We begin with the story of Prudenica Martin Gomez, who died while attempting to cross the us-mexico border

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Biopower Links

Link—Population Management

Modes of surveillance along the border are a form epistemic control. Invoking the border is a good example of this control.

Ajana, Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities & Creative Industries at King’s College London. 2005[Btihaj, 2005 “Surveillance and Biopolitics,” Electronic Journal of Sociology. RH]

With the increasing uncertainties of post September 11 world, the issue of surveillance is given renewed importance through the discourses surrounding the proliferation of ‘control’ technologies and the rhetoric of (in)security pervading contemporary politics. Electronic technologies are seen to be intensifying the ‘capacity’ and ubiquity of surveillance creating ‘new’ forms of social control. Not that the newness of the current modes of surveillance is to be regarded from a merely ontological vantage point and especially not as ‘a shift to a new type of society’ (Rose, 1999: 237) per se but more so from the epistemic informationisation and hybridisation of control and monitoring facilitated by the spread of digital technologies which lend to the emerging trends of surveillance their label of newness while sustaining the existing status quo of society. Examples of these technologies include DNA fingerprinting, electronic tagging, drug testing, health scans, biometric ID cards and passports, smart closed circuit television, etc, all of which rely on algorithmic techniques as well as ‘body parts’ in order to perform their function of surveillance. Whilst there is a myriad of issues pertaining to the phenomenon of surveillance, each of which deserve a thorough examination both theoretically and empirically, this paper will be mainly concerned with one specific aspect of surveillance and its relation to biopolitics and the ways in which surveillance stands as the emblem of the magnitude and dimension of that which constitutes the management of life and death. In so doing, the ‘border’ will be invoked as the principal example of the interwoven relationship between surveillance and biopolitics all the while drawing upon the work of Foucault and others in order to elucidate the theoretical foundations of the relationships as well as the existing juxtaposition of bodies and technologies at the border.

The Panopticon is a metaphor for surveillance along the border. This surveillance causes two forms of biopolitical control in the form of extreme order and in extreme exclusion.

Ajana, Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities & Creative Industries at King’s College London. 2005[Btihaj, 2005 “Surveillance and Biopolitics,” Electronic Journal of Sociology. RH]

In a chapter called Panopticism, Foucault (1975) begins by outlining two major forms through which discipline and surveillance were exerted. The first being the spatialisation of the plague-stricken town by means of segmenting and immobilising space as well as placing individuals within enclosures and under severe and permanent supervision. Such surveillance involves ‘tactics of individualizing disciplines’ (Foucault, 1975: 199) which proceed from a system of ‘permanent registration’ (registering the details of each inhabitant of the town) as well as mechanisms of distribution (in which each inhabitant is related to his place, his body and his condition) so that the disease is met by order, eradicating any confusion that may emerge out of the ‘mixing’ of bodies, be these living or dead. The second organisational form is that of the treatment of the leper which, unlike ‘the plague and its segmentations’, functions by means of separation and exclusion of the leper from the healthy community through mechanisms of ‘branding’, ‘dichotomisation’ and ‘exile-enclosure’. From these two different images (plague and leprosy) which underlies the two different projects (segmentation and separation), Foucault goes on to explain the two ways of exerting (political) power: discipline on the hand (as is the case with the plague), and exclusion on the other (as is the case with leprosy). However, and despite the difference of the two modes, they are ‘not incompatible ones’ (Foucault, 1995: 199) for power functions by way of excluding the ‘infected’ (here, the image of the leper stands as an emblematic figure of ‘beggars’, ‘vagabonds’, ‘madmen’, etc, just as the image of the plague symbolises ‘all forms of confusion and disorder’) and individualising the excluded so much so that lepers (all those who are symbolised by this image) are treated as plague victims (all those who are caught up within disorderly spaces). Hence, power is but a concurrent amalgamation of the two forms, and according to Foucault, Bentham’s Panopticon is par excellence ‘the architectural figure of this composition’ (1975: 200). Bentham’s utilitarian plan for a prison which is based on an observing supervisor placed in a central tower and who can see without being seen, serves as a compelling paradigm for the kind of surveillance that is intrinsic to the compound power of exclusion and individualization. As Elden (2002: 244) explains, the model of the Panopticon is where the space of exclusion (of the figurative leper) ‘is rigidly regimented and controlled’ (as is the case with the figurative plague victim). The idea that ‘visibility is a trap’ (Foucault, 1975: 200) (i.e. the presence of the tall tower at the centre does not necessarily mean the supervisor is watching), that ‘collective’ individualities are overridden by separated ‘individualities’ (the treatment of lepers as a plague victims – the trinity of segmentation, individualisation and separation) and that power is ‘unverifiable’ (uncertainty about whether/when one is being watched), is what makes the model of Panopticon such a subtle and effective architectural apparatus. Power does not need to be enforced but merely ‘internalised’ through mechanisms of self-regulation. Such mechanisms render the observed as simultaneously the bearer (subject) of and the one subjected to power. Not that the Panopticon is merely a method of observation devoid of other disciplinary modes of power but it is also a machine that could be used to ‘carry out experiments, to alter behaviour, to train or correct individuals’ (Foucault, 1975: 203) within a variety of institutional spaces, ranging from prisons to schools, hospitals, factories, etc. It is, hence, the way in which the metaphor of the Panopticon encapsulates different technologies and spaces of surveillance and discipline that Foucault places the notion of disciplinary society under the umbrella of panopticism in order to capture the diagrammatic strategies underlying power relations and in which ‘positions’ and ‘identities’ are fundamental features vis-à-vis the functioning of ‘panoptical’ surveillance.:

