The mobility regime creates a social division, segregating those that seem suspicious into prisons, ghettos, and quarantines- sometimes detaining them indefinitely on nothing more than a suspicion of a threat.
Shamir 05 (Ronen, Professor of Sociology at Tel-Aviv University, 2005 “Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime,” Sociological Theory 23.2 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=a38a1096-53e7-4f5d-8fb2-678c41fae19b%40sessionmgr10&vid=4&hid=26)
The mobility regime also operates within the perimeters of privileged localities, countries, and economic and political blocs.It is useful to distinguish between those elementary forms that work through the prevention of exit (e.g., prisons) and those elementary forms that work through the prevention of entry (e.g., gated communities). While these two forms of social isolation address and manage different social strata, and while they operate on the basis of almost diametrically opposite logics, they may be sociologically located along a continuum of practices designed to consolidate a mobility regime in general and to strategically distance suspect social elements in particular. Indeed, while there are strong sociological reasons not to collapse such distinct phenomena as prisons and gated communities into a single category, there are also other sociological reasons to treat them both as products of distinct strategies of group power; in the former case, the power of dominant groups to stigmatize, isolate, and immobilize suspect groups by controlling their exit rights, and in the latter case, the power of dominant groups to isolate themselves from suspect groups by controlling their rights of entry into certain designated social spaces. Specifically, we may thus see the integrated risk-management system of the mobility regime as predicated upon two pillars: segregating suspect social elements in prisons, urban ghettoes, and quarantines on the one hand, and sheltering privileged groups in gated communities, secured work places, and guarded shopping malls on the other (Davis 1990). In this section, the concept of quarantines refers to multiple forms of containment and imprisonment. Quarantine, in general, operates by identifying and distancing people perceived as dangerous by subjecting them to particular treatment protocols. Foucault (1980)—while not specifically discussing a mobility regime—theorized the development of modern governance in relation to various forms of quarantine. Medieval cities, wrote Foucault, already relied on two types of measures to deal with perceived threats such as leprosy and plague: exclusion and quarantine (Curtis 2002). Urban authorities in later times, pressured by the bourgeoisie, dealt with the politicosanitary menace by perfecting the instrument of quarantine. Yet what started as urban politics of health later converged with other forms of containment to become an important element of modern “governmentality” (Foucault 1991, 1980). Also on the privileged side of border fences, the mobility regime still relies on the old methods of using prisons, penitentiaries, detention camps, and a host of other types of quarantines to isolate social elements perceived to be dangerous. With the world’s largest prison population, the United States imprisons at a far greater rate than both rich and many impoverished and authoritarian countries. On a per capita basis, the United States has three times more prisoners than Iran, four times more than Poland, five times more than Tanzania, and seven times more than Germany12 (Garland 2001; Wacquant 2001). Affirming a no-compromise approach to jailing, as well as a conceptual fusion between immigration and terrorism, the U.S. Department of Justice also announced that undocumented immigrants could be detained indefinitely, without bond, if the government provided evidence that their release might threaten national security.
In order to counteract the deportation efforts of the states they live in, migrants destroy their identity documents, essentially rendering themselves without any rights. The migrants live bare lives and suffer from inhumane acts of violence.
Ellerman 9(Antje, Dept of Politics @ U of British Columbia, Undocumented Migrants and Resistance in the State of Exception, p 12, http://aei.pitt.edu/33054/1/ellermann._antje.pdf) As liberal states have stepped up their deportation efforts, migrants, in particular unsuccessful asylum seekers, have sought to escape the state’s reach by destroying or hiding their identity documents. This act of resistance is far from exceptional. While the following figures and illustrations all refer to immigration enforcement in Germany, they could easily apply to control contexts elsewhere in the advanced democratic world. German interior officials estimate that, in the mid-1980s, immigration authorities had to obtain travel documents for about 30 to 40 percent of all asylum seekers. By the year 2000, the population of “undocumented” asylum applicants is estimated to have increased to 85 percent (Böhling 2001). The dilemma that an unknown identity poses to the state is aptly captured by a deportation officer’s account of the resistance strategies of illegal migrants: “People have started to realize, ‘if they don’t know who I am, they can’t touch me.’1 What is important to note is that homo sacer’s ability to render herself unidentifiable is ultimately contingent on bare life. The lives of illegal migrants and refugees in many ways exemplify the condition of rightlessness that marks bare life. “The territorialization of life means that the refugee is put in a position where she lacks apportioned rights but depends on the charity or goodwill of aid workers or the police. The refugee is outside the law. Levels of innuendo and violence unthinkable to regular human beings, citizens, are regularly perpetrated against the refugee or asylum seeker. The refugee as homo sacer describes the condition of exclusion that those exempt from the normal sovereignty are subject to.” (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004, 41)
