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19. On the art of examining a Witness on the Stand,

see John C. Reed’s “The Conduct of Lawsuits.”



546

LITIGATING THE CONTROVERSY

€1. 2~.


reluctance of the Witness removes much of the danger of suggestion from Leading Ques­tions. It is proper for the Court or Jurors to put additional questions to elicit the facts upon which they desire fuller knowledge.
(C) The Cross-Ex.amination.—Each Wit­ness is not only subject to Direct Examina­tion by the side which produced him; he is also subject to Cross-Examination by the op­posite party, for the purpose of extracting his whole knowledge and to test its credit and significance before he leaves the stand. Ac­cording to Dean Wigmore, a most distin­guished authority in Evidence, “the belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is comparable to that fur­nished by cross-examination, and the convic­tion that no statement(unless by special ex­ception) should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has found increasing strength in lengthening experience. Not even the abuses, the mis­handlings, and the puerilities which are so often found associated with Cross-Examina­tion have availed to nullify its value. It may be that in more than one sense it takes the place in our system which torture occupied in the mediaeval system of the civilians. Nev­ertheless, it is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” 20
(D) The Advantages and Danger of Cross­Examination.-.—Cross-Examination is effec­tive, because it exposes falsehood and inac­curacies, and beats out the truth, by disclos­ing the ability and willingness of the Witness to declare the truth, his opportunity to ascer­tain the facts, his powers of observation and memory, his situation and motives, and by fixing the Witness as to all the minute details of time and place. It is very difficult to make a fabricated story agree with all the circum­stances. Truth alone will match all arOund.
But Cross-Examination often is a two-edged

sword, for it may extract the most unfavor­able and damaging facts, confirming the op­ponent’s case, demonstrating the Witness’ credibility, or supplying fatal gaps which the opponent had left in his Proof.


Methods of Withdrawing the Ca~se from the Jury

AT Common Law, in the course of a Trial by Jury, the respective functions of the Judge and Jury were apportioned, the General Rule being that the Court decided the Law and the Jury the Facts, although this is not invari­ably true. From this practice, it follows logically that where the plaintiff failed to produce legally relevant evidence at the Trial, the matter might be withdrawn from the Jury. And the classic Common-Law pro­cedural device for securing this end was the Demurrer to the Evidence.


(I) The Demurrer to the Evidence:”

(A) In GeneraL—A Demurrer to the Evi­dence is analogous to a Demurrer in Pleading, and it operates to withdraw a case from the Jury. It questions the sufficiency of the Evi­dence in Point of Law, and calls for the opin­ion of the Court upon the legal effect of the facts shown in evidence. And, for this pur­pose, it admits all the facts presented in the


21. In general, ou the Origin, flistocy and Devcdop­meat of tile Demurrer to the Evidence, see:
Treatises: Mansel, A Treatise on the Law and Prac’ tice of Demurrer to Pleadings and Evidence (Phil­adelphia & New York 1839); Thayer, A PreJiminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, c. V, Law and Fact jn Jury Trials (Boston 1898); Scott, Fun­damentals of Procedure in Actions at Law, c. III, Trial by Jury, § 3, Demurrer to the Evidence, 94 (New York 1922); MilIar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in flistorical Perspective, e. XIX, Trial by Jury, 2, Withdrawing the Case from the Jury, 297—303 (New ‘York 1952).
Article: Carlin, Anomalous Features of Den,urrers to the Evidence in West Virginia, 27 W.Va,L.Q. 286 (1927).
CommeNt: Effect of Demurring to the Evidence on Matters Relating Merely to the Quu,ttu,,’ of I1& covery, C Va.L.ltev. 276 (1919).

