German Protestant; b. at Langenbruck (16 m. s.e. of Basel), Switzerland, July 31, 1870. He was educated at the universities of Berlin, Halle, and Bonn (lic. theol., Berlin, 1893), was vicar at Fehrbellin (1895‑96), and pastor at Deyelsdorf, Pommerania (1898‑1902). In 1902 he became privat‑docent for practical theology at the University of Berlin, where he still remains. He has written Das Gebet in der dltesten Christenheit (Leipsic, 1901); Reisebilder am dem griechischrturkischen Orient (Halle, 1902); and Der Dienat der Frau in der christlichen $irehe (Potsdam' 1905); Athanasiua de Virginitate (Leipsie, 1905); and Tisehgebete and Abendmahlgebete in der allchristlwhen uttd griechischen Kirche (1905).
GOLTZ, HERMANN, FREIHERR VON DER:
German Protestant; b. at Dasseldorf May 17,
1835; d. in Berlin July 23, 1906. He was edu
cated at the universities of Erlangen, Berlin, Tti
bingen, and Bonn (1853‑58), and after being
chaplain to the Prussian embassy in Rome from
1861 to 1865, was appointed associate professor
of theology at Basel, becoming full professor there
in 1870. In 1873 he went to Bonn in a simi
lar capacity, but after 1876 resided in Berlin as
honorary professor, councilor of the supreme con
sistory, member of the supreme Evangelical church
council, and provost of St. Peter's. He wrote
Die reformm* Kircke Genf s im neunzehnten Jahr
hundert (Basel, 1862; Gottes Of'enbarung durch
heilige Geschichte, each ihrem Wesen belevchtel (1868) ;
Die christlichen Grundwahrheiten, oder die allge
meinen Principien der christlichen Dogmattk (Goths,
1873); and TempeWder nus dem Leben des Hewn
Jesu (sermons; Berlin, 1877). He also collaborated
tirung fiber die bevorstehende General‑Synode (Bielefeld, 1874‑75).
GOMARUS (GOMAR), FRANCISCUS:Leader of the strict Calvinistic party in Holland in the Arminian controversy; b. at Bruges, in Flanders, Jan. 30, 1563; d. at Groningen Jan. 11, 1641. He devoted himself to humanistic studies under Johann Sturm at Strasburg, and, beginning in 1580, studied theology at Neustadt under Ursinus, Zanchius, and Tossanus, then successively at Oxford, Cambridge, and Heidelberg. From 1587 he was pastor of the Netherlandish congregation in Frankfort‑on‑theMain. In 1594 he became professor of theology in Leyden. His strict Calvinism involved him in severe controversies with Arminius when he became his colleague in 1603. The chief point of dispute was the doctrine of predestination. The controversy soon became general. Colloquies arranged for the purpose of reconciling the opponents were without success. When Arminius died in 1609, Konrad Vorst (q.v.), a man of still more heterodox tendencies, became his successor, and Gomarus resigned in 1611 and became preacher of the Reformed congregation in Middelburg, where he also lectured on theology and Hebrew. In 1614 be went to Sampur as professor of theology, and four years later to Groningen. He took a prominent part in the Synod of Dort (1618‑19), and was one of the chief opponents of Arminianism in that assembly. Thenceforth he lived a lonely life at Groningen. In 1633 he took part in the revision of the translation of the Bible at Leyden. He was of a polemical nature, but faithful and conscientious in the discharge of duty. His collected works, mostly polemical, appeared in one volume folio, Amsterdam, 1645. See ARnsamus, JAconus, ARMIxIAmsM;
DORT, SYNOD OF; REMONsTRANTs.
(S. D. VAN VEEN.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY: B. Glasius, Godgeleerd Nederland, i. 537, 546, Hertogenbosch, 1851; C. Sepp, Het godpeleerd Omderwijs in Nederland i. 101‑120, 167‑170, Leyden, 1873. Consult also A. Schweizer, Die protestantiachen Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwickelunp, ii. 31‑224, Zurich, 1856.
GOMER See TABLE OF NATIONS.