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication) As of March 2006, the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation attributed more than 3,000 deaths to a single southern California border operation known as Operation Gatekeeper.97 Numerous other operations have been put into place in the U.S.-Mexico border region. All have had similar deadly impacts. Despite the death toll, the U.S. government continues to pursue enforcement operations with great vigor. Indeed, Congress consistently enacts proposals designed to bolster border enforcement, with such proposals often representing the only items of political consensus when it comes to immigration reform. Operation Gatekeeper demonstrates the U.S. government’s callous indifference to the human suffering caused by its aggressive border enforcement policy. In the words of one informed commentator, “[t]he real tragedy of [Operation] Gatekeeper . . . is the direct link . . . to the staggering rise in the number of deaths among border crossers. [The U.S. government] has forced these crossers to attempt entry in areas plagued by extreme weather conditions and rugged terrain that [the U.S. government] knows to present mortal danger.”98 In planning Operation Gatekeeper, the U.S. government knew that its strategy would risk many lives but proceeded nonetheless. As another observer concludes, “Operation Gatekeeper, as an enforcement immigration policy financed and politically supported by the U.S. government, flagrantly violates international human rights because this policy was deliberately formulated to maximize the physical risks of Mexican migrant workers, thereby ensuring that hundreds of them would die.”99 Apparently, the government rationalized the deaths of migrants as collateral damage in the “war” on illegal immigration. Even before the 1990s, the Border Patrol had a reputation for committing human rights abuses against immigrants and U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry.100 Created to police the U.S.-Mexican border, the Border Patrol has historically been plagued by reports of brutality, shootings, beatings, and killings.101 Amnesty International, American Friends Service Committee, and Human Rights Watch have all issued reports documenting recent human rights abuses by the Border Patrol.102
Poor law enforcement along the border feeds the human trafficking business which results in slavery and prostitution
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication) Today, because of the money to be made in this black market, criminal syndicates thrive in the trafficking of human beings. A product of ill-considered law enforcement, these syndicates resemble the crime networks that emerged in response to the federal government’s efforts during Prohibition’s ban on the commerce in alcohol. Criminal elements grew and asserted control over a new lucrative industry. But it gets worse. Some undocumented immigrants have been enslaved. Reports of slavery have increased dramatically in the past few years. One 2005 report concluded as follows: Our research identified 57 forced labor operations in almost a dozen cities in California between 1998 and 2003, involving more than 500 individuals from 18 countries. . . . Victims labored in several economic sectors including prostitution and sex services (47.4%), domestic service (33.3%), mail order brides (5.3%), sweatshops (5.3%), and agricultureBordering on the Immoral | 113 (1.8%). . . . Victims of forced labor often suffer severe hardships and deprivations. Their captors often subject them to beatings, threats, and other forms of physical and psychological abuse. They live in conditions of deprivation and despair. Their captors may threaten their families. Perpetrators exert near total control over victims, creating a situation of dependency. Victims come to believe they cannot leave. . . . They are terrified of their captors but also fear law enforcement, a fear often based on bad experiences with police and other government officials in their countries of origin.105
The immigrant’s plight in making it to the “Land of the free” paradoxically risks life and limb and sells themselves into a probable slavery
Johnson 07 (Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Law, and Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies at the University of California, Davis. “Opening the Floodgates”, pg. 200, BW)
Although immigration reform has been the topic of extensive public discussion, there has been no legislative proposal put on the table that would address the fact that the U.S. immigration laws are dramatically out of synch with the social, economic, and political realities of modern immigration in the global economy. Moreover, today’s immigration laws are wholly inconsistent with the moral underpinnings of the United States of America. Put simply, the U.S. immigration laws are broken and must be fixed. Fixing them requires true comprehensive immigration reform, not mere tinkering at the margins. Consider the incontrovertible facts. Immigrants make up about 10 percent of the U.S. population. As many as 12 million undocumented immigrants live in the United States. This large population exists even though, in the 1990s, the U.S. government dramatically bolstered border enforcement with Mexico and engaged in a number of high profile, military-style operations in border cities like El Paso, Texas, and San Diego, California. In an attempt to avoid the Border Patrol, undocumented immigrants today travel through isolated deserts and mountains, literally risking life and limb in hopes of making it to the land of the free and the home of the brave. As a result, over the past decade, thousands of migrants, almost all of them citizens of Mexico, have died attempting to cross the Southwest border. Besides its deadly consequences, heightened immigration enforcement has spurred a booming industry in the trafficking of human beings. Criminal smugglers today charge undocumented immigrants thousands of dollars for passage to the United States. Smugglers show little respect for the safety of their human cargo and, at times, abandon migrants to die in the desert or on the high seas. Many migrants fortunate enough to survive the journey are forced to work as indentured servants to pay off the debts of passage to smugglers. Because trafficking arrangements are not in the least bit regulated, exploitation and abuse run rampant.
Trafficking results in abuse and forced labor
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication) Besides its deadly consequences, heightened immigration enforcement has spurred a booming industry in the trafficking of human beings. Criminal smugglers today charge undocumented immigrants thousands of dollars for passage to the United States. Smugglers show little respect for the safety of their human cargo and, at times, abandon migrants to die in the desert or on the high seas. Many migrants fortunate enough to survive the journey are forced to work as indentured servants to pay off the debts of passage to smugglers. Because trafficking arrangements are not in the least bit regulated, exploitation and abuse run rampant.