Social Institutions within borders reinforce the control on immigration and the management of life.

Ajana, Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities & Creative Industries at King’s College London. 2005 [Btihaj, 2005 “Surveillance and Biopolitics,” Electronic Journal of Sociology. RH]
Other surveillance techniques involve the use of biometrics which consists of an ‘enrolment phase’ (European Commission, 2005: 46) where physical attributes such as fingerprints, DNA patterns, retina, iris, face, voice, etc are used to collect, process, and store biometric samples onto a database for subsequent usage during the ‘recognition phase’ in which these data are matched against the real-time data input in order to verify identity. Authorities have been keen on integrating biometric identifiers into ID cards and passports as a means of strengthening security, enhancing modes of identification and facilitating the exchange of data between different countries. Further application of biometrics in information sharing can be seen in the EU-wide database EURODAC (Koslowski, 2003: 11), used to store the fingerprints of asylum applicants in order to prevent multiple applications in several member states or what is referred to as the so-called ‘asylum shopping’. Added to that, the employment of a broad array of private actors (employers, banks, hospitals, educational institutions, marriage register offices, etc) to perform the role of ‘gatekeepers’ (Lahav, in Koslowski, 2003: 5) (or more accurately, ‘borderkeepers’) and reinforce immigration controls from within the internal and ubiquitous borders, constituting ‘a multiplicity of points for the collection, inscription, accumulation and distribution of information relevant to the management of risk’ (Rose, 1999: 260), and the administration of life and death.

The conceptualization of borders has become a tool of the privileged and powerful to block and contain mobility.

