Wednesday June 30 Introductory class with Jan Beyers



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  • Tuesday June 29
  • Arrivals
  • Wednesday June 30
  • Thursday July 1
  • Master class with David Lowery
  • Room M.002, 9.00 – 15.00
  • Friday July 2
  • No working session, visit to Brussels, co-organized with Hans Diels
  • Saturday July 3
  • Morning working session with Jan Beyers or Hans Diels (TBC)
  • Room C.101, 9.00 – 12.00
  • Social program in the historical city of Antwerp
  • Sunday July 4
  • Social Program in the historical city of Antwerp
  • Monday July 5
  • Master class with William Maloney
  • Room M.002 9.00 – 12.00
  • Working session with William Maloney or Dirk De Bièvre
  • Room M.002 13.00 – 15.00
  • Tuesday July 6
  • Master class with William Maloney Room M.002 9.00 – 12.00
  • Working session with Arlo Polleti or Dirk De Bièvre
  • Room M.002 13.00 – 17.00
  • 17.00: deadline essay
  • Wednesday July 7
  • Master class with Joost Berkhout and Jan Beyers
  • Room M.002 9.00 – 12.00
  • Working session with Joost Berkhout or Marcel Hanegraaff
  • Room M.002 14.00 – 15.00
  • Presentation by students
  • Room M.002 15.00 – 17.00
  • Closing dinner + certificate award: 19.00, Restaurant ‘de Talloorkes’ (details to be confirmed at the start of the summer school)
  • Overview of courses
  • TRIP TO BRUSSELS (with Hans Diels)
  • 07:45: Everybody is expected to gather in Antwerp Centraal Station (train departs at 08:06)
  • 09:45 Arrival European Parliament
  • 10:00-12:00 : Panel discussion on Interest Group Politics
  • Topics:
  • - Which sort of strategies or resources are useful in order to gain influence?
  • - How should groups organize themselves in order to survive in Brussels?
  • - Interest groups: facilitating or hindering representative governance?
  • - Registering interest groups: how far should we go?
  • - Is there a business bias in the interest group system?
  • Interesting cases of success and failure of interest groups.
  • Participants: Bart Staes (MEP, Greens/European Free Alliance), Erik Wesselius (Alter EU), Dr. Pieter Bouwen (European Commission/Visiting Professor KULeuven), Pieter Verhelst (Boerenbond, Belgian Farmers Union), Dr. Stijn Billiet (Coordinator sp.a delegation to the EP), Moderator: Prof. Jan Beyers (University of Antwerp)
  • TRIP TO BRUSSELS (with Hans Diels)
  • 12:00-14:00: Lunch at the European parliament
  • 14:00-15:00: European Commission:
  • Speech by Mr. Gerard Legris, Head of the unit responsible for Transparency and relations with stakeholders in the Secreteriat General about the ‘Register for Interest Representatives.
  • 16:00-17:30: The daily life of a lobbyist (Weber Shandwick offices)
  • Lecture by James Watson (Account Director Public Affaris, Weber-Shandwick) about working day to day as a lobbyist.
  •  
  • Assignment
  • “Successful completion of the summer school will be awarded with a certificate indicating 3 credits according to the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS). Awarding this certificate depends on two conditions; firstly, active participation in the course and, secondly, writing a short essay (about 10 pages).”
  • active participation, reading, questions, discussion…
  • a 10-page essay which includes:
    • a short literature review regarding a topic related to the course
    • this could be related to your PhD-thesis or research
    • it is not expected to present original research or data
    • you are allowed to co-author this essay
  • deadline: Tuesday 6 July at 17:00
  • presentations at 7 July between 15:00 and 17:00
  • facilities, library, internet-access (see Piet De Vroede)
  •  

Why studying interest groups?

  • ‘… policies emerge from the interaction of parties, bureaucrats, companies, membership-based groups, trade bodies, groups with few members, competing elites and public opinion’
  • Jordan, Halpin and Maloney, 2004
  • Groups as democratizing agents? (II)
  • Mobilization and maintenance stage
  • Community stage
  • Exercise of influence stage
  • Political outcome stage
  • Key question
  • Why do individuals and interest organizations mobilize?
  • Why do interest populations take a specific form?
  • Why and how do interest groups seek influence?
  • Why do some interest organizations have more influence than others?
  • Focus of theory construction
  • Interest populations
  • Issues and strategies
  • Political system, issues and strategies
  • Dependent variable
  • Collective action
  • Density, diversity and change of populations
  • Strategies of organizations
  • Policies, government recognition of problem
  • Lowery, D. and H. Brasher (2004). Organized Interests and American Government. New York, Mc Graw Hill; and Lowery, D. and V. Gray (2004). "A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests." Political Research Quarterly 57(1): 163-175.
  • Names and people
  • de Toccqueville
  • Putnam
  • Rousseau
  • Madison
  • Truman
  • Olson
  • Schattschneider
  • Streeck and Schmitter
    • opinions range from
    • -> hostile: specific interest organizations at the disadvantage of the general interest
    • -> optimistic: civil society organizations that empowers citizens
  • Name dropping
  • interest groups
  • interest organizations
  • interest associations
  • pressure groups
  • special interest organization
  • citizen groups
  • public interest groups
  • voluntary organizations (page 198, Jordan et al.)
  • non governmental organizations
  • social movement organizations
  • civil society organizations
  • What is an interest group?
  • organizations (identifiable)
  • political interests (a function)
  • informality (do not seek governing power)
  • -> diversity and quantity
  • potentially very large
  • membership
  • goals: specialized – general
  • institutionalized
  • define by function or by a priori normative criteria
  • ~ bottom-up versus top-down
  • Jordan, G., D. Halpin, et al. (2004). "Defining Interests: Disambiguation and the Need for New Directions?" British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6(2): 195-212.
  • Jordan, Halpin and Maloney (2004)
  • pressure participant
  • policy participant
  • interest or pressure group (page 205)
  • policy-centred group
  • Excercise
  • Greenpeace, Nokia, BEUC, ERT, Business Europe, University of Antwerp