GONESIUS (GONIADZKI, CONYZA), PETRUS:
Polish antitrinitarian; b. at Goniadz (32 m. n.w. of Bielostok) c. 1525; place and date of death unknown. By his opposition to the anti‑Catholic teachings of Francesco Stancaro at Cracow he attracted the attention of the bishop and clergy of Samogitia, who sent him abroad to complete his education. During the following years he resided in Germany (especially at Wittenberg), Switzerland (including Geneva), and probably Italy. His association with Italian antitrinitarians in Switzerland and his study of the writings of Servetus seem to have inspired him with heretical doctrines concerning the Trinity, while from the Moravian Anabaptists he received the teaching that the Christian can neither accept office nor engage in war, and took a hostile attitude toward infant baptism. At a synod held at Secymin Jan. 22‑23, 1556, Gonesius boldly polendzed against the doctrine of the Trinity, accepting the Apostles' Creed, but rejecting the Nicene and Athanasian Symbols. The Father alone
17 RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPEDIA. Golgotha Highest
is God; the Logos is not the Son, but the seed of the Son; and the doctrine of consubstantiality is rejected. The man Christ was transformed into God, and God or the Word into man, so that the Son is at once subject to the Father, and at the same time the two are identical. Refusing to retract, Gonesius was sent to Wittenberg„in the hope that Melanchthon might convince him of error. The treatise which he there prepared, De communications idiomatum nee dialediea nee physics ideoque prorsus nulls, was so filled with the heresy of Servetus that Melanchthon declined to have any further dealings with him, and dismissed him. Gonesius'a reception in Poland, however, was moat unfavorable, and at a synod held in the same year at Pinczow his doctrines were condemned as Arian. Two years later at the Synod of Brzesk in Lithuania, he repeated his assertions, and found a strong defender in the atarost of Samogitia, Jan Kiszka, who appointed him preacher at Wengrow and placed a press at his disposal for the promulgation of his views. He now won to his side many of the clergy and nobility of Podlachia and Lithuania, and in 1565 the Reformed openly divided into trinitarian and unitarian factions. The latter party soon far outstripped Gonesius, and he was forced to struggle in vain against the " Ebionite " and " Artemonite " heresies which denied the preexistence of Christ. Of the latter part of his life nothing is
known. A. HEGLERt. (K. HGLL.)
BInwoGRAFKY:F. S. Rock, Hiat. andidrinitariorum, i. 108, ii. 1079, Leipeie, 1774‑84; 0. Fock, Der Socinianismus, pp. 143 eqq., Kiel, 1847.
GOOD FRIDAY. See HOLY WEEK.
GOOD, THE HIGHEST.
Conceptions of Plato and Aristotle (f 1). The Scriptural Conception Q 2). Augustine's Influence (§ 3). Schleiermacher's View (¢ 4). The Sum of All True " Goods " (¢ 5).
The term " Highest Good " (summum banum) is an
expression used in philosophic discussion to denote
the chief end of man's existence. Cicero defines it
(De fintbw, I., xii. 42) as " that which is referred
to no other thing, .while all other
L Concep‑ things are referred to it." The corre
tions of sponding Greek word telm, " end," is
Plato and often used simply, without any quali
Aristotle. fying words, for the highest good, with
which Aristotle identifies it (" Nico
machean Ethics," 1094a, 18‑22) : " If anything is
an end of our actions which we desire for itself, and
this must be the Good and the Best." And that this
is almost universally predicated of eudaimonia,
" happiness," he states in another passage (1095a,
17 sqq.): "For we choose this for its own sake al
ways, and never for the sake of anything else." He
admits, however, that there is a controversy as to
what constitutes it. The Christian Fathers, in
estimating the opinions of the philosophers on this
subject, give the preference to Plato, because in
his system God is especially prominent as the
" objective " Highest Good, in the modern phrase.
Aristotle considers merely " the end of our actions," the " Good ", which can be realized by human effort, while Plato brings ethics into close relation with metaphyaicq. He hypoatatizes the " Good " of Socrates into the highest of his " ideas," identifying it with the moos, " mind," of Anaxagoras, the one thing, that has real existence, the Godhead. In Plato the same term, " the Good," designates what is highest alike in the life of man and in the system of the universe. The Fathers also commend the way in which he speaks of the ethical "good," the attainable " end," the " happiness " of man; the Highest Good in a subjective sense, as " a likeness to God to the extent of our powers, which likeness consists in becoming just and holy by means of wisdom." The conception of the Highest Good in Christian ethics was largely influenced by the Platonic view, according to which the soul becomes like God only by ascetic flight from the world of sense into the world of ideas, by philosophic meditation on death, by ideal speculation and contemplation of the Godhead. This is intellectualism, to whose prevalence in the Church Aristotle also contributed by defining as the highest good the " contemplative activity " of the soul which is like that of God.
The phrase " your good" of Romans xiv. 16 might be referred to the Highest Good and to the
" kingdom of God " in the following z. The verse; but telos nowhere in the New
Scriptural Testament denotes the Highest Good.
