Asus Pirated software and dissemination of confidential data


Intelligence dissemination management - Between Intelligence and Action



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Intelligence dissemination management - Between Intelligence and Action

  • Clausewitz warns that studying enemy weaknesses without considering one's own capacity to take advantage of those weaknesses is a mistake.

Intelligence dissemination management - Between Intelligence and Action

  • Many first heard of the term 'centers of gravity' in the context of Desert Storm or COL John Warden, but Warden's contribution was adapting the idea

Intelligence dissemination management - Between Intelligence and Action

  • , to air campaigns, of the Clausewitz ideaClausewitz of a center of gravity, a feature that if successfully attacked, can stop the enemy's war effort. Assessment requires considering the potential interaction of the two sides. According to Clausewitz, One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind.

Intelligence dissemination management - Net Assessment

  • In the US, strategic assessment is one step beyond intelligence estimates, although intelligence analysts may well participate in the subsequent process of strategic assessment. The result, called a 'net assessment' in the US and the 'correlation of forces' in the fUSSR, are not themselves contingency plans, but are critical to the formulation of plans. Strategic assessment, above all else, is an examination of interactions, rather than the likely unilateral actions of another side or coalition.

Intelligence dissemination management - Net Assessment

  • Formalizing the role of a command historian was one of the first steps in the evolution of a true general staff,

Intelligence dissemination management - Net Assessment

  • as opposed to the personal entourage of a commander. By applying the planned assessment methodology to historical data, the methodology, cautiously, may be validated. Caution is needed because contingencies can make historical behavior obsolete.

Intelligence dissemination management - Net Assessment

  • In fact, a widely praised explanation for the causes of war is precisely that strategic assessments were in conflict prior to the initiation of combat—one side seldom starts a war knowing in advance it will lose

Intelligence dissemination management - Net Assessment

  • . Thus, we may presume there are almost always miscalculations in strategic assessments of varying types according to the nature of the national leadership that made the assessment.

Intelligence dissemination management - How not to do net assessment

  • How have major nations conducted strategic assessments of the security environment? There is no one standard

Intelligence dissemination management - How not to do net assessment

  • In his specification for the study, Marshall specified four motivations for assessment:

Intelligence dissemination management - How not to do net assessment

  • :* Comparing strengths and predicting outcomes in given contingencies

Intelligence dissemination management - How not to do net assessment

  • :* Monitoring current developments and being alerted to developing problems

Intelligence dissemination management - How not to do net assessment

  • The main problem was how to frame assessments, particularly with regard to political-military factors such as who were the potential threats and potential allies, and what international alignments would be vital to the outcomes of future wars.

Intelligence dissemination management - Simplistic force ratios and assumptions

  • An early but obsolete approach to estimation was a very simple quantitative one, using Lanchester's Laws

Intelligence dissemination management - Simplistic force ratios and assumptions

  • Japan's early WWII strategy towards the US, for example, made numerous assumptions that would lead the US Fleet to sail into the Western Pacific, to fight, on advantageous terms for the Japanese, a Decisive Battle

Intelligence dissemination management - Simplistic force ratios and assumptions

  • France, as well as Japan, used overly simplistic assumptions and calculations in assessing the 1939 situation with Germany

Intelligence dissemination management - Simplistic force ratios and assumptions

  • In the areas of breakthrough, the Germans achieved at least a 4:1 advantage by not advancing on a broad front

Intelligence dissemination management - Psychological and Diplomatic Assumptions

  • Another mistake is to assume which nations and groups will see the country doing an assessment as a friend. In planning for WWII, the United States developed the Rainbow Series of war plans, the serious assumption was that Japan would be the only significant enemy. While this was wargamed again and again, there had been little analysis of a two-front war with the Axis.

Intelligence dissemination management - Psychological and Diplomatic Assumptions

  • For WWII, Britain had assumed France would be an effective ally. Britain also did not consider the effect of the Soviet Union as a second front. This was understandable given the initial Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact before Germany attacked the USSR, but forced the reevaluation of the European balance of power.

Intelligence dissemination management - Psychological and Diplomatic Assumptions

  • Not all WWII assumptions were flawed. The USSR assumed Japanese neutrality toward the Soviets, which was, indeed, the case until the USSR declared war at the very end of WWII.

Intelligence dissemination management - Psychological and Diplomatic Assumptions

  • In 1990-1991, while the US had assumed it would be able to base troops in Saudi Arabia to meet a threat to that nation, such as the invasion of Kuwait, that was not a prior commitment by the Saudis. Even when preliminary negotiations were positive, the size of the proposed American force shocked the Saudis. For a time, until the King was convinced, the US assumption was just that


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