20. 5 Wigmore, Bvidence, § 1307 (3d ed. Boston 1940)-

Sec. 296

TRIAL BY COURT OR BY JURY

547


evidence or which it conduces to prove.22 If the plaintiff’s evidence does not make a prima facie case, the defendant may Demur. But if he wishes to contradict it, he must resort to the Jury.
This step is taken only in cases in which it is Very clear that the evidence has no tend­ency to prove the case; and naturally it is not often resorted to, for it is generally unsafe for a party to rest his case solely upon the test of what the evidence tends to prove—a mat­ter often difficult to determine. The Party Demurring must obviously be the one holding the Negative of the Issue, as the result of the case must, as a General Rule, be in his favor, unless the Affirmative is proved against him. The effect of the proceeding is to determine the question whether the plaintiff’s evidence shows a prima facie case or right of action.’3
The Demurrer to the Evidence withdraws from the Jury the Application of the Law to the Facts, as in the case of a Special Verdict. On a Demurrer to the Evidence or Motion for Nonsuit, no Objection can be made to the Pleadings.’4
(B) In the Several St at es.—In many States, the practice of Demurring to the Evi­
22. English: Gibson v. Hunter, 2 BIB. 187, 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793); Illinois: Rockhill v. Congress Ho­tel Co., 237 Ill. 08, 56 N.E. 740 (1908); Massachu­setts: Copeland v. New England Ins. Co., 22 PIck. (Mass.) 135 (1839); Federal: Slocuin v. New York Life Ins, Co., 228 U.S. 36-1, 33 S.Ct. 523, 57 LEt]. 879 (1014); Fowle v. Alexandria, 11 Wheat. (U.S.)

320, 6 LEd. 484 (1826).


23. A Demurrer to plaintiff’s Evidence raises a Ques­tion of Law whether the Evidence in favor of the plaintiff, if considered to Fe true, together with the inferences which may fairly be drawn therefrom, tends to support the Cause of Action of the plain. tiff. Libby. MeNeill & Libby v. Cook, 222 Ill. 206, 78 N.E. 599 (1006); Brophy v. Illinois Steel Co., 242 III. 55, 80 N.E. 684 (1000); Kee & Chapell Dairy Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 201 Ill. 248, 126 N.E. 179 (1920).
24. English: Lumby v. AIlday, 1 Cr. & J. 301, 148

Eng.Rep. 1434 (11831); Georgia: Kelly V. Strouse &

Bros., 110 Ca. 872, 43 SE. 280 (1909); Federal:

Bank of United States v. Smith, 11 Wheat. (U.S.)

171, 6 LEd. 443 (1826).

dence has become obsolete.” It is supersed­ed by a Motion for a Nonsuit or by a Motion to Direct a Verdict for the Defendant.’°


On the Federal level the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1808 in the case of Pawl­ing v. United States,2originally approved the rule as to admissions by Demurrer applied in the English case of Cocksedge v. Fans.haw,25 to the effect that “by the Demurrer, the de­fendant admits every fact which the Jury could have found upon the evidence.” 29 But some five years later, in 1813, in the case of Young v. Black,30 the Supreme Court, speak­ing through Mr. Justice Story shifted to the rule as enunciated in Gibson v. Hunter.3In that case, decided in 1793, the Court held that where the testimony was oral and loose and indeterminate, or circumstantial, the plaintiff was not required to join in the De­murrer except where there was a specific ad­mission in the Demurrer of every fact which the evidence conduced to prove. Thereafter, unless the plaintiff voluntarily joined in the Demurrer, the issue as to whether the Jury could have found the facts was no longer the subject of the inquiry; if the evidence at all conduced to prove the facts, those facts had to be admitted on the Record. This ruling was, in the words of Professor Thayer,3’ a
25. Colegrove v. New York & New Haven It. It.
Company, 20 N.Y. 492 (1859).
26. New York: Ltmer v. Meeker, 25 N.Y. 361 (1862);
Pennsylvania: Finch v. Conrade’s Ear, 154 Pa.

326, 26 A. 368 (1893); Tennessee: Hopkins v. Nash­ville, C. & St. L. It. H., 96 Tenn. 400, 34 SW. 1029

(1896); Federal: Central Transp. Co. v. Pullmans

Palace Car Co., 130 U.S. 24, 11 S.Ct. 478, 35 LEd.



55 (1890).
27. 8 U.S. 219 (1808).
28. 1 Doug. 119, 99 Eng.Rep. 80 (1779).
CII. Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, 1 Doug. 119, 132, 90 Eng. Rep. 80, 88 (1779).
30. ii U.S. 505 (1813).
31. 2 Bl.H. 187, 207—209, 126 Eng.Rep. 499, 569—510 (1793).

32. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the
Common Law, 235 (Boston, 1898).