Shamir 05 (Ronen, Professor of Sociology at Tel-Aviv University, 2005 “Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime,” Sociological Theory 23.2 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=a38a1096-53e7-4f5d-8fb2-678c41fae19b%40sessionmgr10&vid=4&hid=26)
The first principle of division that governs the mobility regime is that which separates privileged countries and regions from most other regions of the world, in effect turning the latter into suspect countries. It is typically within these suspect countries that we find large concentrations of dispossessed groups, located in lesser regulated areas such as slums or in the more regulated confines of refugee camps. Concurrently, such countries are perceived as social spaces that have the potential of exporting criminal elements, terrorists, and undocumented immigrants into the more privileged social spaces of the globe. Thus, while the traditional function of guarded borders was conceived in terms of the need to defend sovereignty (physically against organized violent invasion and symbolically as an affirmation of national identity), the mobility potential that globalization processes facilitate simultaneously produces the conceptualization of borders in terms of the need to protect a perceived stable and secure social fabric from unwarranted infiltration by suspect populations. Of course, borders are not a new invention. Yet, it is noteworthy that the rational and systematic closure of national borders in general and the use of border controls to prevent immigration in particular are a modern phenomenon. Tilly (1992), theorizing the history of state-building in Europe, pays only cursory attention to borders despite the fact that control over bounded territories is inseparable from his very definition of a state. Rather than using the concept of borders, Tilly (1992) finds that rulers normally tried to establish both a secured area within which they could enjoy the returns from coercion and a fortified buffer zone to protect the secured area. However, once such buffer zones could be turned into secured areas in and of themselves, rulers initiated drives for creating newly expanded buffer zones (1992:184). Borders acquired a more significant meaning only in tandem with the consolidation of the modern national state, when governments began to “control movement across frontiers, to use tariffs and customs as instruments of economic policy, and to treat foreigners as distinctive kinds of people deserving limited rights and close surveillance” (1992:116). However, the regime of movement in the present era is not unlike previous regimes in its primary reliance on physical barriers as means of blocking and containing mobility. These elementary practices, in turn, are based on the quite conventional methods of constructing fences. Accordingly, and in tandem with free trade agreements, an eight-foot fence stretches along the 2,000 miles border between Mexico and the United States, from Brownsville, Texas to San Diego, California. As it ends in the Pacific Ocean, between San Diego and Tihuana, the fence is 15 feet high. Hundreds of names are scribbled on the Mexican side of the fence, a kind of unofficial memorial to those killed while trying to outsmart the U.S. Operation Gatekeeper. Before it stretches a few 100 feet into the ocean, the fence also cuts across Friendship Park (Parque de la Amistad), so titled in 1971 as a gesture to the Mexican people (Nevins 2001; Andreas 2000).

The immigration regime is a tool used by the government to manage populations

Salter 2006 [Mark, Assistant Professor at The American University in Cairo, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics,” Alternatives 31]

There is a Catholic mnemonic to recall how to cross one’s self: “spectacles, testicles, wallet, and watch.” This rhyme is an excellent entry into the importance of confession in the recognition of the self as an international self. In addition to recalling the notion of appeal to authority that is never quite authorized (hence the need for a pneumonic), it also marks the stations of the modern state: vision and surveillance, health and reproduction, commerce and capital, and time. The gesture refers at once to an absolution of sorts and a sanctification of actions and words. A penitent’s presentation to the agent of God to name his sins, in return for which he is given absolution, stands as a central metaphor in under- standing the modern relationship between individual and state. Foucault poses the question of obedience and society in a genealogical frame: “How is it that in Western Christian culture the government of men demands, on the part of those who are led, not only acts of obedience and submission but also ‘acts of truth,’ which have the peculiar requirement not just that the subject tell the truth but that he tell the truth about himself, his faults, his desires, the state of his soul, and so on?”60 This part of the mechanism for the creation of the modern subject who knows himself in relation to the confessionary state is a function of “unconditional obedience, uninterrupted examination, and exhaustive confession” and “appears as an indispensable component of the government of men by each other.”61 Though not traced by Foucault himself, the confessionary complex (obedience, examination, confession) provides a crucial link between the “political economy of the body”62 and the biopolitical governmentality of international management of populations. It is not simply that the international population is managed, but that we come to manage ourselves through the confessionary complex. Foucault describes the importance of “the way by which, through some political technology of individuals, we have been led to recognize ourselves as a society, as a part of a social entity, as a part of nation or of a state.”63 Balibar relates the governmental function of the border as the limit of community to the process of identity-formation:The normality of the national citizen-subject . . . is also internalized by individuals, as it becomes a condition, an essential reference of their collective, communal sense, and hence of their identity. . . . As a consequence, borders cease to be purely external realities.”64 The confessionary complex is a structure framed by law and instantiated in various practices at the border (and in the faces of agents of the state).

