**Acknowledgements:** I am grateful to Bob Clemen, Bart Lipman, Mark Machina, Peter Wakker, and Andy Yates for helpful comments, but they are not responsible for the consequences. This research is supported by the National Science Foundation under grant 98-09225 and by the Fuqua School of Business.
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