We begin with the story of Prudenica Martin Gomez, who died while attempting to cross the us-mexico border

Download 1,11 Mb.
Date conversion16.03.2017
Size1,11 Mb.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   25

Impact—Root Cause

The aff precedes political impact scenarios and is a pre-req to collapsing ‘us-them’ mentalities – rejection of ethical considerations makes your impacts inevitable

Zylinska, Professor of New Media and Communications at the University of London, 2004 (Joanna, “The Universal Acts: Judith Butler and the biopolitics of immigration,” Cultural Studies 18.4, pg. 533-35) MM
The problem of openness which is to be extended to our current and prospective guests - even, or perhaps especially , unwanted ones - is, according to Derrida, coextensive with the ethical problem. ‘It is always about answering for a dwelling place, for one’s identity, one’s space, one’s limits, for the ethos as abode, habitation, house, hearth, family, home’ (Derrida 2000, pp. 149/151, emphasis added). Of course, this absolute and unlimited hospitality can be seen as crazy, self-harming or even impossible. But ethics in fact spans two different realms: it is always suspended between this unconditional hyperbolic order of the demand to answer for my place under the sun and open to the alterity of the other that precedes me, and the conditional order of ethnos, of singular customs, norms, rules, places and political acts. If we see ethics as situated between these two different poles, it becomes clearer why we always remain in a relationship to ethics, why we must respond to it, or, in fact, why we will be responding to it no matter what. Even if we respond ‘nonethically’ to our guest by imposing on him a norm or political legislation as if it came from us ; even if we decide to close the door in the face of the other, make him wait outside for an extended period of time, send him back, cut off his benefits or place him in a detention centre, we must already respond to an ethical call. In this sense, our politics is preceded by an ethical injunction, which does not of course mean that we will ‘respond ethically’ to it (by offering him unlimited hospitality or welcome). However, and here lies the paradox, we will respond ethically to it (in the sense that the injunction coming from the other will make us take a stand, even if we choose to do nothing whatsoever and pretend that we may carry on as if nothing has happened). The ethics of bodies that matter also entails the possibility of changing the laws and acts of the polis and delineating some new forms of political identification and belonging. Indeed, in their respective readings of Antigone, Butler and Derrida show us not only that the paternal law towards the foreigner that regulates the idea of kinship in Western democracies can be altered but also that we can think community and kinship otherwise. If traditional hospitality is based on what Derrida calls ‘a conjugal model, paternal and phallocentric’, in which ‘[i]t’s the familial despot, the father, the spouse, and the boss, the master of the house who lays down the laws of hospitality’ (2000, p. 149), openness towards the alien and the foreign changes the very nature of the polis , with its Oedipal kinship structures and gender laws. Since, as Butler shows us, due to new family affiliations developed by queer communities but also as a result of developments in genomics it is no longer clear who my brother is, the logic of national identity and kinship that protects state boundaries against the ‘influx’ of asylum seekers is to be left wanting. This is not necessarily to advise a carnivalesque political strategy of abandoning all laws, burning all passports and opening all borders (although such actions should at least be considered ), but to point to the possibility of resignifying these laws through their (improper) reiteration. Enacted by political subjects whose own embodiment remains in the state of tension with the normative assumptions regarding propriety, gender and kinship that underlie these laws, the laws of hospitality are never carried out according to the idea/l they are supposed to entail (cf. Butler 1993, p. 231).It is precisely Butler’s account of corporeality and matter, of political subjectivity and kinship, which makes Levinas’ ethics (and Derrida’s reworking of it) particularly relevant to this project. Although the concepts of the body and materiality are not absent from Levinas’ writings - indeed, he was one of the first thinkers to identify embodiment as a philosophical blindspot - Butler allows us to redraw the boundaries of the bodies that matter and question the mechanisms of their constitution. Her ‘others’ are not limited to ‘the stranger’, ‘the orphan’ and the ‘widow’ of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the more acceptable others who evoke sympathy and generate pity.10 It is also the AIDS sufferer, the transsexual and the drag queen / people whose bodies and relationships violate traditional gender and kinship structures - that matter to her. By investigating the contingent limits of universalization, Butler mobilizes us against naturalizing exclusion from the democratic polis and thus creates an opportunity for its radicalization (1997, p. 90). The ethics of bodies that matter does not thus amount to waiting at the door for a needy and humble asylum seeker to knock, and extending a helping hand to him or her. It also involves realizing that the s/he may intrude, invade and change my life to the extent that it will never be the same again, and that I may even become a stranger in the skin of my own home.