Exclusion of economic equality infringes on international human rights
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication) The most frequently invoked substantive ground for excluding noncitizens is that they are “likely at any time to become public charges.”11 The public-charge exclusion squarely conflicts with the anticaste foundations of U.S. law.12 One of the promises of America is the potential for upward economic mobility. No person’s station in life is dictated by class or caste. To that end, the framers of the U.S. Constitution prohibited titles of nobility. Nonetheless, the public-charge exclusion cements economic disparities in place for those denied entry into the United States. Through this barrier, the United States slams the door on poor and working people and thus denies access to the American Dream to those most in pursuit of it. Immigration law allows the United States to do at its borders what it cannot do within them. Because the Constitution guarantees free movement between the United States, individual states cannot erect borders to limit entry. Therefore, efforts by individual states to prevent the poor living in other states from migrating into their jurisdictions have beenBordering on the Immoral | 89 found to be unconstitutional infringements on the right to travel.
Immigrant Detainees Suffering
Immigration detainees are skyrocketing, meanwhile the conditions in these prisons remain inhumane
Griesbach 2010 (Kathleen UC San Diego “Immigration Detention, State Power, and Resistance: The Case of the 2009 Motín in Pecos, Texas” pgs. 8-10) TYBG
The incarceration of men like Galindo reflects the recent trend to turn over illegal immigrants to the justice system for criminal prosecution since 9/11, rather than deporting them as previously22, particularly with the advent of Operation Streamline. On December 2, 2009, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) released a report that in 2009, 369, 483 people were held in custody by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 2009, which is double the number of immigrants detained ten years ago23. This reflects the increase in border and immigration enforcement following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly through initiatives like Operation Streamline, the 2005 Bush initiative which dictated federal criminal charges for anyone detained crossing the US-Mexico border illegally”.24 The US maintains the largest immigration detention center in the world; by the end of 2007, 961 jails and prisons housing detainees were either directly owned by or under contract with the federal government.25 Rampant human rights abuses include particularly poor or nonexistent medical services, a lack of legal services for detained immigrants, and squalid living conditions. Detained migrants face imprisonment in county jails, privately run federal detention centers, or other privately run federal prisons – often with convicted criminals26. The success of private prison management as an unregulated capitalist enterprise explains the inhumane living quarters, lack of medical services (so glaringly obvious in the case of José Manuel Galindo’s death), and lack of legal resources for detainees.27 Another policy in common practice by ICE is the transfer of countless prisoners from detention center to detention center, often at great distances from each other and without informing family or the detainee’s legal counsel if he/she has one (effectively destroying the inmate’s defense).28
The system of immigration control creates exclusionary social hierarchies that are clear in society, with the 3rd border of exclusion of “inferior” Latinos. They are then forced into a grey where they are stripped of their basic rights
Griesbach 2010 (Kathleen UC San Diego “Immigration Detention, State Power, and Resistance: The Case of the 2009 Motín in Pecos, Texas” pgs. 14-15) TYBG
Uneven power relations multiply and endure within the system of immigration control. Luibhéid stresses that “relations of power and inequality at the border cannot be separated from inequitable global relations that structure migration patterns from social hierarchies within the United States”38. These relations of exclusion have been more dramatically enforced in recent years, with the increase in criminal punishment for illegal immigrants, without consideration of extensive transnational familial relations.Immigrants are completely beholden to a system of power relations directly dictated by documentation status, as Galindo’s story illustrates. Foucault stresses that power emanates through discourse, which is internal to the power relations that pervade society. Mike Davis’s discussion of the “3rd border” beyond the border zone and interior enforcement to Latino social exclusion (through the racialization of space) in Southern California illuminates the extension of disciplinary power and the creation of “Other”ness from the political regime to informal society39. Davis discusses and the recent segregationist tactics of wealthy neighborhoods to exclude working-class Latinos from formerly public venues. A main strategy is the incursion of high fees for “non-residents” of wealthy neighborhoods in the San Gabriel Valley, for example. This “Third Border” aims to keep Latinos away from public destinations like parks in affluent white neighborhoods like San Marino’s Lacy Park.40 This exclusion extends a long trend of discriminatory policing, working as a “magnification” of disciplinary power exercised unequally toward Latinos (many of them immigrants). The third border’s segregation complements the first and second borders’ attempt to “exclude Mexican immigrants from entry into the U.S” through force. Thus, “the third border serves as a new form of racial segregation deep within the country”, 41 multiplying and perpetuating the power of the State and its upper echelons over immigrants. This latter definition of the normalizing quality of disciplinary power within institutions characterizes many recent immigration laws and particularly the treatment of US immigrant detainees both within the US and abroad. Yet as Giorgio Agamben argues, the legal treatment of immigrant detainees in some cases operates in a gray area outside the law, which becomes normalized in the “State of Exception”. Agamben argues that under the USA Patriot Act immigrant detainees like the Taliban captured in Afghanistan do not even have the status of persons charged with a crime according to American laws. Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply “detainees”, they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight.44Though most immigrants detained within the US for minor offenses like Galindo are a different case than suspected terrorists, the record of legal and human abuses within the prisons and in the justice system reflect the same lack of judicial and human oversight to which Agamben refers. The disturbing fact that the majority of detainees have not been convicted of any crime demonstrates the exercise of disciplinary power far outside the spirit of “normal” law. The official Immigration and Customs Enforcement database showed on January 25, 20009 that of 32,000 total immigrants in detention, 18,690 had no criminal conviction, even for illegal entry; 400 of those without convictions had been in detention for at least a year.