548


LITIGATING THE CONTROVERSY

Ch. 2~

“death blow” to the Demurrer to Evidence in England. In consequence of this division of view as to the Demurrer to the Evidence in the United States Supreme Court, some States followed the more liberal rule of the Cocksedge Case, while others followed the stricter rule of the Gibson Case. Virginia developed an unorthodox view which included deferring the Demurrer until both Parties had completed their evidence.33 This practice was adopted in West Virginia,34 where it was further distorted by allowing the Court, in certain situations, to determine the sufficien­cy of the Demurrer on the preponderance of the evidence.35 As thus modified, in Virginia and West Virginia, the Demurrer to the Evi­dence still flourished. In England, the place of its origin, by way of contrast, it has long since fallen into disuse.


(II) Nonsujt.36—Another method of with­drawing a case from the consideration of a
33. Patteson v. Ford, 43 Va. 18, 28 (1845).
34. Muhleman V. Nat. Insurance Co., 6 W.Va. 508 (1873).
35. See article by Carlin, Anomalous Features of De­murrers to the Evidence in \Vest Virginia, 27 W.Va. L.Q. 236, 245 (1921).
36. In general, on the Origin and Development of the Nonsuit, see:

Treatises: Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Ac­tIons at Law, c. III, Trial by Jury, 7, Compulsory Nonsuit, 100 (New York 1922) Millar, Civil Proce­dure of the Trial Court In Historical Perspective, c. XIX, Trial by Jury, § 2, Withdrawing the Case from the Jury, 303—305 (New York 1952).


Articles: Demarest, Non-Suits, New and Old, 65 Al­bany Li 363 (1903); Head, The History and De­velopment of Nonsuit, 27 W.Va.L.Q. 20 (1920); Heitz, Voluntary and Involuntary Nonsuits in Mis­souri, 5 Mo.L.Rev. 131 (1940).
Comments: Practice and Procedure—Voluntary Non-

suit—Treatment Under Michigan Court Rules, 40

Mich.L.Rev. 010 (1942); The Itight of a Plaintiff to

Take a Voluntary Nonsuit or to Dismiss his Action

Without Prejudice, 37 Va.L.Bev. 969 (1951).
Annotation: Right of Plaintiff to Take a Nonsuit

When the Defendant has Interposed a Counterclaim

Entitling Him to Affirmative Relief, Where Right to

Such Dismissal is Not Defined or Denied by Statute,

15 L.ILA.(N.S.) 341 (1008),

Jury was by use of the procedural device known as a Nonsuit. At Common Law, a Nonsuit was not granted without the plain­tiff’s consent, and the Court had no power to order a Nonsuit where the plaintiff insisted on a submission of a case to the Jury. But now, in many Jurisdictions, a Court may grant a Motion for a Nonsuit where the plain­tiff’s evidence fails to make out a p;’inic: facic case.


Broadly speaking, a Nonsuit is a Judgment given against the plaintiff when he is unable to prove his case, or when he neglects or re­fuses to proceed to Trial. And Nonsuits are of two descriptions: 1. The Vountary Non-suit, which is an abandonment of his cause by the plaintiff either before the Trial is commenced, or during the presentation of his case; and 2. The Involuntary Nonsuit, which is a Judgment ordered by the Court where the plaintiff fails to appear, or where he has given no evidence on which a Verdict in his favor can be rendered.
(~) The Directed Verdict.37—By far the most important method of withdrawing a
St In geiteral, on the History and Development of the Directed Verdict, see:
Treatises: Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Ac­tions at Law, c. III, Trial by Jury, § 6, Direction of Verdict, 98 (New York, 1922); Millar, Civil Proce­dure of the Trial Court In Historical Perspective, C. XIX, Trial by Jury, 2, Withdrawing the Case Prom the Jury, 305—309 (New York 1052).
Articles: Hackett, Has a Trial Judge of a United States Court the Right to Direct a Verdict, 24 Yale L.J. 127 (1914); Sunderland, Directiag a Verdict for the Party Having the Burden of Proof, 11 Mich. L.Rev. 198 (1913); Smith, The Power of the Judge to Direct a Verdict: Section 457a of the New York Civil Practice Act, 24 Col.L.Rev. 111 (1924); Smith, Some Problems in Connection with Motions During the Trial of a Civil Action Before a Jury, 25 Col.L.Rev. 752 (1925); Blume, Origin and De­velopment of the Directed Verdict, 48 Mich.L.Eev. 555 (1950).
Comments: Criminal Procedure—Variance, 03 U.Pa. LRev. 804 (1915); The Right of a Jury in a Crim­inal Case to Render a Verdict Against the Law and the Evidence, 19 Mich.L.Bev. 325 (1920); Practice— Directed Verdicts in Criminal Cases—Judge and

