Flaws in South Africa’s ‘first’ economy



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Flaws in South Africa’s ‘first’ economy

Martin Legassick

Department of History, University of the Western Cape
Originally presented at the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society

Rosa Luxemburg Political Education Seminar, February 2006, and published in

Africanus Journal of Development Studies

Vol 37 No 2 2007, ISSN 0304-615x



Transcending two economies – renewed debates in South African political economy

November 2007
Flaws in South Africa’s ‘first’ economy

Martin Legassick



pp. 111-145
1 INTRODUCTION
‘Why is the country not embarking on a large-scale socialist programme to mobilize young people, in order to build roads and schools and plant fields?’ ‘Forget it’ says the media manager. ‘The government dare not be seen as socialists, or the West will crap in its pants.’ ‘I am actually sick of being held to ransom by the West,’ grumbles the mfundisi. ‘Do this, do that. What has all this free-market stuff brought us? They don’t give up a thing, not tariffs, not lifestyle, yet we have to be more capitalist than Wall Street’ (Antjie Krog, A change of tongue, 2003.)
There has been an enormous transformation of the South African state from a white-controlled and staffed apartheid repression to a state with a democratic parliament and an extremely democratic constitution (at least on paper) which guarantees basic freedoms. The ANC was elected to govern with a majority of more than 60% in 1994 and has increased its apparent share of the vote at two subsequent elections (1999 and 2004) to some 70% – though the percentage of the population voting in the elections has consistently diminished so that in 2004 only 38% voted for the ANC (McKinley 2004). But the mass of people elected the ANC into government not for the sake of having members of parliament, but in order to improve their lives. ANC election propaganda has recognised this, promising (1994 onwards) ‘a better life for all’, and (in 2004) to ‘create jobs and fight poverty’.
But does the ANC have a policy and programme which is adequate to the task? The ANC leaders introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme with the claim that it would speed up economic growth. But growth has been sluggish – averaging 2.4% a year between 1996 and 2000 and 2.7% a year between 1994 and 2003, compared with the target set by the government in 1996 of an average 4.2% and rising to 6% by 2000 (Terreblanche 2002:117, Gelb 2005:367, Bond 2004). The ANC managers of the economy have been congratulating themselves on their achievements. But what has been the record of delivery since 1994? Overwhelming evidence shows that since 1994 the unemployed have increased in numbers, that the gap between those at the top and the bottom of society has widened, that impoverishment has increased and that social problems have increased in scale.
The government disputes this evidence. Government agencies such as Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) and the Reserve Bank are constantly ‘revising’ the figures – always in the direction of creating a more favourable impression. Perhaps the first occasion was when in 2000 the Reserve Bank revised the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures for 1998 upwards by 17.9%, and ‘adjusted’ the GDP figures back to 1992. As a result a recession (negative growth) in 1998 was wiped out, and ‘real per capita GDP figures, which had been showing a continuous decline throughout the decade, now showed a rise from when the ANC government took office in 1994’. The reasons given were the need to include the ‘informal economy’, although, as Patrick Bond (2004) points out, the ‘correction’ was not carried through consistently.
Straightening out the confusions and removing from the figures the spin given by the government spin-doctors, leads to the same conclusion that most ordinary people have experienced: that the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer (Jones and Inggs 2003, Business Day 22 June 1999, Sunday Independent 27 June 1999, Sunday Times Business Times 27 June 1999).
In 2005 Stats SA again revised the statistics (upwards) on GDP between 2002 and 2005. It is now claimed that in 2002 the economy grew by 3.7% (rather than 3.6%), in 2003 by 3% (rather than 2.8%) and in 2004 by 4.5% (rather than 3.7%). In 2005 the figures were also revised upwards, from 3.5% to 4.6% for the first quarter and from 4.8% to 5.4% for the second quarter, leading to a predicted growth for 2005 of 5.1% as opposed to the original government estimate of 4.3% (Business Day 30 November 2005, Business Report 30 November 2005).
In early 2006, the government announced a new plan – the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) – to achieve 6% growth by 2010. But what confidence can be placed in this plan? Rather, what is likely to be confirmed again is that while the capitalist system continues, the government will not and cannot deliver its promises. The real question raised by an understanding of the dynamics of the economy is: how can capitalism be ended?
