Associate professor of church history princeton theological seminary baker book house

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German Protestant; b. at Langenbruck (16 m. s.e. of Basel), Switzerland, July 31, 1870. He was edu­cated at the universities of Berlin, Halle, and Bonn (lic. theol., Berlin, 1893), was vicar at Fehrbellin (1895‑96), and pastor at Deyelsdorf, Pommerania (1898‑1902). In 1902 he became privat‑docent for practical theology at the University of Berlin, where he still remains. He has written Das Gebet in der dltesten Christenheit (Leipsic, 1901); Reise­bilder am dem griechischrturkischen Orient (Halle, 1902); and Der Dienat der Frau in der christlichen $irehe (Potsdam' 1905); Athanasiua de Virginitate (Leipsie, 1905); and Tisehgebete and Abendmahl­gebete in der allchristlwhen uttd griechischen Kirche (1905).


German Protestant; b. at Dasseldorf May 17,

1835; d. in Berlin July 23, 1906. He was edu­

cated at the universities of Erlangen, Berlin, Tti­

bingen, and Bonn (1853‑58), and after being

chaplain to the Prussian embassy in Rome from

1861 to 1865, was appointed associate professor

of theology at Basel, becoming full professor there

in 1870. In 1873 he went to Bonn in a simi­

lar capacity, but after 1876 resided in Berlin as

honorary professor, councilor of the supreme con­

sistory, member of the supreme Evangelical church

council, and provost of St. Peter's. He wrote

Die reformm* Kircke Genf s im neunzehnten Jahr­

hundert (Basel, 1862; Gottes Of'enbarung durch

heilige Geschichte, each ihrem Wesen belevchtel (1868) ;

Die christlichen Grundwahrheiten, oder die allge­

meinen Principien der christlichen Dogmattk (Goths,

1873); and TempeWder nus dem Leben des Hewn

Jesu (sermons; Berlin, 1877). He also collaborated

with A. Wach in editing Synodalfragan zur Ortetr

tirung fiber die bevorstehende General‑Synode (Biele­feld, 1874‑75).

GOMARUS (GOMAR), FRANCISCUS: Leader of the strict Calvinistic party in Holland in the Armin­ian controversy; b. at Bruges, in Flanders, Jan. 30, 1563; d. at Groningen Jan. 11, 1641. He devoted himself to humanistic studies under Johann Sturm at Strasburg, and, beginning in 1580, studied the­ology at Neustadt under Ursinus, Zanchius, and Tossanus, then successively at Oxford, Cambridge, and Heidelberg. From 1587 he was pastor of the Netherlandish congregation in Frankfort‑on‑the­Main. In 1594 he became professor of theology in Leyden. His strict Calvinism involved him in severe controversies with Arminius when he be­came his colleague in 1603. The chief point of dis­pute was the doctrine of predestination. The controversy soon became general. Colloquies arranged for the purpose of reconciling the oppo­nents were without success. When Arminius died in 1609, Konrad Vorst (q.v.), a man of still more heterodox tendencies, became his successor, and Gomarus resigned in 1611 and became preacher of the Reformed congregation in Middelburg, where he also lectured on theology and Hebrew. In 1614 be went to Sampur as professor of theology, and four years later to Groningen. He took a prominent part in the Synod of Dort (1618‑19), and was one of the chief opponents of Arminianism in that assembly. Thenceforth he lived a lonely life at Groningen. In 1633 he took part in the revision of the trans­lation of the Bible at Leyden. He was of a polem­ical nature, but faithful and conscientious in the discharge of duty. His collected works, mostly polemical, appeared in one volume folio, Amster­dam, 1645. See ARnsamus, JAconus, ARMIxIAmsM;



BIBLIOGRAPHY: B. Glasius, Godgeleerd Nederland, i. 537, 546, Hertogenbosch, 1851; C. Sepp, Het godpeleerd Om­derwijs in Nederland i. 101‑120, 167‑170, Leyden, 1873. Consult also A. Schweizer, Die protestantiachen Central­dogmen in ihrer Entwickelunp, ii. 31‑224, Zurich, 1856.