Conception. Pa. xvi. is sometimes superscribed "God the Highest Good"; though the text of verse 2 is uncertain, throughout the psalm Yahweh is the " portion " of the rights pus, from whom they derive all good things (cf. also Pa. Ixxiii. 25, 26, 28). Schleiermacher remarks (Werke, III., ii. 456) that the designation of God as the Highest Good is an improper expression, and that it is more correctly defined as love for God. But we are in the habit of referring to persons (such as a wife or a child) as our good in the sense of a possession that makes us happy, without thinking it necessary to speak definitely of our love for them. God is thus Israel's Highest Good; he has given himself to this people as their lord and king. As such be is their lawgiver, their national good (Deut. iv. 8), more to be desired than gold (Ps. xix. 10), and provides all other good things for them. If " your good " in Rom. xiv. 16 is not directly to be referred to the kingdom of God, this kingdom is still, according to the words of Jesus (Matt. vi. 33; cf. xiii. 44, 46) that which is first to be sought. When God is perfectly recognized as king, he will as such bless his people with all good things and thus be the Highest Good of men. Even at present it is the good (best) part (Luke x. 42) to hear the words of Jesus, through which the kingdom of God is established within the soul (cf. also Matt. xiii. 16; John iv. 10). That he is our Highest Good is expressed most clearly in Phil. iii. 7‑10, i. 21‑23; 11 Cor. xii. 9; Heb. iii. 14. The " good things " of Matt. vii. 11 are summed up by Luke (xi. 13) in the Holy Spirit as the Highest Good, including all the others. It would, however, be unscriptural to confine the idea of the kingdom of God as the Highest
TheGood, I THE NEW SCHAFF‑HERZOG is
Good to these relations with him. His rule implies the blessing of his people with social and natural good things. But if any religion may be taken as having an eschatological conception of the Highest Good, it is the religion of the Bible, which understands the term of that which is really highest (" that which is perfect," I Cor. xiii. 10). Such passages as I Cor. viii. 8; Rom. mi. 36; Eph. iv. 8 imply that God, who directs all things toward himself, is the end of the world, or that the course of its history is to tend to his glory. The expressions of I Cor. xv. 28 and Rev. i. 8 have contributed to a metaphysical conception of God as the Highest Good in the sense of the ultimate end of all things. The maintenance of his glory in this sense is the devout purpose of those who desire his beneficent rule to prevail (Matt. v. 16; 1 Cor. x. 31; Eph. f. 12; Phil. i. 11, ii. 11; I Peter iv. 11).
In the Church of the second century also, the expected kingdom of God was looked upon as the
Highest Good. It was a result of the 3. Augus‑ Hellenization of Christianity when an tine's In‑ increasing influence was exerted, from fluence. Clement of Rome (Ad Corinthios,
xxxvi. 2) to Clement of Alexandria (Strom., VI., xii.), by the formula " the most perfect good is knowledge, which is to be chosen for its.own sake," without reference to anything else as in the quotation from Aristotle above. This knowledge (in the high sense given to the word gnosis, denoting a knowledge of the mysteries of God), since it has God for its highest, object, in a sense deifies man, and makes him immortal. Augustine's influence was epoch‑makingforthe development of the idea here discussed. He removed it a considerable distance from the moralism, intellectualism, naturalism of the ancients, and returned to the Scriptural paths. In union with Paul, he departs most widely from moralistic naturalism. The ancient morality was capable of the religious interpretation that the natural powers were gifts of God; but Christian ethics presupposes new, supernatural powers, derived from the new creation by God's grace. The ancient ‑philosopher expected, for perfect happiness, to become what he already was by nature, through the energetic cultivation of the higher or spiritual part of his being, in itself good and making it dominate the lower or sensual part. Augustine taught that man can become something quite other than he is by nature, through correspondence to the divine. purpose. The period of Augustine's influence extends practically down to Schleierma,cher. Even Kant's conception of the Highest Good is not really a new one. In the %ritik der praktischen Vernunft (Riga, 1788), he treats of two different elements of the Highest Good‑virtue conceived as an incessant progression toward perfect happiness, he calls the highest (supremum) good; but it is not yet the perfect and complete (consummatum) good, since to become this it requires a happiness proportioned to it, which is the second element of the Highest Good. The ultimate end of the universe is to be sought not in the happiness of rational beings, but in the Highest Good, which adds the condition of its accordance with the laws of virtue,
After Augustine Schleiermacher's teaching marks
the next stage in the development. In his two
treatises Ueber den Begrif dea hiichsten
4. Schleier‑ Guts (1827, 18301, the term denotes
macher'a the sum of the products of moral
View. activity, in so far as this activity still
includes them in itself and continues to
develop them. The total result of the operations of
reason in the world through the human organiza
tion is the Highest Good‑a perfect and complete
whole, expressed in the terms " golden age," " per
to this view, the Christian doctrine uses the term
" Highest Good " in the old eudemonistic sense,
and maintains that the happiness produced in the
blessed spirits by their perfect acts of causation
is necessarily included in the absolute ultimate end.