The border is inextricably linked to sovereignty

Salter 2006 [Mark, Assistant Professor at The American University in Cairo, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics,” Alternatives 31]
On his entry to the United States, Oscar Wilde was asked the customary question: He apocryphally replied “I have nothing to declare except my genius!”4 This act of confession before the vanguard of governmental machinery is crucial to both the operation of the global mobility regime and the operation of sovereign power. It is those first acts of examination, obedience, and confession that establishes the fundamental relationship between sovereign and subject, between the body politic and a particular body. Sovereignty and boundary maintenance are inextricable: “since there is no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence.”5 The border represents a unique case of entry into the social contract; it is not an entry that is inherited or claimed by right but a status that is requested. Following R. B. J. Walker, I would argue that border practices are examples of the “very concrete practices” that instantiate the abstract doctrines of sovereignty.6 Conventional political accounts of migration focus on masses of moving populations (broad demographic and social trends) or the public policy process by which the regulation of those populations are constrained or enabled.7 My account here seeks to turn traditional analysis on its head and ask: What if we were to put the individual body at the center of our analysis of the border? The nascent global mobility regime through passport, visa, and frontier formalities manages an international population through and within a biopolitical frame and a confessionary complex that creates bodies that understand themselves to be international.

The border is a state of exception where the sovereign has absolute rule

Salter 2006 [Mark, Assistant Professor at The American University in Cairo, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics,” Alternatives 31]
What makes the border a state of exception? The sovereign decides the political status of the individual as they cross the frontier: national, stateless, refugee, foreigner, alien. This decision is absolute. The agent of the sovereign’s customs decides not only the nationality and status of foreigners but of all travelers. There is a zone of indistinction wherein a traveler possesses not even his/her nationality unless it is confirmed by the decision of the sovereign. Nothing can compel a particular decision; no appeal can be made; the only expulsion that bears any intersovereign consequence is denationalization or becoming a refugee. Thus, the traveler only gains some kind of advantage with other sovereigns once s/he can prove that s/he is abject, will be afforded no protection whatsoever, that one is bare international life, a seeker of refuge, a life that without state rights but subject to the law of states. Only the national border may be considered a state of exception, as opposed to other social or spatial borders. Entry to a house is plainly governed by a set of legal restrictions on the power of the state, such as the US Fourth Amendment right to be protected from unreasonable search. However, rights are configured quite differently at the border.21 In the United States, the authority by which the Customs and Border Patrol is empowered to search border-crossers is different from that of police [19 U.S.C. 1467], which derives from an early congressional act of July 31, 1789 [1 St. 43]. It is the very space of the border that makes the burden of law different. The threshold between law and force is spatialized or rather conditional on a particular mobility: “searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”22 The right to detain, examine, and search travelers is defined in relation to their foreignness, their origins “outside,” which renders them without protection while under question at the border. Searches within state’s territory and at the border bear two different standards: “probable cause” is replaced by “reasonable suspicion.” Thus, state actions at the border are a special case of law. “Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from the outside.”23 That which is outside both constitutes and threatens the integrity of the inside, and the decision to include/ exclude both defines the population of the state and gives lie to the presumed homogeneity and stability of that community.24 This situation of permanent threat is neutralized through the successful management of risk at the border in a way that renders threat permanent and insolvable. The visa regime, and the delocalization of the border that it represents, is emblematic of this management.

The border is used by the state to harness people for labor

Salter 2006 [Mark, Assistant Professor at The American University in Cairo, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics,” Alternatives 31]
In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault argues that “the body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances.”57 To this, I would add that there is an internationalization of the body: through biometric capture, the assignation of risk profiles according to race, gender, ethnic, national and religious scripts, and the visa system within the institutions of customs and immigration controls. The visa system as an essential component in the attempt of the state to claim a monopoly over legitimate movement classifies mobile bodies as legitimate through the schema of production and subjection. We have already seen the criteria by which this management of population is organized: labor, health, and risk. To understand the way this governmentality creates populations and individuals, I will use two of Foucault’s key ideas: biopolitics and political technologies of the individual. Foucault’s writings on the topic of biopolitics ground this analysis. Foucault examined the concomitant evolution of industrial and institutional techniques of modern governance through an investigation of how mobile, productive, healthy, moral bodies were constructed, schooled, policed, and harnessed for labor.58 His investigation of the how the penal system in particular led into the evolution of a disciplinary society stopped at the borders of the state, but in principle can be expanded to encompass a biopolitics of international relations: the management of international bodies. Fundamental to the evolution of the modern state was the control over mobility of citizens, which Foucault illustrates architecturally in the panopticon and plague town, Timothy Mitchell within Egyptian schools and urban architecture, and John Torpey through state passports.59 What these authors neglect is the international aspect of this control of mobility. Following work by Barry Hindess, Nevzat Soguk, and William Walters, who describe a structure of international management of population through the regulation of citizenship, refugees, and stateless persons, the international control of persons is just as vital to the stability of the modern state system as the domestic control of mobility. We can see the ways in which the visa system contributes to the definition and control of international populations: through the ascription of biopolitical characteristics in terms of labor skill or capitalization, epidemic or health liability, and risk or normalcy.