Modern otherization of immigrants occurs under an imperialist framework fueled by the continual maintenance of the border

Hayter, Migration activist and graduate of Oxford University, 2004 (Theresa, Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls, 2nd ed.  Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004) MM
Immigration ‘problems’ are not a problem of excessive numbers of immigrants. They are a problem of the racism of Europeans, North Americans and white majorities elsewhere, who more or less explicitly harbour notions of the superiority of the white ‘race’, whatever that may mean, and the undesirability of destroying the supposed homogeneity of their nation. In the past these notions have been applied to virtually all new immigrants, whatever their nationality or race. In the last forty years the main objects of anti-immigrant racism in Britain and elsewhere have been, and are, people of African and Asian origin. In the 1950s and 1960s British politicians tried to work out how to exclude ‘coloured’ Commonwealth citizens without excluding white Commonwealth citizens and the much larger numbers of Irish immigrants, without giving an appearance of discrimination and without causing offence to the governments and peoples of the ‘multiracial Commonwealth’. Eventually they abandoned the attempt, and immigration controls, from 1962 onwards, were at first covertly and then blatantly based on racist discrimination not only against foreigners in general, but against particular types of foreigners (see Chapter 2). The currently dominant form of anti-immigrant racism, that which is directed against black and Asian people, and most recently Romany people, is sometimes ‘explained’ by the assertion that they are more easily identifiable as immigrants, or the children of immigrants, than most of the other waves of migrants to Britain over the centuries. But similar things have been said about the supposed ‘non-assimilability’ of other immigrants, and in any case it is unclear why such distinctions should matter. The most convincing explanation for the strength and persistence of anti-black racism is to be found in the myths which the imperialists invented to justify to themselves the extreme forms of suffering they imposed on their colonial subjects. These myths survive, permeate British people’s consciousness, and infect the way all of us think and act. It would nevertheless be surprising if prejudice against black people did not diminish in the same way as prejudice against earlier immigrants has. Meanwhile, anti-immigrant hysteria is whipped up not only against black, Asian and Romany refugees but also against other recent groups of refugees and migrants: Kosovans and other white east Europeans. The primary targets of racism and xenophobia are now refugees. Since the 1980s there have been rapid increases, from a low level, in the numberof people coming from the Third World and eastern Europe to Britain and other rich countries to seek asylum. The increase in asylum seekers followed the closing of borders against people coming to seek work in the 1960s and 1970s. The government and others have made the false logical leap that this means that asylum seekers are actually economic migrants trying to exploit a loophole in immigration controls. A few are. But to claim that most asylum seekers are ‘bogus’, as government ministers and the media often do, is false and unjust. They come overwhelmingly from countries and regions in which there are repressive regimes, civil wars and violent conflicts. Most of these are not the areas from which people had previously migrated to work. There is in fact a connection between the two types of migration, but not in the way in which those opposed to immigration see it. This is that imperialism bears much responsibility for both of them. Imperialism created links between the colonies and the metropolis. While war, conflicts and repression are often the product of many internal factors, including the chauvinism of religious and ethnic majorities, various forms of nationalism and more straightforward struggles for domination and wealth, it can be argued that some arise from centuries of imperialist control, and in particular the imperialists’ divide-and-rule tactics and the boundaries they drew on maps. Imperialism in its modern guise has created new forms of impoverishment, which may exacerbate existing nationalist and ethnic tensions. When the long postwar capitalist boom ended in the late 1970s, the rich countries succeeded in transferring much of the burden of their own crisis to the Third World. The prices of Third World countries’ exports of primary commodities and raw materials collapsed. When at the beginning of the 1980s first the Reagan government in the United States and then European governments raised interest rates to unprecedented heights, they massively increased the cost of servicing foreign debt for governments in the Third World (which had been pressed to borrow at low or even negative interest rates from Western banks seeking a ‘sinkhole’ for the money deposited by oil-exporters in the 1970s). In order to force governments to continue to service their debt at these new extortionate rates of interest, a cartel of the World Bank, the IMF, Western governments and banks and Third World elites imposed cuts in public expenditure on social services, wages and employment in Third World countries which bore most heavily on the poor and urban wage earners. In Algeria the massacres started when the military denied election victory to the FIS, an Islamic party, whose strength was built especially among the poor in urban areas impoverished by the government’s turn to more orthodox pro-Western economic policies. The imposition of IMF/World Bank ‘liberalisation’ in Yugoslavia led to severe poverty and unemployment and heavy indebtednessto Western banks and financial institutions. In their attempt to get Yugoslavia to service this debt, the IMF/World Bank forced the federal government to cut investment and transfers to the regions. Michel Chossudovsky in a detailed article on this issue says: ‘Secessionist tendencies feeding on social and ethnic divisions gained impetus precisely during aperiod of brutal impoverishment of the Yugoslav population. ... The “economic therapy” (launched in January 1990) contributed to crippling the federal State system. State revenues which should have gone as transfer payments to the republics and autonomous provinces were instead funnelled towards servicing Belgrade’s debt ... .’ This in turn fuelled the populist nationalism which led to the break-up of Yugoslavia and war