Polish antitrinitarian; b. at Goniadz (32 m. n.w. of Bielostok) c. 1525; place and date of death un­known. By his opposition to the anti‑Catholic teachings of Francesco Stancaro at Cracow he attracted the attention of the bishop and clergy of Samogitia, who sent him abroad to complete his education. During the following years he resided in Germany (especially at Wittenberg), Switzer­land (including Geneva), and probably Italy. His association with Italian antitrinitarians in Switzer­land and his study of the writings of Servetus seem to have inspired him with heretical doctrines con­cerning the Trinity, while from the Moravian Ana­baptists he received the teaching that the Christian can neither accept office nor engage in war, and took a hostile attitude toward infant baptism. At a synod held at Secymin Jan. 22‑23, 1556, Gonesius boldly polendzed against the doctrine of the Trinity, accepting the Apostles' Creed, but rejecting the Nicene and Athanasian Symbols. The Father alone


is God; the Logos is not the Son, but the seed of the Son; and the doctrine of consubstantiality is rejected. The man Christ was transformed into God, and God or the Word into man, so that the Son is at once subject to the Father, and at the same time the two are identical. Refusing to re­tract, Gonesius was sent to Wittenberg„in the hope that Melanchthon might convince him of error. The treatise which he there prepared, De communi­cations idiomatum nee dialediea nee physics ideoque prorsus nulls, was so filled with the heresy of Serve­tus that Melanchthon declined to have any further dealings with him, and dismissed him. Gonesius'a reception in Poland, however, was moat unfavor­able, and at a synod held in the same year at Pinc­zow his doctrines were condemned as Arian. Two years later at the Synod of Brzesk in Lithuania, he repeated his assertions, and found a strong defender in the atarost of Samogitia, Jan Kiszka, who ap­pointed him preacher at Wengrow and placed a press at his disposal for the promulgation of his views. He now won to his side many of the clergy and nobility of Podlachia and Lithuania, and in 1565 the Reformed openly divided into trinitarian and unitarian factions. The latter party soon far outstripped Gonesius, and he was forced to struggle in vain against the " Ebionite " and " Artemon­ite " heresies which denied the preexistence of Christ. Of the latter part of his life nothing is

known. A. HEGLERt. (K. HGLL.)
BInwoGRAFKY: F. S. Rock, Hiat. andidrinitariorum, i. 108, ii. 1079, Leipeie, 1774‑84; 0. Fock, Der Socinianismus, pp. 143 eqq., Kiel, 1847.

Conceptions of Plato and Aristotle (f 1). The Scriptural Conception Q 2). Augustine's Influence (§ 3). Schleiermacher's View (¢ 4). The Sum of All True " Goods " (¢ 5).

The term " Highest Good " (summum banum) is an

expression used in philosophic discussion to denote

the chief end of man's existence. Cicero defines it

(De fintbw, I., xii. 42) as " that which is referred

to no other thing, .while all other

L Concep‑ things are referred to it." The corre­

tions of sponding Greek word telm, " end," is

Plato and often used simply, without any quali­

Aristotle. fying words, for the highest good, with

which Aristotle identifies it (" Nico­

machean Ethics," 1094a, 18‑22) : " If anything is

an end of our actions which we desire for itself, and

other things on account of it . . . it is plain that

this must be the Good and the Best." And that this

is almost universally predicated of eudaimonia,

" happiness," he states in another passage (1095a,

17 sqq.): "For we choose this for its own sake al­

ways, and never for the sake of anything else." He

admits, however, that there is a controversy as to

what constitutes it. The Christian Fathers, in

estimating the opinions of the philosophers on this

subject, give the preference to Plato, because in

his system God is especially prominent as the

" objective " Highest Good, in the modern phrase.