Biopower sets up a way for the liberal governance to administer the prosperity of the population, ensuring the human continuation to be the “proper” way.

Lee 2010, works at the interface of critical theory, cultural studies, and citizenship/democracy studies. focuses on the cultural politics, practices, and discourses of migrant domestic workers [Charles, “Bare Life, Interstices, and the Third Spaces of Citizenship,” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 38.1/2]
Michel Foucault has conceptualized the modern form of power as “bio-power,” wherein the essential measure of liberal governance is to oversee the welfare of the population (wealth, longevity, health, etc.) through mechanisms of calculation, monitoring, regulation, and utilization, such that citizen life will be fostered productively in the interests and security of the state (1980a; 1997). Biopower taps into the bodies and souls of human subjects to ensure the reproduction of the social body in a “proper” mode and “proper” way (Foucault 1980b). As a technique of liberal governance,¶ the inscription of subjects into modern citizenship initiates modern state’s¶ systematic surveillance of its population. David Lyon points out that the¶ civil, political, and social rights granted to citizens in the age of modernity¶ imply that “people had to be registered, and their personal details filed,¶ which of course paradoxically facilitated their increased surveillance”¶ 66 Bare Life, Interstices, and the Third Space of Citizenship¶ (2001, 294). New and minute forms of surveillance and control were established via documentary identification of citizens (i.e., birth certificates,¶ driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, passports, bankbooks, credit¶ cards) throughout liberal societies by the last quarter of the twentieth century¶ (294). Rather than an autonomous species standing in opposition to corporate bureaucratic power, citizenship is itself entangled in the webs of surveillance and subjection, discipline and normalization as a constitutive part of liberal governance in the making of citizen-subjects


The perception of citizenship creates the dichotomy that is known as society. The state is able to focus it zoepolitical forces on those it does not deem worthy of the political life.

Smith 11 (Robert, “Endgame Nearing an End: The Production of Bare Life under the U.S. Deportation Regime”, pg. 9, BW)
To address the distinction between zoe, bare life, and bios, political life, Willem Schinkel suggests that biopolitics be understood in two dimensions: the zoepolitical and the biopolitical. Zoepolitics, externally directed, focuses on the bare life of people outside the state, including Guantanamo detainees and immigration detainees. Biopolitics, directed internally towards people within state’s territory but outside of “society,” focuses on the boundaries of the social body. Citizenship thus functions as a mechanism of population control that enables the exercise of biopower on both dimensions (Schinkel 2010: 19). Space, both social and physical, is the linchpin of illegality and immigration detention, and we can see that bare life inhabits a social space structured on a polarity of oppositions in the zone of indistinction. Next we will examine how spatial ideas proceed from the figure at the opposite pole from the homo sacer, the sovereign.