Militarized border discourse is the root cause of exclusion – the aff shifts from questioning the migrant to questioning their forced eviction

Hayter, Migration activist and graduate of Oxford University, 2004 (Theresa, Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls, 2nd ed.  Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004) MM
In a more direct sense, repression and wars in the Third World are largely made possible because both the regimes and those who fight them obtain weapons from the industrialised countries, frequently with the help of official loans. Many of the world’s most repressive regimes are supported, with aid for example, by European governments and the United States. Boththe Nigerian and the Zairean governments, as well as many governments in Latin America and Asia, were supported for years while they oppressed and tortured their peoples and stole their wealth. When right-wing governments are thrown out or voted out by liberation the West intervenes by cutting aid, boycotting trade and sometimes by military intervention movements or left-wing political parties and attempt to carry out reforms and to redistribute wealth to the poor, , directly or through its surrogates. It thus has direct responsibility, for example, for refugees from Chile and from Angola, among others. The recent flow of refugees from eastern Europe follows the introduction of capitalism and market systems and the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, most of which was welcomed and supported by the West. In 1999 more than half of all asylum seekers in Europe were from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, nearly all of them Kosovans. Those who assert that refugees and migrants are a problem should examine the causes of forced migration, rather than blaming and punishing refugees.


The USfg is constantly attempting to further securitize the border in an attempt to control the people attempting to cross it

Griesbach 2010 (Kathleen UC San Diego “Immigration Detention, State Power, and
Resistance: The Case of the 2009 Motín in Pecos, Texas” pgs. 5-6) TYBG

Foucault points out that the foundations of the modern state were made by soldiers as well as jurists and philosophers; the continued use of military tactics as a primary method of immigration control - particularly in border initiatives such as Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Hold the Line of the 1990s -attests to the perpetuation of these origins of power-over by force14. In and of themselves, these tactics seem “natural” for any state interested in regulating its population and controlling its outsiders. Disciplinary power operates within the US through the system of immigration control as an extension of the “disciplined” encounters with migrants at the border. The differentiation of individuals by documentation is essential in the construction of the “Other.” The soldierly “tactics” of US border enforcement illustrate the militarization of the national front to keep out an “Other” whose demographic characteristics have historically been constructed through United States immigration policies from the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and onward in more subtle ways. The surveillance and at times armed expulsion of others once they enter the US, and not merely if they enter it illegally, exemplifies the perpetuation of disciplinary power. As Eithne Luibhéid argues, Clearly, inspection at the border is not a one-time experience but it is rather, as Foucault’s image of the carceral archipelago suggests, a process that situates migrants within lifelong networks of surveillance and disciplinary relations.15 Foucault’s discussion of “panopticism” illuminates the evolution of institutions into disciplinary societies, through the extension of the mechanisms of discipline throughout society in “the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society”16. The theoretical Panopticon is a place of constant surveillance, of power transmitted through the knowledge that others are watching. The Panopticon shows us how “power is exercised, not simply held”17. In Bentham’s Panopticon “each comrade becomes a guardian.” This calls to mind the Minutemen, the citizen activist group engaged in voluntary civilian border “defense”. Their interventions in US border enforcement contribute to the “surveillance” of the border, reinforcing the disciplinary power exercised over would-be immigrants to the United States. They show that disciplinary power is exercised on all levels of society, well beyond the auspices of the state. The same spirit of “surveillance” characterizes federal collaboration with local authorities, in the form of 287 (g) partnerships between Immigration and Customs Enforcement and local law enforcement. In 287 (g) partnerships (signed into effect with the Immigrant Nationality Act of 1996), ICE trains local officials around the US to act in its capacity, aggressively seeking and capturing undocumented migrants within local jails (“criminal aliens”) and in the local community.18 In this way, the local police become “guardians”, exerting disciplinary power on behalf of federal officials over immigrants illegally in the United States. The vast majority of migrants apprehended through these strategies are Mexican19, and a great majority of these immigrant detainees are charged for nothing more than illegal entry.20 The disciplinary power exercised toward the immigrant population of course doesn’t end at the border; surveillance of immigrants continues once they enter the country in the context of documentation status and far beyond official records in social segregation. Immigrants enter the official records on conditional terms or else stay in the shadows as “undocumented” migrants. Their immigration status determines the amount of “surveillance” they face from the government, in the sense that legal permanent residents or other non-citizens are in much greater danger of being deported and can be denied citizenship for any misstep. The actions of their lives (tax activities, criminal record) come under great scrutiny when they apply for citizenship or for other government benefits. In the pursuit of adjusting or acquiring status, then, they are voluntarily under government watch throughout the probationary period before citizenship is established, if it is at all. Differentiation by immigrant status determines the degree of agency – to vote, to get a higher education, or to walk without anxiety down the street. If, as Luibhéid argues, immigration control is both a powerful symbol of nationhood and people and “a means to literally construct the nation and the people in particular ways”21, then differentiation by immigrant status - a way of exercising disciplinary power - presents many complications to a coherent construction of who belongs and who is “Other”. Mixed status families exemplify this difficulty. Though he had lived in the United States for almost 20 years, Jesus Manuel Galindo had a different status than that of his wife, children, and extended family. As a result he was expelled from the nation in which he had come of age and separated from his entire family, and then sentenced to serve jail time for attempting to reunify with his family by crossing the northern border