Aristotle considers merely " the end of our actions," the " Good ", which can be realized by human effort, while Plato brings ethics into close relation with metaphyaicq. He hypoatatizes the " Good " of Socrates into the highest of his " ideas," identi­fying it with the moos, " mind," of Anaxagoras, the one thing, that has real existence, the Godhead. In Plato the same term, " the Good," designates what is highest alike in the life of man and in the system of the universe. The Fathers also commend the way in which he speaks of the ethical "good," the attainable " end," the " happiness " of man; the Highest Good in a subjective sense, as " a likeness to God to the extent of our powers, which likeness consists in becoming just and holy by means of wisdom." The conception of the Highest Good in Christian ethics was largely influenced by the Platonic view, according to which the soul becomes like God only by ascetic flight from the world of sense into the world of ideas, by philosophic medi­tation on death, by ideal speculation and contem­plation of the Godhead. This is intellectualism, to whose prevalence in the Church Aristotle also con­tributed by defining as the highest good the " con­templative activity " of the soul which is like that of God.

The phrase " your good" of Romans xiv. 16 might be referred to the Highest Good and to the

" kingdom of God " in the following z. The verse; but telos nowhere in the New

Scriptural Testament denotes the Highest Good.

Conception. Pa. xvi. is sometimes superscribed "God the Highest Good"; though the text of verse 2 is uncertain, throughout the psalm Yahweh is the " portion " of the rights pus, from whom they derive all good things (cf. also Pa. Ixxiii. 25, 26, 28). Schleiermacher remarks (Werke, III., ii. 456) that the designation of God as the Highest Good is an improper expression, and that it is more correctly defined as love for God. But we are in the habit of referring to persons (such as a wife or a child) as our good in the sense of a possession that makes us happy, without thinking it necessary to speak definitely of our love for them. God is thus Israel's Highest Good; he has given himself to this people as their lord and king. As such be is their lawgiver, their national good (Deut. iv. 8), more to be desired than gold (Ps. xix. 10), and provides all other good things for them. If " your good " in Rom. xiv. 16 is not directly to be referred to the kingdom of God, this kingdom is still, according to the words of Jesus (Matt. vi. 33; cf. xiii. 44, 46) that which is first to be sought. When God is perfectly recognized as king, he will as such bless his people with all good things and thus be the Highest Good of men. Even at present it is the good (best) part (Luke x. 42) to hear the words of Jesus, through which the kingdom of God is established within the soul (cf. also Matt. xiii. 16; John iv. 10). That he is our Highest Good is ex­pressed most clearly in Phil. iii. 7‑10, i. 21‑23; 11 Cor. xii. 9; Heb. iii. 14. The " good things " of Matt. vii. 11 are summed up by Luke (xi. 13) in the Holy Spirit as the Highest Good, including all the others. It would, however, be unscriptural to con­fine the idea of the kingdom of God as the Highest


Good to these relations with him. His rule implies the blessing of his people with social and natural good things. But if any religion may be taken as having an eschatological conception of the Highest Good, it is the religion of the Bible, which under­stands the term of that which is really highest (" that which is perfect," I Cor. xiii. 10). Such passages as I Cor. viii. 8; Rom. mi. 36; Eph. iv. 8 imply that God, who directs all things toward himself, is the end of the world, or that the course of its history is to tend to his glory. The expressions of I Cor. xv. 28 and Rev. i. 8 have contributed to a metaphysical conception of God as the Highest Good in the sense of the ultimate end of all things. The maintenance of his glory in this sense is the devout purpose of those who desire his beneficent rule to prevail (Matt. v. 16; 1 Cor. x. 31; Eph. f. 12; Phil. i. 11, ii. 11; I Peter iv. 11).

In the Church of the second century also, the expected kingdom of God was looked upon as the

