s; weakly implying that future crises will mimic Asia's experience.(Ferguson, 2008, 2010) This is implausible. Asia's crisis provides an object lesson on the broad danger posed to a wide variety of economies in various stages of economic development by overly exuberant international financial liberalization, but doesn't offer a blueprint about how things must unfold.21