Social services have been withheld from “aliens” solely because of their social standing in an unregulated utopian society.
Lee 2010, works at the interface of critical theory, cultural studies, and citizenship/democracy studies. focuses on the cultural politics, practices, and discourses of migrant domestic workers [Charles, “Bare Life, Interstices, and the Third Spaces of Citizenship,” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 38.1/2] For Rancière, democracy is about “the power of those who have no¶ qualification for exercising power.” It is “the count of the uncounted—or¶ the part of those who have no part” (2004, 304–5). As McNevin sums up:¶ “Resistance occurs as outsiders attempt to recast their identity as politically¶ legitimate subjects of justice” (2006, 138).¶ Inside Isin and Rygiel’s abject spaces, immanent outsiders have enacted¶ themselves as political by exercising rights that they do not have, thereby¶ turning bare life into political life (2007, 186). Scholars have termed these¶ political stagings as widely as “insurgent citizenship” (Isin 2002), “acts of¶ citizenship” (Isin and Nielsen 2008), “non-citizen citizenship” (Gordon¶ 2005), “democratic cosmopolitanism” (Honig 2001), or “abject cosmopolitanism”¶ (Nyers 2003). For instance, Isin and Rygiel point to acts of¶ suturing mouths by refugees in protest against state asylum laws and setting¶ boats on fire in order to avoid being sent off to offshore detention centers¶ (2007, 193). They also find acts of resistance in the “sanctuary city”¶ movements across Europe and Canada where state law is suspended to¶ provide hospitality to aliens, as well as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” campaigns¶ in the United States that forbid city workers to inquire into a person’s¶ status to ensure access to social services (198–99). In his study of¶ the antideportation campaigns by the refugee group, Action Committee¶ of Non-Status Algerians (CASS) in Montreal, Peter Nyers further cites¶ political acts such as regular assemblies, weekly information pickets, delegation¶ visits to immigration offices, public demonstration and marches,¶ and leafleting against deportations at airports (2003, 1083). Through¶ these public and collective demonstrations, undocumented subjects mark¶ themselves as visible and audible and write themselves into a status of recognition.
The paradigm of suspicion criminalizes the mobility of immigrants, the impoverished and other agents of suspect.
Shamir 05 (Ronen, Professor of Sociology at Tel-Aviv University, 2005 “Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime,” Sociological Theory 23.2 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=a38a1096-53e7-4f5d-8fb2-678c41fae19b%40sessionmgr10&vid=4&hid=26)
In speaking about a paradigm of suspicion, I mean that the primary principle for determining the “license to move,” both across borders and in public spaces within borders, has to do with the degree to which the agents of mobility are suspected of representing the threats of crime, undesired immigration, and terrorism, either independently or, increasingly, interchangeably. Apart from terrorism, being a newly articulated form of organized trans-national violence (Tilly 2004),6 the perceived threats of crime and immigration, and particularly their mutually constitutive interplay, are part of the history of modernity. The residents of the modern cities that absorbed Europe’s new urban proletariat in the 19th century retained a profound mistrust of people without established connections. This mistrust has been an important engine in the increasing formal criminalization of mobility itself, from the concept of “criminal vagabondage” in France, where mobility was the crime, through a series of vagrancy panics in Britain, to increasing legal hostility to vagrants and anxiety about “crimes of mobility” in the United States (Cole 2001:9). It is also no coincidence, therefore, that early efforts to create reliable identification systems were based on the simultaneous development of police records, photographic methods, and the perfection of the passport system (Deflem 2002). The conceptual link between immigration and social vices such as crime, disease, and moral contamination has gripped the public mind long before the present era and continually shapes immigration policies and border-control measures. Mobility is perceived as a suspicious activity especially when it relates to those without property. Immigration seekers aside, consider the policy that guides the grant of nonimmigrant visas to the United States. The standard reason for refusing to issue a visa, when such a reason is given, is that the applicant did not qualify under Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This section is premised upon a paradigm of suspicion that stipulates that every foreigner seeking to enter the United States is considered an immigrant as long as he or she did not convince the immigration officer that at the time of the application he or she was eligible for a nonimmigrant status. To convince the immigration officer, one has to show proof of “strong ties” to the country of origin, such as a permanent job or ownership of property, in fact identical in nature to the old need to establish “settled connections.” Both the European and American media are flooded with reports and studies that link immigration and crime, often mediated through indicators of poverty. In the Netherlands, for example, reports abound about such links, citing scientific evidence that illegal immigrants are by far more likely to be involved with crime and singling out Moslem “culture of religious extremism” as a factor. While crime records are not kept according to ethnicity, Dutch police and government officials have publicly linked a rise in crime to immigrants, and according to criminologist Chris Rutenfrans, 63 percent of those convicted of homicide are immigrants—Moroccans, Antilleans, and sub-Saharan Africans being the chief culprits.7 In the United States, a senior policy analyst at the Center for Immigration Studies published a study showing that immigrants and their minor children now account for almost one in four persons living in poverty. The proportion of immigrant-headed households using at least one major welfare program is 24.5 percent compared to 16.3 percent for native households and the poverty rate for immigrants and their U.S.-born children (under 18) is twothirds higher than that of natives and their children, 17.6 percent versus 10.6 percent