TRIAL BY COURT OR BY JURY

Sec. 296
case from the Jury isthe Directed Verdict, which is, in effect, the Modern Substitute for the Old Demurrer to the Evidence. The rea­son for this situation was that the Demurrer to the Evidence was highly technical and dif­ficult to draft, as it was required to contain a full written statement of all the facts shown in evidence by the opposition Party, together with every reasonable inference favorable to the Party who presented the evidence.36 Moreover, the use of the Demur­rer was “an absolute, final and irrevocable withdrawal of the case from the Jury, which resulted necessarily in a Final Judgment on the merits for one party or the other.” ~ In consequence, one who had a meritorious De­fense was reluctant to risk his whole case on one fling—the Demurrer to the Evidence.


The substituted motion for a Directed Ver­dict avoided the defects above set forth. Presented orally at the Trial, and grounded on the evidence as preserved by the Court

51~,
Stenographer and in the memory of the Judge, such Motion, if sustained, results in a Verdict being directed by the Court, upon which is entered a Judgment on the merits; if overruled, the moving Party may still go on with the Trial, and seek a Vcrdict from the Jury.4°
The Charge of the Court

(I) Instructions—Charging the J-ury— The Jury, in finding a General Verdict for Plaintiff or Defendant, must necessarily ap­ply the Law to the Facts found; e.g., to de­cide whether or not they show a legal lia­bility. Accordingly, after the Arguments, the Judge Orally Charges the Jury, and Jays down the Rules of Law which they are to apply to the Facts proved in rendering their Verdict for one or the other Party. The Judge will ordinarily state the Nature of the Action and Defense, the Points in Issue, what the plaintiff must prove to recover, and what rules will apply to the different states of fact which may possibly be established in the Opinion of the Jury.


(II) Restrictions on the Charge.—At Com­mon Law the Judge was under slight re­straint in guiding the Jury. He could sum up the evidence, observing where the main issue lay, stating what evidence had been given to support it, and giving them his opin­ion on the credibility of the Witnesses and the weight and effect of the evidence—e.g., that the defendant’s case was a very “thin” one; but under our practice in the United States such comment, even if correct, would be regarded as an invasion of the Province of the Jury, and as such Reversible Error. The Judge cannot single out and disparage a Particular Witness, or express his belief or disbelief of certain testimony, or even make a comparison between direct and circumstan­
40. Eberstadt v. State, 92 Tex. 94, 45 S.W. 1007 (189s)~ As to the relation of the Burden of Proof and the

Directed Verdict, see article by Sunderland, Direct­ing a Verdict for the Party Having the Burden otT Proof, 11 Mieh.LRev. 198 (1912).

Jury—Instructions as to Law in Effect Directing a Verdict, 30 Yale L.J. 421 (1921); Directed Verdict Under the New York Civil Practice Act, 22 CoIL. Rev. 250 (1922); The Effect of Motions by Both Parties for Directed Verdicts on the Right to a Jury Trial, 22 Col.L.Rev, 358 (1022); Practice— Motion by Both Sides to Direct the Verdict, I~ ru. LRev, 474 (1925); Practice: Motion by Both Sides to Direct the Verdict: Waiver of Jury Trial, II Corn.L.Q. 400 (1926); Trial Practice—Effect of Each Party Moving for a Directed Verdict, 27 Mich. L.Rev. 719 (1929); Practice and Procedure—Reser­vation of Decision on Motion for Directed Verdict as a Means of Avoiding Unnecessary New Trials, 34 Mich.L.Rev. 93 (1935); Practice and Procedure— Dismissal and Directed verdict in Minnesota, 23 Minri.L.Rev. 363 (1939); Federal Courts—Directed Verdicts in Civil Actions, 47 Mich.L.Ee-c-. 974 (1949).
Annotations: Direction of Verdict on Opening State­ment of Counsel, 83 ALIt, 221 (1933); Id., 129 AL.