The evolution of capitalism in South Africa – in particular the development of secondary manufacturing industry – had by the 1970s already created an enormous and militant black working class whose opposition to apartheid and capitalism constituted the major challenge to the system. Today apartheid has been ended. Yet neither national nor social liberation has been achieved. The working class, organised predominantly within Cosatu, holds the key to the future in its hands. At the head of all the oppressed – the unemployed, young and old, women and men, in countryside and town, as well as drawing to its side a middle class exploited and oppressed by the banks and monopolies – and with a programme to solve the social and democratic tasks, it could easily defeat the ANC and win power. However, is its leadership up to the task?
2 SOUTH AFRICA’S ACCUMULATION CRISIS
Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution asserts that late developing capitalist societies are subject to combined and uneven economic development, and cannot ‘catch up’ with the first developing capitalist societies. In addition, he argued that in late developing capitalist societies all the burdens of the past are not solved by capitalism, but become attached to capitalism and are worsened by it. In South Africa since colonial occupation, race has been the main form of division and oppression in society, and in the 20th century it was used to promote the profitability of capitalism. The extent of South Africa’s ‘national capitalist’ development was made possible by the intensification of national oppression, and the worsening of the land question (Inqaba ya basebenzi 1982).
Today for many poor blacks, despite an ANC government, race and not class is still seen as the main division in society. And it is. National oppression will not be ended until capitalism is ended (Legassick 2001). This is why the SACP can get away with presenting this as still the stage of the ‘national democratic revolution’ (with a struggle for workers’ democracy not really on the agenda) – because they are right in a certain sense, but they fail to put forward the conclusion confirmed by the Russian revolution – that only the working class can solve the democratic problems of society, including the national question.
As both William Martin (1990) and Patrick Bond (2000) have pointed out, the most rapid economic growth in South Africa took place in the 1930s and 1940s, when the events associated with the world depression lifted the chains of imperialism somewhat from the country – thus lessening its dependence. For Bond (2000) it was ‘the post-war reintegration of South Africa into international capitalist circuits which fostered the crisis conditions that are so overwhelming today’.
The elements of the contemporary crisis were already identified by Marxists by the late 1970s. Rooted in the relation of the South African economy to the global capitalist market, and expressed as a chronic crisis in the balance of payments, it was a manifestation of the relations between different departments of production. It was a crisis of overproduction – rooted in the incapacity of the apartheid economy to provide a market for expanding manufactures, and the inability of South African manufacturing to break through into the world market because of the problems of economies of scale, intensified by the downturn in the world economy from 1974.
Earnings from manufactured exports were needed to fill out the earnings from mineral and agricultural exports (particularly as, with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreements) the gold price became unstable. The failure to achieve this led to a falloff of new foreign investment, worsening the balance of payments crisis. A vicious cycle developed, barely eased by spasmodic increases in the gold price (to a peak of $864 in early 1980). This explanation – its core put forward by Simon Clarke in 1978 in an argument against the South African Poulantzians – was developed and rounded out by the Marxist Workers’ Tendency of the ANC in the 1980s.
In the early 1990s Bond redeveloped Clarke’s arguments into a similar explanation of the crisis in terms of overaccumulation, which he argued had begun in the late 1960s. The root cause was excessive production of consumer goods locally (textiles, chemicals, rubber, motor vehicles) and the inability of local producers of manufactures to export profitably. ‘Too many goods are produced, workers are replaced by machines, and competition between capitalists becomes ruinous … a situation in which goods cannot be brought to market profitably, leaving capital to pile up without being put into new productive investment … unused plant and equipment, huge gluts of unsold commodities, an unusually large number of unemployed workers, and the rise of speculation in shares and real estate’. Excessive automation in the 1970s led to loss of jobs. The consequence was a decline in economic growth and a drought of new investment through the 1970s and 1980s.