Even when we call God himself the "objective
Highest Good," we do so only in distinction from
the subjective eudaimonia (happiness) which he
causes. And God is not a " good " in the abstract,
but the Highest Good to himself, to the Son, and
to the world. So far Schleiermacher is correct
when he says in' his Christliche Ethik : " The asser
tion that God is the Highest Good is not altogether
justifiable, four a thing is only classed among our
goods '‑ when we have or possess it; but if we say
that the possession of God or union with God is the
Highest Good, no objection can be raised." This
possession is not an inactive possession. achleier
macher insists that it, is an essential property of
what we call a " good " to arouse a living activity,
and that an inactive condition, no matter bow
richly endowed, does not come under this head; and
19 RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPEDIAGood. The Nishest
the same is true also of " goods " not produced by human activity, of God and his dominion, in relation to the religious and social activities of the spirits, in which they are " blessed" (James i. 25). Now, the Christian faith knows of no capacity to produce these activities except through the Savior; and Sehleiermacher says, "accordingly the redemption through Christ is itself the Highest Good," thus including in the term the element of the gift of grace. It is easy enough to avoid any identification of this with the real end.
There is, however, a distinction drawn by Thomas Aquinas (Summa, iii. 13) between " an end which is constituted by the action of an g. The Sum agent " and " an end which is proof All True existent and to be acquired or ob‑
"Goods." twined .by action or motion." Under
the latter head come God and his
gifts, the Savior and salvation, and the Holy Ghost
who ministers salvation. These gifts are accepted
by an act of the will, with which man's part, the
" action," begins, that which constitutes the " end "
in the former sense, without losing sight of the
" preexistent end." In the religious and social ac
tivities produced in him by the eternal"goods"the
Christian must perfect himself by daily repentance.
The degree of perfection which must be attained
by each in this world is not known to us; but we
have firm confidence in the grace of God, and hope
for moral perfection in the other world, which shall
perfect also our moral happiness. Physical happi
ness, too, will~be bestowed upon us by God's love,
though of what nature this will be no one knows.
While Christians already possess "eternal life," a
life which is supramundane and heavenly, this is
only a feeble beginning compared with the blessed
perfection to be attained in the likeness of God in
the world to come. It may therefore be doubted
whether it is to be included in the idea of the (sub
jective) Highest Good. God's gifts, when he shall
be all in all, will of course not be the same as his
present gift‑redemption, forgiveness of sins,
sanctification. And since in this life the blessings
of civilisation may be numbered among his gifts,
it is possible to include them also in the conception
BIBLIOGRAPHY: The subject is treated from the historicphilosophloal side in all works on the history of philosoply‑e.g.. F. Ueberweg, Gew*kAu der philosopAis, ed. M. Heinse, i. 184, 238 277‑273, Berlin, 1894 (giving references to other literature). It is also included within the scope of works on ethics and Christian ethics.
Consult: Palmer, in Jahrbflchar fflr deutsdis Theolopie,
v (1880), 438 eqq.; K. Werner, GesrhiAte der apolopetiaehen and polmiacAan Likmtur der chrieaichan Thsolopia, I. 489‑499, Schaffhausen, 1881• Roman, in jahrbgcher fir deutadw Theolopie, roil (1872), 442 eqq. (on Sehleiermseher); Arnoldt, in Altpreussieche‑iKonatswArifk, u (1874), 193 sqq‑ (on Kant); 8. Huber, Die Glaekeelipkeitskhre des Aristotdee and heifigen Thomas von Aquinas Freising, 1893; J. Kaftan, in Zeiteehritt tar Tkeolopie Una Birds, vii (1897), 13.
GOOD, JAMES ISAAC: German Reformed; b. at York, Pa., Dec. 31, 1850. He was educated at Lafayette College (B.A., 1872) and Union Theological Seminary (1872‑75). He was pastor of Heidelberg Reformed Church, York, Pa. (1875‑
1877), Heidelberg Reformed Church, Philadelphia
(1877‑90); Calvary Reformed Church, Reading,
Pa., (1890‑05). He was connected with Ur
einus College, Philadelphia, first as professor of
church history from 1890 to 1893, and then as pro
fessor of dogmatics and pastoral theology and dean
of the school of theology from 1893 to 1897.
Since 1907 he has been professor of Reformed
Church history in Central Theological Seminary,
Tiffin, O. In theology his position is conservative
and positive. He has written Origin of the Re
formed Church of Germany (Reading, Pa., 188?);
Rambles around Reformed Lands (1889); History
of the Reformed Church of Germany (1894); History
of the Reformed Church in the United States (1899);