R. 557 (1940); Request by Both Sides for Directed

Verdict as Waiver of Sobinissioo to Jury, IS A.LIt.

1433 (1922); Id., 69 A.L.R. 633 (1930); Id., 108 A.L.

R. 1315 (1936); Cross Motions for Directed Verdicts,

11 U. of Cinn.L.Rev. 72 (1937).


~t Sundorland, Directing a verdict for the Party Having the Burden of Proof, 11 Mieh.L.flev. 198 (1912).

Ibid.

550


LITIGATING THE CONTROVERSY

Cli. 25


tial evidence. It is almost universally pro­vided that Judges may not Charge Juries with respect to Matters of Fact, but may sum up the testimony and Declare the Law. The Judge is not to state abstract principles of Law, but should state the Law concretely as applied to different conceivable theories of thc case, and instruct the Jury to find for the plaintiff or defendant according to one hy­pothesis or another. He may lay down the Rules by which the credibility of the Wit­nesses in general is to be judged, and where there is no Evidence or where a fact is ad­mitted he may so state; but he cannot indi­cate his opinion as to what the Evidence proves, and the Jury is thus deprived of the benefit of his training and exuerience.
(III) Requests to Charge—It is the duty of the Judge to Instruct the Jury, upon prop­er request, as to the correct decision, assum­ing any reasonable hypothesis in relation to the Facts in Evidence, and it is error for the Court to refuse any instruction which cor­rectly Declares the Law, framed on a theory pertinent to the case. These requests may be presented to the Judge before or during Ar­gument, but should be made in such time as will give the Judge opportunity to examine and pass upon them without delaying the Trial. There seems to bc no limitation on the number or length of the instructions which may be requested. Very few Lawyers are competent to write an elaborate Set of In­structions without committing errors which might conceivably mislead the Jury, and in the hurry of a Trial the ablest Judge may mistake the Law and misdirect the Jury; yet a Verdict for the plaintiff, obtained upon er­roneous instructions, is practically worthless. This is one of the most serious abuses con. nected with Jury Trials. Exceptions for er­rors in giving, refusing, or modifying instruc­tions should be taken before the retirement of the Jury, and should specifically point out the ones objected to. In some States excep­

tions may be entered at any time before En­try of Final Judgment.


The Deliberations of the Jury

THE Jury, after the Charge, unless the case be very clear, withdraws from the Ear to deliberate upon their Verdict. After the case was finally submitted to them, they could not separate, but were kept in charge of a Bailiff or Officer of the Court, duly sworn to attend them, but this is not always the case in Modern Practice. Ry the old English Prac­tice they were to be kept without meat, drink, fire, or candle, unless by permission of the Judge, till they were unanimously agreed, a method of accelerating unanimity which is now given up. Formerly, if they did not agree in their Verdict before the Judges left town, they might be carried around the Cir­cuit from town to town in a cart. Now, if it appears to the Court that they cannot agree, they are Discharged, and the case must be re­tried. The Court is not permitted to coerce the Jury into finding a Verdict, and should refrain from anything savoring of a threat as to how long the Jury will be kcpt together unless a Verdict is rendered.4


The Verdict

(I) The General Verdict—Its Form and Tenor.—The Verdict, regardless of its char­acter, must be responsive to the Issue sub­mitted for Trial. At the Pleading Stage, in connection with the Development of the Common-Law Forms of Action, two inflexi­ble rules of pleading grew up, one, that the Charge in the Declaration must correspond with the Charge in the Original Writ; two, that the Charge proved at the Trial must correspond with the Charge in the Declara­tion. It follows, therefore, that the Rule that the Issue found by the Verdict must cor­41, Alabama: DeJarnette v. Cox, 128 Ala. 518, 29 S.

618 (1900); Massachusetts: Highland Foundry Co.

v. N. Y., lV H, & 11. II. Co 109 Mass. 403, 85 NE.

