Security acp



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Security ACP


NOTE

A lot of affs on this topic argued that valuing truth-seeking over the attorney-client privilege would decrease crime. This kritik argued that restricting rights in order to stop crime is a dangerous sort of thinking, and justifies presuming people to be guilty rather than innocent, justifying violence.


1NC

Shell

The quest for truth-seeking at the expense of rights in the CJS results in securitization that paints all of society as guilty


Williams 13 [(Jason Michael, activist scholar, B.S and M.S in Criminal Justice from New Jersey City University, PhD in Administration of Justice from Texas Southern University, has presented at a number of academic conferences, teaches at Farleigh Dickinson University) “The National Securitization of Traditional Criminal Justice” I Criminal Justice, Analysis, June 27th, 2013] AT

In the post-911 era, traditional criminal justice processes have become nearly ancient. For example, according to some scholars within criminology/criminal justice, the administration of justice presently finds itself at a strange crossroad (Wacquant, 2009; Garland, 2001; Braithewaite, 2000; Simon, 2007). This crossroad has been linked to several paradigmatic shifts that have been occurring within the crime control complex that has governed the administration of justice since the 1980s. Some believe this shift is the consequence of late modernity (Garland, 2001; Monahan, 2006) and others blame neo-liberalism (Brown, 2010), and the changing currents within the social, political, and cultural contexts. Birthed from this discourse are crimes of late modernity. These crimes consist of terrorism, cyber- crime, and other crimes categorized under the umbrella of national security. What is of essential importance is the context in which the mechanisms of punishment and crime control has changed. For example, traditionally, rights afforded to U.S. citizens via the Constitution were off limits and could never be challenged or taken away under any circumstances; however, today, because of various laws and powers of the Executive Branch of government, U.S. citizens are at a greater risk of being punished and surveilled by the government. A good indicator of this reality is the current debates on the Obama Administration and the National Security Administration's (NSA) spying program. The ACLU has taken measures to combat the intrusive qualities of the NSA's spying program. According to the ACLU, the U.S. government does not seem to have a concrete purpose for collecting data on its citizens; it simply alleges that, by doing so, it makes it easier for intelligence officials to identify trends and possible leads later. This shifting in the administration of justice implicates a minority report-effect wherein law enforcement has become involved in the business of preemptive-law enforcement. This shift is a process whereby the government investigates to prevent crime but under a dogmatic notion that everyone is possibly guilty before committing the crime. This logic is abundantly counterproductive to the usual processes of law enforcement. However, the biggest question regarding this discourse is why this is happening and what are some critical elements that may need to be contextualized for a better understanding on what is occurring. In the post-911 era, the crime control model of administering justice has been placed on steroids. Packer (1968) describes the crime control model as a process in which justice is swift and based on just deserts. There is very little room for improvement of the individual under this model, for justice is at best an assembly line and crime is never-ending and unfixable. The crime control model operates off the presumption of guilt, which is congruent to the way in which the system operates today under preemptive-law enforcement. Large quantities of cases are brought into adjudication and convicts are swiftly assigned punishment. In fact, many cases are never brought to court due to the continuous movement of the system and the large amounts of persons being charged daily. According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, 90-95% of defendants on both the federal and state levels never reach the trail stage due to plea bargains, which have more striking cons to them than pros. Timothy Lynch of the CATO Institute has written a compelling article that focused on government's response to one's option/right to a trial by jury, thus alleging that government retaliates against those defendants who are apathetic to pleas. On the other hand, Packer describes the due process model as a more egalitarian approach to administering justice. Under this model, the humanity of the victim and perpetrator is recognized, and there is no loss of Constitutional rights for either side. The due process model understands that error can occur within the fact-finding process and makes strides toward making sure that such errors are avoided and considered; thus, it tries to maintain the integrity of justice. However, the impact that all the above has on modern day criminal justice is one of the most important questions that must be answered. Since 911, social control has become more punitive. Government can now surveil people in ways never done before. Techno-surveillance has become a very attractive tool in modern-day spying. More strikingly, state and local law enforcement agencies are starting to impersonate federal protocol. For example, many states now have counter-terrorism units, cyber-crime units, and departments of homeland security and emergency management. These advents are indicative of a dual police state (federal and state), or a system in which surveillance reigns supreme 24/7 and within all spaces of governance.