The issue with opening the border has long been framed under the concept of “securitization” – Securitization fails in democratic regimes because the public is often swayed by the overdramatized threat of terminal harms. As we “open the border”, we want to lessen the dramatic portrayal of the perceived threat and instead leave it up to politicization.

Astor 2009 (Avi, Post-Doc @ University of Michigan, later Pompeu Fabra University, Department of Poltical and Social Sciences, “Unauthorized Immigration, Securitization and the Making of Operation Wetback”, Latino Studies (2009) 7, 5/29, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/lst/journal/v7/n1/full/lst200856a.html)
Bare life is life that is excluded from the political order. The relation of bare life to the political order, however, is not purely a relation of exteriority. Rather, bare life is the “zone of indistinction” in which political life and natural life “constitute each other in including and excluding each other” (p. 90). Citizenship, the lynchpin of the modern political order, would be meaningless without the presence, whether real or imaginary, of non-citizens. But the role played by non-citizens in constituting the political order is contingent on their exclusion from this order. Agamben sees this exclusive logic as the fatal flaw of the modern nation-state, and attributes the myriad abuses suffered by refugees and denaturalized subjects during the last two centuries to its immanent unfolding.¶ The utility of Agamben's insights derive from their uncanny ability to highlight both the constitutive role that politically marginalized populations play in shaping the modern political order and the logic of their exclusion from this order. They are not excluded simply by virtue of being non-citizens, refugees or stateless persons, but by virtue of being the embodiment of pure life itself, which has no place in the modern political order when decoupled from political existence. Scholars must be cautious, however, not to lose sight of the fact that Agamben's analysis of bare life emerged from his analysis of specific European events, most notably the Holocaust, and therefore may miss unique aspects of the experiences of racism and exclusion in non-European contexts. Hesse (2004), for instance, argues that Agamben's conception of racism is “Eurocentric,” as it defines racism as a “relation of exception” and consequently overlooks the ways in which racism is built into social institutions. Taking the Holocaust as the ideal-typical case of biopolitical exclusion, Hesse writes, obscures other experiences of racist exclusion that cannot be assimilated into this paradigm.¶ As I explain below, it is highly important to contextualize Agamben's concepts within the given socio-historical setting in which they are employed, and to be attentive to processes that they may overlook. Nevertheless, Hesse's critique of his framework does not do justice to Agamben's unique and innovative definition of “relations of exception.” By focusing on the exception, Agamben by no means wants to argue that racism and other exclusionary ideologies are not built into social institutions. Indeed, he believes that relations of exception are constitutive of the fundamental institutions underpinning the modern political order, namely sovereignty and citizenship. Without the ability to call forth a state of exception, and without the presence of non-citizens, sovereignty and citizenship would be meaningless. Following Benjamin (1965), Agamben (2005) argues that the exception has become the rule in modern society, as it is built into the basic workings of modern social and political institutions.¶ Agamben's argument does, however, suffer from several shortcomings. The most serious is that it is overly teleological, attributing essentially all atrocities committed against those at the margins of the political community to the actualization of the logic inherent to the foundational principles of nation-states. Consequently, Agamben's ideas are not especially useful for explaining why xenophobic sentiment and discriminatory practices crystallize during some periods and not others, or why they target certain collectives but neglect others similarly situated economically and socially. This shortcoming results, in part, from Agamben's overemphasis on political and legal exclusion, and his neglect of the important role of social processes and practices in determining which populations become marked as excluded and targeted by discriminatory policies, and when this tends to occur.