Mair (2006)

  • Record low turnouts since 1990
  • Electoral volatility peaking in the 1990s
  • Declining ratios of party membership to the electorate
  • Declines in absolute numbers of party members
  • Policymaking that is increasingly segmented
  • Non-majoritarian policymaking, less electoral competition
  • Mair, P. (2006). Polity-Scepticism, Party Failings, and the Challenge to European Democracy. Ulenbeck Lecture.

UK Governing Party Membership Trends

  • Party Year Membership
  • Labour 1952 1,014,000
  • Labour 2007 200,000
  • Conservative 1953 2,806,000
  • Conservative 2006 247,394
  • Source: Guardian Unlimited, 12th June 2007; 24dash.com 2006; Jordan and Maloney, 2007.

2006 Directory of British Associations

  • 7755 organizations
  • (48% formed between 1966-1995)
  • -------------------------------------------------
  • Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 1 million
  • Amnesty International, Greenpeace, FoE, Countryside Alliance ALL +100,000
  • Braun-Poppelaars, C., J. Berkhout, et al. (2010). Belangenorganisaties in de Nederlandse democratie: beleidsexperts of vertegenwoordigers, unpublished manuscript.
  • Groups in the Netherlands
  • Note:
  • Source: General Secretariat of the European Commission. CONNECS data set, May 2002.
  • Vertical lines denote the implementation of different treaties or treaty changes.

bias is not simply a matter of variation among a given population, in particular not in the EU

  • bias is not simply a matter of variation among a given population, in particular not in the EU
    • some sections of society are difficult to organize:
    • => can we blame the interest group system for this?
    • re-organized by political institutions: 1% of the EU budget, some get 80 to 90% of their budget from the EU
    • => logic institutions want not to be dependent on one single interest
    • citizens support so-called civil society organizations are not a representative sample of society; middle class
    • => skewed citizen involvement can some re-distributive effects
    • much bias is the result of group specialization and the division of competencies
    • not a matter of EU institutions granting no access
  • BIAS

What is the democratic potential of interest groups?

  • Solidarity
  • Representation
  • Constituency
  • Non-human, future generation
  • Human
  • Overlap affiliated and constituency possible?
  • No
  • Yes
  • Can constituency speak in its own voice
  • No
  • yes
  • Linkage
  • Supporters
  • Members
  • Implications for democratizing potential
  • Difficult and not necessarily needed: affiliated are not beneficiaries
  • Possible and might be needed: affiliated are benificiaries
  • Source of legitimacy
  • Being responsive to membership: a mandate
  • Source: Halpin, D. R. (2006). "The Participatory and Democratic Potential and Practice of Interest Groups: Between Solidarity and Representation." Public Administration 84(4): 919-940.

Implications

  • Implications
    • internal democracy (involving members, consultation) is difficult for solidarity groups (see Maloney)
    • members are a costs; succesful diffuse interest organizations are strongly professionalized and features characterised by weak membership input
    • “deliberation”
      • with citizens will be weak
      • if it occurs; it will be mediated through the media,
      • for legitimating positions, epistemic claims will prevail
    • “representativeness” is a tricky device for granting and regulating access
  • Groups as democratizing agents? (II)

Theoretical perspectives (Lowery and Gray, 2004)

  • the pluralist perspective; representation (Truman)
  • the economic perspective; exchange perspective (Olsen)
  • the neo-pluralist perspective
  • -> population dependency (David Lowery)
  • -> no micro-level bias (168)
  • -> also competition for maintenance (among politically similar organizations)
  • -> contingency and context (see difference)
  • -> variation in strategic context
  • Groups as democratizing agents? (II)
  • Pluralism as a network of interest intermediation

Neo-corporatism (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005)

  • ORIGINS
  • limits of the Jacobin state
  • Catholic social doctrine, subsidiarity
  • end class conflict (left and right)
  • Post-war political economic settlement in continental and Nordic European countries
  • can be conceived as an exchange (pp. 446-7)
  • difference with pluralism
  • macro- versus meso-corporatism
  • surrounded by ideological controversy
  • logic of influence versus logic of membership (p. 451-2)
  • Groups as democratizing agents? (II)
  • See also: Schmitter, P. C. and W. Streeck (1999 [1982]). The organization of business interest. Studying associative action of business in advanced industrial societies. Discussion paper 99/1. Cologne, Germany, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Corporatism as a network of interest intermediation
  • logic of influence versus logic of membership
  • Schmitter, P. C. and W. Streeck (1999 [1982]). The organization of business interest. Studying associative action of business in advanced industrial societies. Discussion paper 99/1. Cologne, Germany, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.


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