Border Policies Bad
Closed borders punish human beings for their unlucky birthplace, contributing to eternal human suffering, inequality, human trafficking, slavery and death
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication) Although arbitrary constructs that are nothing more than legal fictions, borders contribute to human suffering and economic inequality. The accident of place of birth may effectively create a life of relative opportunity or deprivation. Today, however, it is far easier than ever before to rectify that accident. Migration between nations is more common in the twenty-first century than it ever has been. Goods, services, and people regularly flow across borders. Elaborate transportation networks exist to move people and goods quickly and inexpensively all over the world. A fundamental question for any body of immigration law and policy therefore iswhether it should facilitate migration and increased access to economic opportunity and social mobility or whether it simply should reinforce the inequalities attributable to the luck of the draw. At a fundamental level, “[a]n open entry policy is a broad attack on the problem of morally arbitrary suffering and inequality.”55 Open entry is more egalitarian than closed borders, allows for the possibility of a more just world, and recognizes that people should not be trapped for life by the random occurrence of place of their birth. Consequently, an anticaste justification for open borders, which has also been an important basis for much of U.S. constitutional law, warrants the most serious consideration. Other moral justifications exist as well, many of them stemming from the immoral consequences of current U.S. immigration law. Open borders can helpeliminate the immoral consequences that directly result from the nation’s efforts to close the borders, including racial discrimi- 102 | Bordering on the Immoral nation, exploitation in the labor market, human trafficking and slavery, and deaths resulting from border enforcement.
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication) Labor exploitation is a special problem with respect to immigrants from Mexico. Mexican citizens are the largest group of immigrants in the United States. The U.S. government’s policies have, over time, encouraged their entry into this country, using them to supply an inexpensive, exploitable labor force beneficial to American employers and consumers. But the same government that encourages their migration has wholly failed to protect them from exploitation and abuse. It has persistently allowed these poor people to remain vulnerable to exploitation. Moral obligations grow out of such treatment but have yet to be recognized by the U.S. government. In order to bring U.S. immigration law into line with the nation’s moral compass,change is essential. The system, by almost all accounts, is broken. The fundamental question about which there is serious difference of opinion is the solution. The immigration issues that face the United States will not go away due to wishful thinking or tough talk. Such responses, unfortunately, dominate public discussion of immigration in the United States.
Closed borders promotes isolation and the profound acknowledgement of “the other”
Johnson 2007 (Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication)
Open borders could help ameliorate some of the problems experienced by Mexican immigrants and Mexican-American citizens. Legal distinctions between immigrants and citizens, which are currently central to the immigration laws, serve to create in-groups and out-groups, promote interethnic tension, and breed discrimination against perceived outsiders.By tending to render such distinctions irrelevant, liberal admission policies would promote full community membership for all people living and working in U.S. society. By minimizing, if not wholly, eliminating, the importance of immigration distinctions between people in the United States, a liberal admissions system would also tend to dampen the institutionalized stigmatization of domestic minorities, such as Mexican-Americans, who share into ancestries with disfavored immigrants. In so doing, the law would help to promote the integration of noncitizens and certain groups of U.S. citizens U.S. society.
Borders are Discriminating
Border controls serve discriminatory intentions of segregation
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication) Another way of evaluating immigration restrictions proves instructive in evaluating their racial impacts. Border controls have been characterized as a form of employment discrimination against noncitizens because they effectively bar many foreigners from accessing the U.S. labor markets.63Under the existing border controls,the persons barred from seeking domestic jobs are predominantly people of color from the developing world. Border controls thus serve to racially segregate international labor markets. The discriminatory impacts of immigration regulation can be seen starkly in the post–September 11 heightened scrutiny of noncitizens. Almost all of the legal measures taken in the war on terror have been directed at the immigrant community, resulting in racially disparate consequences. The recent governmental targeting of Arabs and Muslims demonstrates how immigration law conveniently can be employed to fo- 104 | Bordering on the Immoral cus upon disfavored minority groups. This targeting was accompanied by a precipitous rise in private racial discrimination and hate crimes directed against Arabs and Muslims in the United States.64
Immigration laws label immigrants as disposable and racially unequal in the class system
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication).