¶ Recent developments in the field of security studies, most notably the concept of “securitization” developed by the Copenhagen School, provide the analytic tools necessary for a more contextualized and historically based analysis of the exceptional politics discussed so eloquently by Agamben. Waever (1995) originally developed the concept of securitization in reaction to traditional conceptions of security, which confined issues of security to military threats and their effects on international relations. Part of the rationale for confining the field of security studies to military issues was that broadening it to address other sectors would lead to a loss in analytic coherence and focus (Walt, 1991; Dorff, 1994). However, it also reflected an identification of security threats with the referent objects of such threats, which were defined exclusively in terms of state sovereignty. The radical move of Waever in developing the concept of securitization, which has been elaborated further by Buzan et al (1998), was to shift the emphasis of security studies away from referent objects alone and toward the processes by which actors present threats (military and non-military alike) as a justification for emergency measures and the transcendence of ordinary politics, as well as the outcomes of these processes.¶ Securitization, according to Buzan et al, is a “speech act” that dramatizes and presents an issue as of supreme priority. By claiming an issue is a matter of security, an agent “claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (p. 26). Contrasting securitization with politicization, Buzan et al write,¶ Politicization means to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility, in contrast to issues that either could not be different … or should not be put under political control. By contrast, securitization … means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the ordinary haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues. (p. 29)¶ A person or group that makes a speech act, or “securitizing move” is a “securitizing actor.” But just because an appeal to security is made, there is no guarantee that a given issue will be securitized. The threat must also be seen as reasonable by the “audience” of the “speech act.” The audience may very well regard the “securitizing move” as illegitimate and oppose attempts to elevate the threat into the realm of security. Securitization is thus an inter-subjective process, encompassing both the actor who makes the securitizing move and the audience who perceives the move as legitimate. The possibility that securitizing moves may fail is essential for understanding the functioning of securitizing discourses in liberal democratic states, as opposed to dictatorial regimes. Securitization involves, at least to some degree, public endorsement of the suspension of normal rules and procedures. Indeed, as Agamben (2005) similarly points out, the power invested in the state during a state of exception comes from the fact that the state's actions are viewed as having the force of law behind them, even though they may violate the normal dictates of the law. However, unlike Agamben, who talks very little about the conditions under which attempts to engage in exceptional politics are likely or unlikely to be successful, Buzan et al specify a set of “facilitating conditions,” or conditions under which a speech act can succeed in securitizing an issue. First, the speech act must follow the grammar, or general structure, of security discourse. Second, the securitizing actor must possess sufficient social capital to be convincing to the audience of the speech act. Finally, the alleged threat must be perceived, at least to some degree, by the audience as a legitimate threat to their well-being, rather than a fabrication used to further the interests of a particular person or group. Thus, not just anyone can securitize an issue, and not just any issue can be securitized.

Under the broad umbrella of the “Red Scare”, illegal immigrants have long been labeled enemies of the nation and threats to national security. The securitization goes as far as to dehumanize the Mexicans to the point where their long-lost relatives, now of partial American descent and full citizenship, despise them and shun them for self-preservation.