437 (1905); Virg tin: liii itt ii v. City of Daiivillc,

93 Va. 200, 24 sE. 830 (1896).

Sec. 296

TRIAL BY COURT OR BY JURY

551

respond with the Issue submitted for Trial, is merely a continuation, at the Trial Stage, of the effort of the Common-Law Courts to maintain unity in their procedure. And, of course, the Judgment must correspond with the Issue as found by the Verdict. By these devices the procedure at Common Law, both in the Pleading and Trial Stages, was able to secure what, in English Composition, in rela­tion to writing a paragraph, we refer to as unity and coherence.


The General Verdict is in general terms, that is, merely “for the plaintiff” or “for the defendant.” If it is returned for the plain­tiff, it contains a Finding as to the Amount of Damages to which the Jury thinks him en­titled, where Damages are claimed in the ac­tion.
At Common Law, the Rule of Unanimity, made it essential that the Jurors must be in complete agreement as to the Verdict. After the Verdict was rendered, it was Entered on the back of the Nisi Prius Record) and was called the Postea (afterwards), from the name in Latin with which the recital began.
(II) The Special Verdict—Its Form and Tenor.42—In a Special Verdict, permission
42. In general, on the History and Development of the Special Verdict, see:
Treatises: Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evi­dence at the Common Law, c. V Law and Fact ia Jury Trials (Boston 1897); Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions nt Law, e. III, Trial by Jury, § 4, The Special Verdict, 95 (New York 1922).
Articles: Sunderland, Verdicts, General aad Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253 (1919); Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 Yale L.J. 575 (1922); Coleman, Advantages of Special Verdict, 13 J.Am.Jud.Soc. 122 (1929); Staton, The Special Verdict as an Aid to the Jury, 13 J.Am.Jud.Soc. 176 (1030); Lipscomb, Special Verdicts under the Federal Rules, 25 Wash. L.Q. 185 (1940); Nordhyc, Use of Special Ye,’­dicts under Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 LED., 138 (1943); Dooloy, The Use of Special Issues Under the New State and Federal Rules, 20 Texas L.ltev. 32 (1941); Driver, A Consideration of the More l~x­tended Use of the Special Verdict, 25 Wash.L.Rev. 43 (1950); Driver, The Special Verdict—Theory and Practice, 26 WashL 12ev 21 (1951); McCormick-,

for which was given by Chapter 30 of the Statute of Westminster II (1285) ,~ the Jury states the Naked Facts as they find them, concluding, conditionally, that if upon the whole matter the Court should be of the opin­ion that the plaintiff has a cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff; if otherwise, then for the defendant. Such Special Ver­dict, rendered in lieu of a General Verdict, leaves it to the Court to Apply the Law to the Facts, and largely obviates the necessity for Instructions, whereas, under a General Verdict, the Jury is required to Apply the Law to Questions of Fact under the Instruc­tions of the Court.


At Common Law, it was entirely optional with the Jury to find Generally or Specially. If they returned a Special Verdict, setting forth their Findings of Fact, it concluded as follows: “that they (the Jury) are ignorant in Point of Law on which side they ought upon these Facts to find the Issue; that, if upon the whole matter the Court shall be of the opinion that the issue is proved for the plaintiff, they find for the plaintiff according­ly, and Assess the Damages at (a stated sum); but if the Court is of an opposite opin­ion, then vice versa.” Such Special Findings,
Jury Verdicts upon Special Questions in Civil Cases,

2 FED. 176 (1943),


Comments: Trial—Special Issnes—Comlitional Sub-mission, 16 Texas L.Bov. 383 (1985); The Special Verdict Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­cedure. 34 Iil.L.Rev. 96 (1939); Ultimate and Controfling Issues in Texas: special Issue Sub­missions, 25 Texas L.Rev. 391 (1947); Special Find­ings and General Verdicts: The Reconciliation Doctrine, 18 U. of Chi.L.Rcv. 321 (1951); Trial Practice—Special Verdicts—Conclusions of Law— Failure to Find on All Issues, 16 Ohio St.LJ. 120 (1955).
Annotations: Effect of Failure of Special Verdict or

Special Finding to Include Findings of All Ultimate

Facts or Issues, 76 ALE. 1137 (1032); Failure of

One or More Jurors to Join in Answer to Special

Interrogatory or Special Verdict as Affecting Ver­dict, 155 ALE. ~SG (1945)

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