Not coincidentally, the disposable labor force that immigration law has helped to create in the United States is composed primarily of immigrants of color from the developing world.133 In effect, we see the existence of a new racial caste system in the United States that has replaced the old system that existed in the days of Jim Crow. The current immigrant labor system is nothing less than a variant of the old sharecropping system in the South. Poorly paid, exploitative jobs are reserved for marginalized immigrants of color.Immigration law thus contributes to racial stratification in the U.S. labor market. In this way, labor exploitation overlaps with concerns about the racial discrimination embedded in the U.S. immigration laws and their enforcement.
Closed borders purposely target people of color, the disabled and ill
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, “Opening the Floodgates”, New York University Publication) The poor are not the only group that, although enjoying the protection of the laws within the country, is denied that protection at the border. Joining the poor as inadmissible “aliens” who are barred from entry into the country are disabled persons. In the United States, they are protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act.14 At the border, however, the disabled can be denied admission into the country simply on account of the fact that they are disabled.15 Congress also has acted to exclude persons with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), even though the U.S. Public Health Service concluded that HIV-positive noncitizens do not pose a significant health risk to the general population.16 Despite technically complying with the colorblindness demanded by the U.S. Supreme Court,17 modern immigration laws also have racially disparate impacts. People of color are disproportionately barred from entering the country. Such a result is in tension with the nation’s stated commitment to equality under the law.18 Although discrimination against the poor, the disabled, HIV-positive persons, or racial minorities would be patently unlawful if directed against citizens in the United States, it is nothing less than routine under the U.S. immigration laws. One is left to wonder what the moral justifications could be for keeping these groups out of the United States. The elaborate system of controls that inflicts disparate impacts on people of 90 | Bordering on the Immoral color raises similar questions. All of these excluded groups seem to fall squarely within the category of the “huddled masses” for whom the nation has long—and loudly—declared itself open. There is, however, a simple answer. Most of the exclusionary categories in U.S. immigration law are not based on fairness, equality, or any respect for individual rights. Instead, the restrictions and exclusions are based on crude and arbitrary utilitarian calculations of the relative costs and benefits offered by different groups of immigrants to U.S. society. Of course, such considerations are the antithesis of a liberal devotion to individual rights.
Migrant Conditions is a D-Rule
Migrant abuse is a D-rule – inclusion of the state re-entrenches hierarchies of power
Hayter, Migration activist and graduate of Oxford University, 2004 (Theresa, Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls, 2nd ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004) MM
By far the most important reason for opposing immigration controls is that they impose harsh suffering and injustice on those who attempt to migrate, or to flee for their lives and liberty. The issue is whether the purposes immigration controls are intended to serve justify the imposition of such suffering. Controls are supposed to stop people migrating to the countries which enforce them. They are supposed to preserve and enhance the wealth of those countries against the perceived threats posed by immigration, and so to reassure people who believe that uncontrolled immigration might reduce them to Third World conditions. They are supposed to meet the concerns of racists and so reduce racism. They are supposed to control crossborder crime. In none of these objectives are they very effective or useful. In reality they increase, rather than decrease, both racism and crime, and they threaten to undermine the human rights not just of migrants and refugees, but of the existing inhabitants of the rich countries which are trying to exclude them. Immigration controls should be abandoned.
We must consider global mobility and human rights first and understanding the global political system is key
Salter 2006 [Mark, Assistant Professor at The American University in Cairo, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics,” Alternatives 31]
The field of migration studies has been hamstrung by two dominant approaches: microstudies of migration networks, and macrostudies of push-pull factors. This article argues for the consideration of a different kind of micropolitics of power, that of the border itself. We must investigate the legal state of exception at the border and the ways that these exceptions are instantiated in laws and policies. The interface of the body and the body politic is hotly contested, and scholars need to take seriously the question of admission and exclusion to the political community at its border, not solely from an immigration/refugee rights perspective but from a wider view of the global mobility regime and human rights. This corporealism must also take into account the management of international populations through biopolitics in creating, classifying, and policing specific kinds of international bodies, and the way in which political technologies of individuals such as passports, visas, and frontier control educate mobile subjectivities in kinds of obedience and auto-confession. We must ask: How does the global mobility regime foster conditions under which we reorganize ourselves into international bodies and characterize those bodies as national or stateless, laboring or leisured, healthy or diseased, and safe or pathological? This is aided by understanding the visa as part of a global biopolitical system. In the loose visa regime, we see the control of population through the self-confession of our status as national, working, healthy, and safe bodies through application procedures. We need to unpack the way in which visa systems erase the middle ground previously occupied by gastarbeiter programs and shunt economic migrants into the category of asylum seekers, a category that does little to acknowledge the material basis of well-founded fears of economic persecution. Some of this work has been done by human rights–based advocacy groups like Statewatch and Amnesty International, but we also need to conduct close ethnographies of the bureaucracies responsible for the management of these decisions.¶ Confession Is Good for the Soul In particular, I see two dangers in this corporal/confessional regime. The issue of consent is erased on both technological and governmental levels. First, the body comes to testify or confess for the subject without the consent or even perhaps knowledge of the subject. Leaving aside the sociological issue of the ways in which body politics are constructed through stereotypes, there is an issue of data being collected, analyzed, and assigned to a particular body without any kind of check or balance. Second, the dynamics of these data flows are not transparent. Once this corporeal information is added to our governmental profile, we have little way of tracking its progress through private and official channels. As David Lyon and Elia Zureik have argued elsewhere, the burden of surveillance falls disproportionately on the poor and marginal.78 We must be vigilant of the expansion of state policing powers, especially at the borders where the operation of state power is both naked and hidden from view.