Astor 2009 (Avi, Post-Doc @ University of Michigan, later Pompeu Fabra University, Department of Poltical and Social Sciences, “Unauthorized Immigration, Securitization and the Making of Operation Wetback”, Latino Studies (2009) 7, 5/29, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/lst/journal/v7/n1/full/lst200856a.html)
Interests alone did not determine the way in which different social institutions and actors embraced or resisted the securitizing rhetoric around immigration during the 1950s. The case of unions and Hispanic civic organizations and their embrace of the securitizing rhetoric promoted by the media, politicians and the INS illustrates the importance of looking at the broader social field and historical context in which the discourses surrounding immigration and security were embedded. The restrictive and xenophobic stance of unions toward Mexican immigrant workers during the 1950s had roots dating back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During this period, it was the norm for the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and mainstream unions to push for heavy restrictions on immigration, and to reinforce racism among the general populace. Although there were a select few unions, such as the Industrial Workers of the World, that espoused a more inclusive ideology of worker solidarity and encouraged immigrant participation, such unions failed to attract a strong enough membership base to sustain themselves over time (Mink, 1986).¶ The intensification of the Cold War and the atmosphere of fear created by McCarthy and others who exploited the Red Scare placed unions in a somewhat precarious position, as those sympathetic to worker interests were frequently suspected of being sympathetic to communism as well. Consequently, unions, at least at the federal level, took strong measures to distinguish themselves as allies, rather than enemies, in the war against communism. In combination with their traditional xenophobic approach toward dealing with questions of immigration, this led them to embrace wholeheartedly the rhetoric linking immigration to communism.¶ In opposition to H.R. 355, Walter P. Reuther, the president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), argued that the government's failure to tighten border security and implicit encouragement of illegal entry into the United States invited “fifth-column activities of subversion and sabotage” (United States, Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 1954). A couple of months later, in April of 1954, William Schnitzler, the secretary-treasurer of the AFL said that “Communists and potential spies and saboteurs” were among the Mexican “wetbacks” entering the country, and that “Red-hunting Senators” ignored this threat to national security because of the interest of big business in cheap labor (Los Angeles Times, 1954a, 17). In addition to contributing to fears of direct communist infiltration through the Mexican border, union leaders argued that the terrible exploitation of Mexican immigrants was being used by communists and other ideologues to bolster anti-American sentiment by portraying the United States as a country completely focused on the advancement of narrow economic interests and unconcerned with the welfare of ordinary workers. Reuther, for example, stated that the administration was playing “directly into the hands of Communist elements” in Central and South America, and that the legislation allowing unilateral recruitment of farm labor “would give the Communists invaluable support in their unceasing efforts to picture the United States as “the colossus of the north,” a Nation motivated solely by narrow economic self-interest” (United States, Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, 1954, 76–77).¶ Hispanic civic groups also partook in the use of securitizing rhetoric linking Mexican immigration to threats to internal security. The tenuousness of the relationship between Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants has roots dating back to the nineteenth century. Up until the rise of the Chicano Movement and the civil rights struggles that took place during the 1960s and 1970s, the main strategy of Hispanic civic organizations was assimilationist. The goal was to become “white,” rather than to gain acceptance as a national minority. Mexican Americans and long-term Mexican residents in the United States perceived the entry of poor Mexican peasants into the Southwest not only as a source of job competition, but also as a barrier to their full assimilation and acceptance in American society, as they were often poor, illiterate and unfamiliar with the cultural and linguistic norms of the United States (Sanchez, 1993; Gutierrez, 1995).

Securitization of the immigrant problem leads to a loss of identity for the illegal immigrants and reduces government policy to a point where it is no longer a problem of the economy but a problem of national security. This skews government policy in uncontrollable and racist ways.