The impact is global war and extermination


Mamon 12 [(The Campaign against Criminalising Communities (CAMPACC) in association with the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers, European Association of Lawyers for Democracy & World Human Rights (EDLH), the Newham Monitoring Project (NMP), the Network for Police Monitoring (Netpol), G4S Campaign and CagePrisoners); “Securitisation as a Political Strategy: Creating Insecurity, suppressing Dissent” Backdoor Broadcasting, 11 July 2012] AT

Security Measures’ are becoming all-pervasive, supposedly to protect us from severe threats. In practice, such measures turn us into suspects subjected to preventative measures such as state surveillance, restrictions on movement, extra-judicial powers, secret evidence and even punishment without trial. ‘Terrorism’ , ‘extremism’ and ‘ suspicious behavior’ are defined so broadly and vaguely as to entrap potentially anyone. Some measures target specific groups; for example, anti-terror powers target migrant diaspora and Muslim communities, as well as (increasingly) political activists. Organised as mass-media spectacles, anti-terror raids label individuals and entire groups as terror suspects. For the past decade, secret evidence has been systematically used to label and detain foreigners as ‘terror suspects’; more recently, secret evidence has been extended to other procedures, likewise in the name of national security. Curfews and dispersal orders target youth, labeling normal social activities as dangerous. Israel’s occupation of Palestine has served as a laboratory for many surveillance and control techniques designed for global export. These are being adapted for ‘security measures’ at airports and mega-events such as the Olympics. In the run-up to the London Olympics, military equipment is being deployed to build public fear, justifying a quasi-military occupation on behalf of multinational companies. Israeli checkpoints have been spreading: when Palestinian activists planned protests against Israel’s Habima Treatre performance in London in May, the Shakespeare Globe Theatre installed airport-style detectors to screen all ticket holders, as well as employing private ‘security guards’. The British-Danish company G4S has been quickly growing and gaining state-like powers in this country. It has been long involved in the Israeli occupation, e.g. by supplying equipment to Israeli prisons and ‘security services’ to businesses in illegal Israeli settlement. G4S has been designated as the ‘official provider of security and cash services for the Olympics’. In all these ways, securitisation is a political strategy for spreading fear and insecurity, while also suppressing dissent against neoliberal policies and war. It attempts to discipline us all through fear that our behavior will be treated as ‘extreme’ or ‘suspicious’. Societal conflicts are increasingly defined as ‘security problems’ warranting special measures – which thereby become normal. All these measures encourage suspicion towards each other, discouraging solidarity. We will ask the following questions: How is insecurity being defined and even created by the state? Who threatens whose security? What has been driving securitisation? How can this be undermined through solidarity among the groups being targeted?

Vote neg to endorse a new scholarship that starts security discussions in the community – this is where resistance to securitizing narratives occurs


Simon 2 [(Jonathan, Professor of Law at Berkeley, Director at Center for the Study of Law and Society) “Crime, Community, and Criminal Justice” California Law Review, Volume 90, Issue 5 Article 2 10-31-2002] AT