The protection of individual rights of migrants outweighs the sacrifice that must be made by the citizen as a result of a moral obligation
Pevnick 11 [Ryan, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University, Immigration and the Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Absolute Sovereignty, p. 100-101, AJM]
What is needed, in regard to our first question, is a principle that prioritizes rights by giving them a special, but not absolute, weight. Unhappily, specifying that principle is a task I can only leave to a better mind. For us, the important point is only (once again) that those from non-compliant territories should -like traditional refugees- be granted priority admissions, and there is an obligation to grant entity to such individuals at least up to the point where allowing more to enter promises to generate significant costs. In regard to the first question, we saw thatwhile a commitment to individual rights surely demands at least some willingness to sacrifice the general welfare, it is much less clear how far this willingness to sacrifice must go. Likewise, in regard to the question of the limits of a plausible duty to rescue, it seems clear that we ought to be willing to accept some sacrifice. Consider the following example: You are preparing dinner for an evening date (the other person has yet to arrive) when you hear a faint knock at the door. Opening the door reveals a severely bloodied individual. It is clear that the person requires immediate transportation to the hospital. In this case, I think it is clear that there exists a duty of assistance to stop preparations for your date and aid the individual. It would be morally unacceptable to explain, while gently shutting the door, that you have a risotto going on the stove that will surely be ruined- along with the rest of your evening - if you leave. While assisting the person requires you to accept some cost (rescheduling or delaying your date), it nevertheless seems incumbent upon you to do so. We might, then, agree that there is a duty to rescue that requires accept ing some limits on the pursuit of our own interests (Singer 1972). Nevertheless, the extent of such limits remains unclear. Contrast our first case with the one that follows: An individual in Nazi Germany, overcome by the plight of her Jewish compatriots, decides to secretly hide Jews and help them escape the country. She does this despite recognizing that her chance of pulling off the task without eventually being detected and punished accordingly is small. This case is importantly different from the first one. We regard the Schindlers of the world as heroes. They, because of the risk they undertake, leave the world of moral requirements and embark upon the supererogatory. While we perhaps hope that- faced with such a situation -we might reveal ourselves to be of the same character, [yet] those who fail to do so, instead neither contributing to nor preventing atrocities, are not blameworthy. Instead, they reveal themselves to be mere mortals rather than heroes. The primary reason for our different reactions to the cases is that the individual in the second case assumes a serious burden or cost. If caught, she faces severe and costly punishment above and beyond the mere inconvenience of a missed date. We can see this by fancifully revising the first case so that rather than one bleeding individual there are 2, then 8, then 100, then 1000, and so on. As the numbers increase, so too do the demands imposed on he who would provide assistance. What was at first a sacrificed date becomes a sacrificed weekend which, in turn, becomes a holiday from work and eventually the forgoing of significant life projects. The difference between the required action and the saintly action seems to lie[s] in the degree of self-sacrifice.27 These distinctions, though far too rough, set the parameters of the debate: when refuge can be provided at minimal cost, it is surely required. When the cost imposes important risks or constraints on our lifestyle, it begins to enter[s] the category of supererogatory. Candidly, I do not know how to further specify this condition (for example, how much risk or self-sacrifice is one obliged to take on?), and so we are left with a much too vague directive: allow economic refugees (those from severely impoverished areas) until it begins to have an important effect on the political community's standard of living. At such a point, there is still reason, albeit no longer dispositive, to allow further entry. While I wish that I could say something more specific about this guiding principle, I doubt whether we can get to a more precise conclusion from widely accepted premises or shared intuitions. Despite not having adequate answers to these questions, we have enough to- at least for the moment- guide our thinking about immigration policy. In particular, there is reason to significantly liberalize restrictions on those from severely impoverished areas and to continue to do so, step by step, until there is good reason to think that substantial costs are thereby being imposed. While these costs can- in principle - be either material or in the form of radical and abrupt cultural changes (as discussed in chapter 6), I see no reason to think that current levels of immigration from very poor regions impose anything like such costs. And, again, even once significant costs begin to be imposed by the entry of economic migrants, there nevertheless remains reason to continue to grant entry. Such reason is just no longer clearly dispositive. Thus, at present, there seems to be good reason to admit far more individuals from economically failing (or non-compliant) states.