Astor 2009 (Avi, Post-Doc @ University of Michigan, later Pompeu Fabra University, Department of Poltical and Social Sciences, “Unauthorized Immigration, Securitization and the Making of Operation Wetback”, Latino Studies (2009) 7, 5/29, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/lst/journal/v7/n1/full/lst200856a.html)
As this paper has shown, Operation Wetback was the culmination of a process of securitization that had taken place over the course of several years preceding the summer of 1954. The intensification of the Cold War provided the context within which it was possible for myriad social actors, including politicians, the media and the INS, to advance claims linking unauthorized immigration to the Red Scare that would not have been credible under different circumstances. Other actors, including unions and Hispanic civic organizations, also took advantage of the opportunity to use discourses linking immigration to national security in order to advance their own struggles for position and recognition in society. Those who resisted such securitizing moves, namely growers and politicians from the Southwest, did so solely out of self-interest, and cared little about the welfare of undocumented immigrants themselves. When growers were guaranteed an adequate and stable supply of bracero labor by government authorities, they generally embraced plans to carry out the mass deportation of undocumented workers so as to avoid the increasingly negative reputation that came along with employing undocumented labor (Calavita, 1992). With minimal social organization and integration into US communities, due in large part to INS post-harvest deportations and spatial segregation, undocumented immigrants remained faceless and invisible in US society, and they had few advocates who genuinely cared about their well-being. Consequently, the securitizing moves made by different actors were, by and large, accepted by the American public as a legitimate justification for elevating the issue of unauthorized immigration out of the realm of ordinary politics and into the realm of security. Once unauthorized immigration had been elevated into the realm of security, ordinary laws and procedures no longer influenced what government officials and agencies could or could not do. They had virtually complete discretion to deal with the “wetback problem” as they saw fit. During the planning stages of Operation Wetback, Brownell even suggested the possibility of shooting some undocumented immigrants to discourage others from crossing the border (García, 1980). The mere consideration of killing as a possible means of dealing with unauthorized immigration demonstrates the extreme dangers that come with elevating an issue into the realm of security.


Immigration should be unlimited— limiting it leads to dangerous communal fusion movements such as Nazism or Fascism

Ajana 06, (PhD in Sociology from London School of Economics and Political Science Btihaj. "Immigration Interrupted." Journal for Cultural Research 10.3 (2006): 259-273. Print.)
Instead of regarding being-in-common as the gathering together of individuals who share some common property or essence –and in which the clinamen is removed from such gathering, Nancy (1991, p. 26–7) offers an alternative under- standing of this concept. He asserts that being-in-common is first and foremost being exposed to alterity through a relationship of sharing, made possible by the Heideggerian notion of being-with (Mitsein) which goes beyond commonality and identity politics. Such an understanding, albeit abstract due to its breaking away from any spatial particularity, does indeed save individuals or rather singularities from the danger of communal fusion (witnessed for instance in the movements of fascism and Nazism) and the restraints of self-enclosure [like] (immigration controls for instance). For in Nancy’s conceptualisation, singular beings are not regarded as absolute figures of immanentist politics (i.e. citizens) but as beings whose experience of being-in-common is constituted through their predicate-free existential/ ontological position of being-there (Dasein) and what they reveal to each other in their exteriority (which forms their interiority) and their multiplicity (which forms their uniqueness). The being-such of a singular being is irreducibly a being- with that draws its sense of ‘selfness’ from the existence of ‘otherness’ without, however, having to live up to a differentiating identity or a shared individuality that would place it within the confines of categorisation i.e. suchness: ‘such-and- such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property … (the reds, the French, the Muslims)’ (Agamben 1993, p. 1). Thus, the realisation or rather actualisation of being-in-common is only possible insofar as singular beings are ‘whatever’ (ibid.) beings (not having any particular identity) whose ‘membership’ could not be determined by or reduced to having/sharing ‘common’ characteristics. But a membership that can only be experienced at the moment of exposure to singu- larity, at the moment of its ‘taking place’ ‘…(which is itself without a place, with- out a space reserved for or devoted to its presence)’ (Nancy 1991, p. 72). Exposure, sharing and being-with are thus constitutive of being-in-common in such a way that belonging itself becomes a ‘bare’ belonging stripped from any predetermined condition of membership (Agamben 1993, p. 84) or demarcated territoriality. It is a belonging where ‘whatever’ (singularity such as it is – and this ‘such’ is uniden- tifiable and fluid) belongs to ‘whateverness’ (unconditional being-in-common). Immigration, in this sense, can be regarded as an aspect of exposure, sharing and being-with, to which there could/should be no fixed limit or neat bordering.

The implication of regulated immigration is violence derived from this radical breach of ethics

Ajana 06, (PhD in Sociology from London School of Economics and Political Science Btihaj. "Immigration Interrupted." Journal for Cultural Research 10.3 (2006): 259-273. Print.)
For when the issue of immigration is contemplated from an ethical standpoint, it becomes possible to reveal not only the failure but also the ‘violence’ embedded within Western politics (Metselaar 2003, p. 1). This political violence is epitomised in the policies of detention, the treatment of refugees, the proposal of asylum quotas, the forced integration, or even, the act of ‘naming’ (‘illegal immigrant’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee’, ‘bogus’, ‘detainee’, ‘deportee’, etc.), all of which breach the ethics of radical generosity toward otherness – in that ‘violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves’ (Levinas 1969, p. 21). It is, hence, the call for ethics that puts the question of politics into doubt and reconfigures the understanding of responsibility ‘for the Other’ (Levinas 1982, p. 95), for the ‘Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself’ (Levinas 1969, p. 39)4.