Highest Good. It was a result of the 3. Augus‑ Hellenization of Christianity when an tine's In‑ increasing influence was exerted, from fluence. Clement of Rome (Ad Corinthios,

xxxvi. 2) to Clement of Alexandria (Strom., VI., xii.), by the formula " the most per­fect good is knowledge, which is to be chosen for its.own sake," without reference to anything else as in the quotation from Aristotle above. This knowledge (in the high sense given to the word gnosis, denoting a knowledge of the mysteries of God), since it has God for its highest, object, in a sense deifies man, and makes him immortal. Au­gustine's influence was epoch‑makingforthe develop­ment of the idea here discussed. He removed it a considerable distance from the moralism, intellec­tualism, naturalism of the ancients, and returned to the Scriptural paths. In union with Paul, he departs most widely from moralistic naturalism. The ancient morality was capable of the religious interpretation that the natural powers were gifts of God; but Christian ethics presupposes new, supernatural powers, derived from the new creation by God's grace. The ancient ‑philosopher expected, for perfect happiness, to become what he already was by nature, through the energetic cultivation of the higher or spiritual part of his being, in itself good and making it dominate the lower or sensual part. Augustine taught that man can become something quite other than he is by nature, through correspondence to the divine. purpose. The period of Augustine's influence extends practically down to Schleierma,cher. Even Kant's conception of the Highest Good is not really a new one. In the %ritik der praktischen Vernunft (Riga, 1788), he treats of two different elements of the Highest Good‑virtue conceived as an incessant progression toward perfect happiness, he calls the highest (supremum) good; but it is not yet the perfect and complete (consummatum) good, since to become this it requires a happiness proportioned to it, which is the second element of the Highest Good. The ultimate end of the universe is to be sought not in the happiness of rational beings, but in the Highest Good, which adds the condition of its accordance with the laws of virtue,

After Augustine Schleiermacher's teaching marks

the next stage in the development. In his two

treatises Ueber den Begrif dea hiichsten

4. Schleier‑ Guts (1827, 18301, the term denotes

macher'a the sum of the products of moral

View. activity, in so far as this activity still

includes them in itself and continues to

develop them. The total result of the operations of

reason in the world through the human organiza­

tion is the Highest Good‑a perfect and complete

whole, expressed in the terms " golden age," " per­

petual peace," " community of language," " king­

dom of heaven." In this organism of results, vir­

tue, their cause, is included as the powerful life of

reason in the individuals. Schleiermacher's epoch­

making character in regard to this question con­

sists in his introduction into the concept of the

Highest Good of two new elements, the dominion of

man over the earth and the blessings of civilization.

The place where alone, if God is all in all, the

absolute ultimate end exists is God's own personal

spirit, that of his Son, and those of the angels and

saints. The life of God and the " eternal life " of

his perfect children is the highest reality which

exists for its own sake and renders the question of

a purpose absurd. But what is life? In the Scrip­

tural conception of the life of God causation, ac­

tivity, incessant energy predominates among its

constituent factors. In the eternal life of spirits

that are like him, causation of religious acts in

relation to him and of social acts in relation to the

world of blessed spirits is a sinulaxly dominant fac­

tor. With this energy sensations of happiness are

so inseparably connected that they can not be

differentiated, as accidental consequences, from it

as the end. To separate happiness as a subjective

accident from the moral end is something only to

be attempted by objectivism, which designates

objective spiritual results, valuable in and for them­

selves, as the end. It calls them " good " because

the object of life is their attainment, and disap­

proves of the ordinary meaning of the word " good,"

something which has the power to produce happi­

ness in the individual consciousness. In opposition

to this view, the Christian doctrine uses the term

" Highest Good " in the old eudemonistic sense,

and maintains that the happiness produced in the

blessed spirits by their perfect acts of causation

is necessarily included in the absolute ultimate end.

Even when we call God himself the "objective

Highest Good," we do so only in distinction from

the subjective eudaimonia (happiness) which he

causes. And God is not a " good " in the abstract,

but the Highest Good to himself, to the Son, and

to the world. So far Schleiermacher is correct

when he says in' his Christliche Ethik : " The asser­

tion that God is the Highest Good is not altogether

justifiable, four a thing is only classed among our

goods '‑ when we have or possess it; but if we say

that the possession of God or union with God is the

Highest Good, no objection can be raised." This

possession is not an inactive possession. achleier­

macher insists that it, is an essential property of

what we call a " good " to arouse a living activity,

and that an inactive condition, no matter bow

richly endowed, does not come under this head; and


(food Work

the same is true also of " goods " not produced by human activity, of God and his dominion, in rela­tion to the religious and social activities of the spirits, in which they are " blessed" (James i. 25). Now, the Christian faith knows of no capacity to produce these activities except through the Savior; and Sehleiermacher says, "accordingly the redemp­tion through Christ is itself the Highest Good," thus including in the term the element of the gift of grace. It is easy enough to avoid any identifi­cation of this with the real end.