The idea of “citizenship” is inherently exclusive, the government uses borders to make this exclusion possible

Ajana 06, (PhD in Sociology from London School of Economics and Political Science Btihaj. "Immigration Interrupted." Journal for Cultural Research 10.3 (2006): 259-273. Print.)
Central to this politics of particularity is the principle of inclusion (of good particulars) and exclusion (of bad particulars) through which ‘the idea of norma- tive universality’ (Zylinska 2004, p. 524) is established in relation to constitutive particularity. Particularity in a sense could be understood as the partitioning of differences and the demarcating of spatiality based on the ‘universal’ values of autonomy and self-governing, manifested in the notion of statehood. The production and formulation of the particular citizen within particular state is initially performed through modes of inclusion and exclusion whereby individual, communal and national identities are conceived of in terms of dichotomies of self and other, of inside and outside, of belonging and alien, and so on. The state, as such, represents itself as the locus par excellence of spatial particularity – terri- toriality – through the politicisation of its borders, the principle by which the concept of citizen is made possible. For without a state, the particular character of the citizen dissolves into universality (being a human) and without citizens, there could be no state (Coward 1999, p. 9). This interdependent relationship between state and citizens is in fact what produces the spurious needs and rationalisation of division and containment which find their expression in the ruling of sovereignty. Such a relationship also [this]explains why each time the question of immigration is raised by governments, there is a tendency to invoke the notion of ‘people’ i.e. ‘citizens’ in order to substantiate the will to exclusion and total enclosure


Deterrence at the border is also a symbolic power which re-inscribes the stability of the border.

Doty, Associate Professor School of Politics & Global Studies, 11

[Roxanne Lynn, Published April 12, 2011. “Bare life: border-crossing deaths and spaces of moral alibi.” Page 605. http://www.envplan.com/openaccess/d3110.pdf. RH]

The significance of prevention through deterrence in terms of the techniques of biopower can be found in the fact that it has not, nor arguably was it ever intended, to completely eliminate unauthorized immigration (Nevins, 2010, page 114). Like the border policies prior to it, prevention through deterrence was in part a `border game', rife with symbolic power which functioned to reaffirm the significance of the boundary between Mexico and the United States and at the same time asserted/reasserted the sovereignty of the latter.(18) However, it inaugurated a new intensity in that US border policies became much more than a symbolic game in the sense that crossing the border without authorization now became an extremely dangerous proposition in which death lurked in every new migrant crossing route, through formidable mountain ranges and along desolate, heat-scorched desert lands. In terms of the operation(s) of power, the significance of this new border strategy lies in a subtle shift from the dominance of sovereign, juridical power to biopower. I say `subtle' because I do not mean to suggest that juridical power and biopower are opposed to one another. Clearly, they work together in this case, and it is a matter of emphasis that I am suggesting here. Juridical power intensified the US border enforcement regime. However, biopower is clearly evident as the newly intensified enforcement regime produced a radical exposure for migrants which stripped them of their humanity and permitted their killing without punishment.


This perception of migrants as ‘inferior’ is inextricably linked to the state – its inclusion cements biopolitical control

Zylinska, Professor of New Media and Communications at the University of London, 2004 (Joanna, “The Universal Acts: Judith Butler and the biopolitics of immigration,” Cultural Studies 18.4, pg. 524-25) MM
The notion of biopolitics comes from Michel Foucault, who in the final section of The History of Sexuality puts forward a claim that, in modernity, ancient sovereign power exerted over life and death has been replaced by bio-power: ‘a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ (1984, p. 138). Biopolitics thus describes the processes through which Western democracies, with all their regulatory and corrective mechanisms, administer life by exercising power over the species body (1984, p. 139). What is now at issue, according to Foucault, is not so much ‘bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty’ as instantiating the idea and sense of the norm, which is supposed to regulate society and ensure the intactness of its sovereign authority. The biopolitics of immigration - one of the forms through which bio-power is enacted in Western democracies and through which life is ‘managed’ - thus contributes to the development of the idea of normative universality, against which particular acts of political (mis)practice can be judged. And yet, as Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida and Ernesto Laclau have demonstrated in numerous works, the notion of universality proposed in official political discourses always entails (or is contaminated by, as Laclau has it) a certain particularity. Indeed, the universal juridico-political acts acquire their ‘universal’ value only if they draw on the particularity of the official and non-official regulatory mechanisms that are supposed to exclude whatever may pose a threat to this idea of universality. This is to say, they rely on state legislation already in place, on the concept of citizenship embraced by the democratic community, but also on ‘public opinion’ that has to be taken into account and responded to.
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