We present the story of Prudenica Martin Gomez, an example of the migrants who died while attempting to cross the US-Mexico border as a result of migrants’ classification as bare life by the border patrol.
Doty, Associate Professor School of Politics & Global Studies, 11
[Roxanne Lynn, Published April 12, 2011. “Bare life: border-crossing deaths and spaces of moral alibi.” Page 601-602. http://www.envplan.com/openaccess/d3110.pdf. RH]
On Friday, 6 July 2007, volunteers with two local humanitarian groups in Tucson, Arizona, Humane Borders and Samaritans, went in search of Prudencia Martin Gomez, age 18 from Guatemala. She was headed to Oakland, California, to join her boyfriend/fiance¨ and had been missing since 11 June in the Ironwood National Forest, a 129 000-acre expanse of land, in the Sonoran Desert 25 miles northwest of Tucson. There are no facilities in the Ironwood National Forest, and visitors are warned of the hazards of the extreme heat. Human beings simply cannot survive in this part of the southwestern deserts for as long as Prudencia had been missing, so there was no pretense that they would find her alive, and they did not. The official location of her body was recorded as GPS: N32 0 25.455/W1110307.80 (Arizona Daily Star 2010). Prudencia had fallen ill and had been unable to continue. Her fellow travelers left her with water, but it was not enough. She was only a mile south of a Humane Borders' water station, but a mile can be a very long way in the desert, in the month of June, when one has already walked a long distance. Authorities determined that Prudencia had died on 15 June. The recorded high temperature on that day was 115˚F. Prudencia was a contemporary version of what Agamben (1998) refers to as bare life, life that can be taken without apology, classified as neither homicide nor sacrifice. She was US border policy stripped to its essence. And hers, tragically, is not an isolated example. In 2004 Mario Alberto Diaz, 6 feet tall with a black belt in karate and working on a masters degree in biology crossed the border near Sasabe, Arizona. His body was discovered twenty days later in a creek in the foothills of the Sierrita Mountains (Bourdeaux, 2004). In the summer of 2005 the Pima County medical examiner in Tucson, Arizona, had to rent a refrigerated tractor-trailer to store the bodies of migrants due to the record number of deaths that year (Arizona Republic 2005). The deadly trend continues. Even as apprehensions have steadily declined, deaths continue to rise (McCombs, 2009).(6) The migrant death count for fiscal year 2009 is the third highest since 1998. In the fifteen-year period since ``prevention through deterrence'' was first introduced approximately 5000 migrants have died, though near universal agreement exists that estimates of migrant deaths are undercounts and the actual number is likely much higher (Coalicion de Derechos Humanos, 2007). When they debated, formulated, and put into effect the various border control operations collectively known as prevention through deterrence, policy makers likely had never heard of GPS: N32 025.455/W1110307.80 or the Ironwood National Forest or the Sierrita mountains or the many other locations at which migrant bodies have been, and continue to be, found. However, it is arguably inconceivable that they did not know of the harsh conditions to which migrants would be subjected under this border strategy.The Border Patrol's own blueprint for one of the early and well-known manifestations of the new operations, Operation Gatekeeper, noted that it would channel migrants to locations where ``the days are blazing hot and nights freezing cold''.(7) In this section I argue that the prevention through deterrence border control strategies exemplify Foucault's theoretical writings on how biopower, sovereign power, and racism can be articulated with one another thus to function in concert. While biopolitics, as formulated by Foucault, is generally understood as being concerned with the governance and regulation of a population in matters such as health and sexuality, it is also consistent with what Agamben refers to as bare life. For Foucault the emergence of the ``problem of the population'' coincided with the development of an art of government wherein the main concerns of government were on the wealth, longevity, health, and sexuality of the population, giving rise to the notion of biopower as ``making life live'' (Foucault, 1991). Through regulations in these matters, subjects become entangled in the practices of statecraft. Agamben has critiqued what he calls Foucault's ``progressive disqualification of death'' (ie the circumscription of the issue of death to discussions of classical sovereign power), offering a conceptualization of biopower which focuses on the ways in which sovereign power produces a radical exposure abandoning subjects, stripping their identities to that of bare life, and thereby creating spaces of exception or a ``juridical void'' which permits abuses and killings without punishment.(8) While Agamben's theorizations of biopower and its relation to bare life are invaluable for understanding how modern power works, he arguably draws a bit of a strawman when it comes to Foucault. In Society Must be Defended, Foucault poses the following question. How can biopower, whose function is to improve life and prolong its duration, kill? ``How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower? '' (2003, page 254). His definition of `killing' is not ``simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejections, and so on'' (page 256). Clearly Foucault recognizes that biopower does not preclude the taking of life. He responds to his own question by turning to race, suggesting that race performs two functions: (1) it introduces a break in the domain of life under power's control between what must live and what must die thus fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls, and (2) it establishes a relationship between life and death. ``If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill'' (2003, pages 254 ^ 255).