As subsequently summarised by Bond (1991:34–40 and Meth 1990), the crisis conditions included a near-exhausted raw materials export sector, an overproductive luxury goods sector hosting overprotected local monopoly capital and multinational corporations, an inadequate capital goods sector, and a hopelessly under-resourced basic needs sector. As in many semi-peripheral countries, import-substitution industrialisation was geared to the desires of the local bourgeoisie and ended up generating serious balance of payments tensions. Under such structural conditions, as rising levels of class struggle combined with local processes of uneven development, an accumulation crisis surfaced during the 1970s and became acute during the late 1980s.
South Africa’s ‘abundant mineral resource endowment … promoted a lotus-eating effect – that is, it was easier to import producer goods than make them locally’ (Bond 2000:237, 2005:15–24). In an attempt to resolve the crisis, the state stepped up its investment, with a dramatic increase in foreign borrowing for parastatals such as the ‘strategic’ SASOL (oil-from-coal), ISCOR and ESKOM. Basic chemicals and basic metals accounted for two-thirds of investment between 1972 and 1990, with MOSSGAS and SASOL accounting for about 50% of the growth in manufacturing investment, and roads, dams, railways, nuclear power and arms production accounting for the rest.
Because of negative real interest rates and accelerated depreciation allowances, this investment was extremely capital intensive. The manufacturing sector, for example, was producing 40% less output per unit of capital in 2001 than it was in 1960. Nattrass argues that the state had a choice of extending inward industrialisation in this way, or of opting from the early 1970s for a more outward-oriented export strategy (on the model of the East Asian tigers), but the pattern of accumulation was already long and well-established (Altman 2004, Nattrass 2004 and Hirsch 2006). In the 1980s the state began to reverse course on state investment and embarked on a privatisation programe, leading to the privatisation of ISCOR and SASOL late in the decade. Having attempted to liberalise exchange control regulations, the state was forced in 1985 into a financial freeze and a rescheduling of foreign debt.
American banks, perturbed by the revolutionary upsurge in the country, refused to roll over their loans. It was the prelude to the worst period for the South African economy, with high interest rates failing to stem a drain of big capital (foreign and local) from the country. There was negative per capita growth, a negative growth rate of productive investment, and an absolute decline in the value of capital stock, especially in manufacturing. ‘Overaccumulated capital was placed in the JSE, real estate and various other financial markets, rather than in new productive plant and investment’ – and the result was ‘volatile and vastly overvalued stock market, inordinate corporate and consumer debt [and] hugely overbuilt commercial property markets’ (Bond 1991:40–48, Bond 2000:Chapter 7 and Bond 2005:50).
The South African economy, from the time of gold-mining and the domination of a few big mining houses (Wernher-Beit, Rhodes’ Consolidated Gold Fields, Albu’s General Mining, Goerz and Co) had always tended towards monopoly. In the 1960s the mining houses extended their control over manufacturing industry, and in the 1980s they and the big insurance companies took over the interests of foreign companies who pulled out. Thus, by 1992 six companies accounted for 85.7% of the market valuation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange: Anglo American Corporation had 33.7%, Sanlam had 15.6%, Rembrandt had 14.6%, SA Mutual had 14.2%, Liberty Life had 4.7% and Anglovaal had 2.9% (Lewis 1995, Innes 1984).
3 DEBATING THE ROOTS AND MEANING OF CRISIS
Similar conclusions – of a crisis – had been reached earlier, in 1981, by John Saul and Stephen Gelb (1981) in their ground breaking book, The crisis in South Africa, though these were phrased more in terms of under-consumption, and with less attention to the relationship of South Africa to the world economy. Saul and Gelb pointed to such contradictions as the saturation of the white consumer market by the late 1960s, and the lack therefore of economies of scale, a structurally high rate of unemployment and the shortages of skilled labour because of the job colour bar. They linked the onset of the crisis to the 1974 downturn in the world economy and to the Durban strikes of 1973. The ability of capitalism to resist the pressures of the crisis was, they argued, undermined by ‘growing inflation, skilled labour shortages, and balance of payments deficits’. They regarded the problems of inflation and the balance of payments, however, as less serious than skilled labour shortages, the limits of the white consumer market and the high black unemployment rate (see also Simkins 1978, 1982).