Conditional hospitality bad—leads to exclusion and violence

Ajana 06, (PhD in Sociology from London School of Economics and Political Science Btihaj. "Immigration Interrupted." Journal for Cultural Research 10.3 (2006): 259-273. Print.)
For conditional hospitality entails a measuring of actions, a calculation of responsibility and a selection of those to whom one may/should be hospitable [or] responsible. This is indeed the political hospitality manifested, for instance, in what Cohen (2003, p. 72) calls ‘economic elitism’ found in the schemes of points system and work permits which function by means of filtering those who may economically contribute ‘more to the public purse’ (Spencer, in Cohen 2003, p. 73) from those who have ‘little or nothing to contribute’ (Cohen 2003, p. 73). Added to that the current ‘Worker Registration Scheme’ in the United Kingdom relating to nationals of the new European Union member states7 as well as the proposed quotas for asylum. Ramifications of this political hospitality are [is] damaging and violent in that not only modes of discrimination, inequality and exclusion are systematically implemented, but also, the absolute responsibility for the Other is negated and overridden by an exigency for reciprocity or a demand for repayment

Impact—Human Rights

Bioprofiling creates a web of nonegalitarian distinctions, undermining human rights associated with globalization.

Shamir 05 (Ronen, Professor of Sociology at Tel-Aviv University, 2005 “Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime,” Sociological Theory 23.2 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=a38a1096-53e7-4f5d-8fb2-678c41fae19b%40sessionmgr10&vid=4&hid=26)
Bioprofiling, however, is not simply a more accurate and efficient way to validate one’s identity and to cross it with relevant data on illegal immigration, crime, or terrorism. Bioprofiling inscribes a designated category of suspicion on human bodies, facilitating a situation in which one’s fingerprints testify to one’s travel log and consumption patterns along with one’s place of origin, ethnic background, or religious affiliation. In this way, biosocial profiling transforms mobility into a public performance, both in the sense of treating the human individual as a mobile unit located within collective categories of suspicion and in the sense of subjecting a relatively discreet social action to public scrutiny. Perhaps ironically, however, the transformation of mobility into a moment of utmost exposure does not enhance social proximity but rather maintains and facilitates a regime of social distance. Profiling represents a distinct modality of power, in this case the power to immobilize, to create social distances, and in general to police and regulate spatial behavior. Profiling has to be distinguished from other modalities of power. Foucault characterized late modernity by arguing that an intricate web of nonegalitarian distinctions— enabled by technologies of normalization—underwrites the package of egalitarian and universal rights promised to individuals in liberal constitutions. Normalization, as Foucault called it, announced an era of lesser reliance on physical punishment in general and on the life-taking powers of law in particular. Rather, normalization uses disciplinary techniques that manage life by subjecting individuals to an everexpanding list of standards to which they are expected to conform. Perceiving people as “moral and rational actors” (Simon 1988), normalization aspires to “change” people and to correct behavior. In guiding sentencing policies, write Feeley and Simon (1992), this meant concerns with rehabilitation and reform. However, the new penology, they argue, relies on actuarial techniques rather than individual characteristics to determine punishment, aiming more at efficient risk management than at rehabilitation (Feeley and Simon 1994, 1992). Because this actuarial justice does not seek to change people but rather “to manage them in place” (Simon 1988:773), its logic seems to be in perfect fit with the mobility-curbing and mobilityconfining tasks of biosocial profiling as well. Biosocial profiling, activated at the service of a mobility regime, is not concerned with correction (whether through education, persuasion, or sanctions), but rather with fixing individuals into given categories of suspicion. If various tests serve the disciplines in their attempt to normalize individual behavior, then the classifications of profiling serve the mobility regime in its attempt to block or contain individuals. Thus, paraphrasing Foucault, we may argue that a dense web of nonegalitarian distinctions—establishing a system of highly differential movement licenses—underwrites the universal declarations of human rights that are so strongly associated with globalization.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   25

The database is protected by copyright ©sckool.org 2016
send message

    Main page