Perhaps the new scholarship on community and criminal justice, which the essays in this Colloquium represent a major contribution to, can begin a much-needed counter-discourse that will reinfuse community legal landscapes with a fuller set of social values than crime control, including equality, economic revitalization, and social solidarity. By its very position between individual actors and society as a whole, community complicates our dominant crime narratives. As Tracey Meares reminds us in her contribution to this volume, the space of community has long been a space for reimagining how law enforcement, community leaders, and others might act on and know crime in ways different than the traditional punitive criminal law."5 Shifting the practice of criminal-justice institutions and policies in ways that address community opportunities for crime control will require convincing new narratives for crime-control institutions themselves. 9 Three of the Essays here provide quite different directions for theorizing a community logic of criminal justice. In his contribution to this volume, Dan Kahan sets out to establish a theory of community policing that can compete with the dominant model of deterrence that has sustained traditional (and modem) surveillance oriented policing aimed at simply raising the likelihood of catching and convicting criminals.2" Crime is largely determined by solving collectiveaction problems embedded in the nature of all communities. On Kahan's account, community policing is best seen as a device for facilitating circuits of reciprocity that permit these problems to resolved without crime and often without harsh crime control. Anthony Alfieri and Kathryn Abrams each offer interpretations of community criminal justice practices that draw on contemporary critical theories of race and gender. For Alfieri, community prosecution offers a redemptive possibility that goes to the heart of one of the most disturbing features of governing through crime: the increasing racialization of crime.2' Traditional models of the prosecution function have provided little reason for prosecutors to consider the role of law in constructing racial meanings. Prosecution committed to controlling crime through enhancing community capacity for order definition and maintenance inevitably confronts the way race-making practices operate to facilitate and even mandate violence. Kathryn Abrams joins an argument about the purposes behind one of the most popular forms in which an idea of community is infusing criminal justice, that is, hate crimes.22 Earlier work by Kahan argued that punishments for hate crimes operate to turn around the social-meaning making of the criminals by imposing on them marks of degradation and producing disgust against them much as they sought to do to the victims.23 Abrams argues that fighting discrimination through using the emotional power of disgust to reassign meanings is ultimately risky to the creation of durable diverse communities. 4 Turning to the strategies of victims of hate crimes, she finds that groups that have organized for hate-crime legislation after long experience as victims reject the transfer-of-disgust model in favor of affirmative cultural programs aimed at confronting the ignorance that shelters enduring prejudices. For more than forty years now the federal government has played a major role in promoting crime as a primary concern for state and local govemments.' The reach and severity of federal crime-control measures reflect in part the distance between federal lawmakers and any actual communities. State legislatures, in contrast, are generally less punitive precisely because they are closer to the costs and collateral damages of crime control on the community. 6 Susan Klein explores the potential for federalism arguments to create more space for the kinds of less-punitive resolutions with which states are increasingly experimenting.27 Exploring arguments more frequently plumbed by conservatives, Klein suggests that the Tenth Amendment may limit the Commerce Clause even in areas clearly part of commerce where state law protects a minority value preference by recognizing an "independent-norm federalism" that would immunize certain behaviors legalized by state law from federal criminal law enforcement. While "agnostic" about whether such independent norms are desirable, Klein's work offers arguments for those who would seek to limit federal criminalization precisely to protect certain kinds of communities. There is certainly some risks on the road to community justice. In the short term it commits us to an ever-closer association with crime and its metaphors in seeking to solve other kinds of community problems. We may detect here subtle tones of surrender to the popular concern with crime. Economic decline, alienation, inequality can all get back into the discussion, but only by associating with the crime problem and its solution. 2 In the long term, however, these Essays also point to the potential to enrich the current logic of governing through crime by moving it away from the very narrow spectrum of ways of knowing and acting on crime enshrined in our current policies and practices. By searching for new logics of crime control to replace, or at least supplement, the now dominant logics of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution, the new research on community justice opens up the range of what can count as crime-control strategies and begins to reverse the deflation of options for addressing destructive conduct that accompanies the war on crime. By identifying diverse sites of moral judgment and norm definition, including states, social movements, and churches, this scholarship challenges the tendency of traditional criminal law to constitute thin but totalizing claims of community protected by law. Finally, by asking how community members can participate in the construction of their own security, this scholarship counters the tendency of state criminal-justice agencies to exercise top-down power over passive subjects dependent on the state for managing risks.
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