Gelb was to develop this analysis in the late 1980s on the basis of French regulation theory, and to identify the crisis as one of ‘racial Fordism’.1 This became the standpoint of the Economic Trends group, policy-makers for Cosatu. Fordism was the accumulation regime of the advanced capitalist countries based on assemblyline production for a mass market. Racial Fordism was South Africa’s version of this – import-substitution industrialisation based predominantly on the white market. Then Gelb placed more emphasis on the role of the balance of payments – as between mineral/agricultural exports and capital goods imports – than in his 1981 book. The bottlenecks caused by the need for foreign exchange and the shortage of skilled labour were ‘reproductive’ rather than negative in that they limited the rise of the capital-labour and capital-ouput ratios.
The economic crisis in the advanced capitalist countries in the early 1970s (collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the 1974 downturn) precipitated crisis in the South African economy. It meant (a) fluctuations in the gold price and (b) the price of machinery imports rising leading to inflation. The consequences were (a) destabilisation of the balance of payments and (b) rising inflation meant falling real interest rates, encouraging capital-intensive investment, eating into profits, and deepening the crisis. In addition, the rise in black wages consequent on the Durban strikes pushed up real unit labour costs (see Gelb 1987, 1991, reproduced by Marais 1998 and Murray 1994). Bond (1991), relying partly on Charles Meth, criticised Gelb’s analysis for (a) being under-consumptionist in the sense of maintaining that the problem could be solved by pumping money into the economy and (b) identifying the ‘unreasonable (politically-motivated)’ wage claims of the workers as a key cause of crisis, thus laying the blame for the crisis on those who were its victims. Thus Gelb, according to Meth (1990:32–33), ‘allows capital to slide too easily off the hook’.
In addition, Meth apparently regarded the rising cost of raw materials, rather than of machinery, as the means of transmission of the world economic crisis into the South African economy. Gelb’s analysis, in addition, seems to involve a contradiction – blaming both low wages and wage rises for the crisis. Nor does Gelb explain clearly how the balance of payments can be seen as both a ‘reproductive’ factor and a crisis-inducing factor: racial Fordism’s ‘success’ in achieving growth brought its own problems, however … the ability to expand production was increasingly tied to balance of payments considerations’.
Clarke (1988:7–11) regarded regulation theory as having ‘very valuable’ features, such as ‘drawing attention to the systematic character of the regulation of capital accumulation, relating the forms of regulation of capitalist production to the forms of regulation of accumulation by money and the state’. However, he continued, the explanatory relationships proposed are very unclear, both theoretically and empirically … it is not at all clear that the different aspects of a particular ‘regime of accumulation’ can be so neatly tied together in a functional whole, nor that the directions of causality are as unambiguous as indicated in the model … [Its structural-functionalism] leads it considerably to overemphasise the coherence and stability of the ‘regime of accumulation’ in a period of sustained accumulation, and to exaggerate its disintegration and instability in a period of crisis … [It had] no theory of money and the state as the dual forms of capitalist power, nor any conception of the contradictory character of capitalist regulation that derives from the contradictory form of capitalist production … [Crisis] is seen only as a crisis of particular ‘modes of regulation’ of capital accumulation, resolvable by developing new forms, rather than being seen as a crisis which expresses the contradictory form of accumulation itself.
In 1981 Saul and Gelb (1981:3–4) wrote not just of economic crisis, but of organic crisis: that economic crisis spilled over into political crisis (splits in the ruling class, development of mass opposition) and ideological crisis (a crisis of legitimacy). They quoted the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1971:178) from his prison notebooks:
A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts (since no social formation will ever admit that it has been superseded) form the terrain of the ‘conjunctural’ and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organise.
It is well known that in his prison notebooks, Gramsci (1971:276) was forced into extreme circumlocutions to evade censorship. Evidently here, however, he is describing the emergence of a revolutionary situation in which the ‘supersession’ of capitalism is possible. A similar and more well-known passage of Gramsci’s (1971:276) on the same theme reads, ‘[t]he crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot yet be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’. It is significant that Saul and Gelb omitted, however, the immediately following sentence of Gramsci’s (1976:276): ‘These forces [of opposition] seek to demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions already exist to make possible, and hence imperative, the accomplishment of certain historical tasks’ – which, in Gramsci’s circumlocutions meant that under those conditions the working class tries to make a social revolution (my emphasis).