There is, however, a distinction drawn by Thomas Aquinas (Summa, iii. 13) between " an end which is constituted by the action of an g. The Sum agent " and " an end which is pro­of All True existent and to be acquired or ob‑

"Goods." twined .by action or motion." Under

the latter head come God and his

gifts, the Savior and salvation, and the Holy Ghost

who ministers salvation. These gifts are accepted

by an act of the will, with which man's part, the

" action," begins, that which constitutes the " end "

in the former sense, without losing sight of the

" preexistent end." In the religious and social ac­

tivities produced in him by the eternal"goods"the

Christian must perfect himself by daily repentance.

The degree of perfection which must be attained

by each in this world is not known to us; but we

have firm confidence in the grace of God, and hope

for moral perfection in the other world, which shall

perfect also our moral happiness. Physical happi­

ness, too, will~be bestowed upon us by God's love,

though of what nature this will be no one knows.

While Christians already possess "eternal life," a

life which is supramundane and heavenly, this is

only a feeble beginning compared with the blessed

perfection to be attained in the likeness of God in

the world to come. It may therefore be doubted

whether it is to be included in the idea of the (sub­

jective) Highest Good. God's gifts, when he shall

be all in all, will of course not be the same as his

present gift‑redemption, forgiveness of sins,

sanctification. And since in this life the blessings

of civilisation may be numbered among his gifts,

it is possible to include them also in the conception

of the Highest Good, which thus becomes the sum,

the organism, the system, the totality of all true

" goods." KARL THIEME.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: The subject is treated from the historic­philosophloal side in all works on the history of philoso­ply‑e.g.. F. Ueberweg, Gew*kAu der philosopAis, ed. M. Heinse, i. 184, 238 277‑273, Berlin, 1894 (giving ref­erences to other literature). It is also included within the scope of works on ethics and Christian ethics.

Consult: Palmer, in Jahrbflchar fflr deutsdis Theolopie,

v (1880), 438 eqq.; K. Werner, GesrhiAte der apolope­tiaehen and polmiacAan Likmtur der chrieaichan Thsolopia, I. 489‑499, Schaffhausen, 1881• Roman, in jahrbgcher fir deutadw Theolopie, roil (1872), 442 eqq. (on Sehleier­mseher); Arnoldt, in Altpreussieche‑iKonatswArifk, u (1874), 193 sqq‑ (on Kant); 8. Huber, Die Glaekeelipkeits­khre des Aristotdee and heifigen Thomas von Aquinas Freising, 1893; J. Kaftan, in Zeiteehritt tar Tkeolopie Una Birds, vii (1897), 13.

GOOD, JAMES ISAAC: German Reformed; b. at York, Pa., Dec. 31, 1850. He was educated at Lafayette College (B.A., 1872) and Union Theo­logical Seminary (1872‑75). He was pastor of Heidelberg Reformed Church, York, Pa. (1875‑

1877), Heidelberg Reformed Church, Philadelphia

(1877‑90); Calvary Reformed Church, Reading,

Pa., (1890‑05). He was connected with Ur­

einus College, Philadelphia, first as professor of

church history from 1890 to 1893, and then as pro­

fessor of dogmatics and pastoral theology and dean

of the school of theology from 1893 to 1897.

Since 1907 he has been professor of Reformed

Church history in Central Theological Seminary,

Tiffin, O. In theology his position is conservative

and positive. He has written Origin of the Re­

formed Church of Germany (Reading, Pa., 188?);

Rambles around Reformed Lands (1889); History

of the Reformed Church of Germany (1894); History

of the Reformed Church in the United States (1899);

Famous Women of the Reformed Church (Philadel­

phia, 1902); and Famous Miasionariea o f the Re­

formed Church (1903).


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