Instead of advocating revolution, Gelb (1987:35–36) adopted regulation theory and became more explicit about the political project ahead. He regarded the various ‘orthodox’ Marxist explanations of capitalist crisis as limited because they implied that crisis was a terminal disease for capitalism, and fail to account for capitalism’s continued survival through numerous crises. Marais (1998:37) followed Gelb in this, caricaturing the ‘orthodox’ Marxist definition of crisis: ‘a terminal breakdown of the system which necessarily inaugurates profound social transformation’. Both Gelb and Marais insisted instead that an economic crisis ‘is thus seen more appropriately as a turning point in the form of capitalism rather than as a terminal disease.
Its resolution is as likely, or more so, to involve a transformation of capitalism as a transformation from capitalism to a different mode of production.’ Or, again: The popular connotation associated with ‘crisis’ is an idea of collapse or breakdown. But the original, more useful meaning of the term is ‘turning point’. In this sense a crisis in a capitalist economy implies that the system cannot continue to develop along the same path as before – it must ‘adapt or die’ as P.W. Botha eloquently expressed it more than a decade ago (Gelb 1987:36).
Why did they not stick with Gramsci’s Marxist approach to capitalist crisis, in which the possibility (not necessity) of social revolution exists, provided the working class can correctly organise its hegemony? A similar idea was expressed by Trotsky (1934): The strength of finance capital does not reside in its ability to establish a government of any kind and at any time, according to its wish ... Its strength resides in the fact that every non-proletarian government is forced to serve finance capital; or better yet, that finance capital possesses the possibility of substituting for each one of its systems of domination that decays, another system corresponding better to the changed conditions. However the passage from one system to another signifies the political crisis which, with the concourse of the activity of the revolutionary proletariat, may be transformed into a social danger to the bourgeoisie (my emphasis).
Such a Gramscian/Trotskyist definition of crisis focusses attention on the subjective organisation of the working class as the key to whether social revolution is achieved out of organic crisis. This subjective organisation depends critically on the strategies and policies pursued by the leadership of the political parties in which the working class is organised. Only if the working class fails to make a revolution is the capitalist class able to impose its own solution.
Gelb explicitly repudiated such an approach. A telling review of the book that he edited as the leader of Cosatu’s Economic Trends policy-making group, in 1991, South Africa’s economic crisis, appeared in Work in Progress. ‘Gracchus’ (1991:45- 46) maintained that the economic trends group had become a ‘project to rescue capitalism’. Capitalists would not invest under existing conditions because they could not make a profit, and poverty would continue until investment created new jobs and enriched existing jobs: ‘If the capitalists won’t invest, then the state will have to take over and do the investing instead. Yes, that means nationalisation’ – yet ‘in the entire book, the word socialism is mentioned only once. If nationalisation is mentioned at all, it escaped among the jargon and got clean away’.
Gelb (1991:42–43) replied in an article entitled ‘Capitalism: There is no alternative … for now’, repeating his deterministic position that ‘South African capitalism is right now in the process of transforming itself, away from an excessive reliance on racially-defined institutions and structures; and … capitalism will survive its own transition so that socialism is not on South Africa’s agenda for the next round… The real issue of the day, then, is what form South African capitalism will take in the next round’. As if any ‘agency’ – working-class action – could not have altered this ‘structurally imposed’ situation.
Gelb, at the time a critic of neoliberal policies, has in a more recent piece justified the agreement between big business and the ANC, on the basis that it was needed to secure inflows of foreign investment. The ‘concession’ by big business, Gelb (2005:368– 370) states, was to support the modification of the ‘racial structure of asset ownership’ – i.e., to support black economic empowerment (BEE). The ANC government, according to Terreblanche (2002:102), made a much more important concession: to relax exchange control so that the conglomerates could ‘escape into globalism’, meaning they could invest abroad in the world economy. Thus big capital in South Africa would become a player on the global stage, with blacks co-opted into the capitalist class.
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