Econ 7003-01: political economy I



Download 16,41 Kb.
Date conversion28.12.2016
Size16,41 Kb.

Fall 2012 Dr. Erturk

University of Utah Office: OSH – 354

Hrs: M: 1-2pm





ECON 7003-01: POLITICAL ECONOMY I

The class starts with a discussion of some new developments in economics that go under the heading, Post-Walrasian economics, including the theory of contested exchange, incomplete contracts and transaction cost economics along with behavioral extensions of game theoretic experiments and models of conflict. The class then concentrates on the older non-Walrasian conceptions of market exchange as found, most notably, in Polanyi, Marx and Veblen and discusses the theory of capitalism as a distinct form of market economy found in the works of these authors. The class ends with a brief discussion of the relevance of political economy for modern economics in its many versions.


Readings indicated with an asterisk are recommended, and all others required. Class evaluation will be based on class participation (10%), two mid-term exams (30% each) and a final examination (30%).


COURSE OUTLINE



  1. Market Exchange and Society




    1. Self-Regulation, Agency and Conflict

Bowles, S. & H. Gintis (1993). “The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(1), Winter, pp. 83-102.

Veblen, T. (1934). “The Instinct of Workmanship” in his Essays in Our Changing Times.

Hardin, G. (1968). “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162(3859).




  • Foley, D. (2004). “Rationality and Ideology in Economics,” Social Research, 71(2).

  • Evensky (2005). “Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments: On Morals and Why They Matter to a Liberal Society of Free People and Free Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3), pp. 109-30.



ii. “Spontaneous Order” and Collective Action
Sudgen, R. (1989). “Spontaneous Order,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(4), pp. 85-97.

Ostrom, E. (2000). “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), pp. 137-58.

Axelrod, R. & W. Hamilton (1981). “The Evolution of Cooperation,” Science, 211, pp. 1390-16.

Nesse, R. (2010). “Social Selection and the Origins of Culture,” in M. Schaller, J. Heine, A. Norenzayan, T. Yamagishi & T. Kameda (eds.) Evolution, Culture, and the Human Mind.




  • Fehr, E. & S. Gachter (2000). “Fairness and Retaliation: the Economics of Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, pp. 159-81.

  • Bowles, S. & H. Gintis (2002). Social Capital and Community Governance,” Economic Journal, 112.



iii. Ownership, Property, Power and Social Organization
Hymer, S. (1980). “Robinson Crusoe and the Secret of Primitive Accumulation,” in E.J. Nell (ed.) Growth, Profits, and Property, Cambridge University Press.

Veblen, T. (1934). “The Beginnings of Ownership” in his Essays in Our Changing Times.

Gintis, H. (2007). “The Evolution of Private Property,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64, pp. 1-16.


  • Rider, R. (1999). “Conflict, the Sire of Exchange,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 40, pp. 217-32.



  1. Formal Institutions of Enforcement - Economics of Governance


    1. The State – Enforcement of Property Relations

North, D. (1981). “A Neoclassical Theory of the State,” Ch..3 in his Structure and Change in Economic History. W.W. Norton & Company.

Harvey, D. (1976). “The Marxian Theory of the State,” Antipode, 8(2).

Marx, K. & F. Engels (1848). The Communist Manifesto

Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation, Chp. 5

Pagano, U. (2003). “Nationalism, Development and Integration,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 27, pp. 623-46.




    1. The Firm- Enforcement of Contracts

Hardin, R. (1995). “Group Power,” Ch. 2 in his One for All. The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton University Press.

Williamson, O. (2005). “The Economics of Governance,” American Economic Review, 95(2), Papers and Proceedings.

Coase, R. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 4(16).





  1. Capitalism in Historical Perspective




    1. Self-Regulation and Commodity Production

Marx, Capital, Vol. I: Chp. 1 (sections 4, 2); Chps. 2, 4 and 5

Polanyi, K. - Great Transformation – Chps. 3,4

Marx, K. – Grundrisse, Introduction, pp. 83-111; 145-65.


ii. Commodification of Labor & “Fictitious” Commodities
Marx, Capital, Vol. I: Chps. 6 – 10.

Marx - Grundrisse: pp. 483-488


iii. Production and its Transformation
Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation, Chps. 11 – 18.

Marx, Capital, Vol. I: Chps. 6 – 10;


Chps. 12 through 14

Chp 15 – sections 1, 3, 4, 6

Chps. 23 through 26
iv. Normative Underpinnings of Capitalism
Marx, K. (1844). “Estranged Labor and Capital.”

Hunt, E.K. (1978). “Normative Foundations of Social Theory: An Essay on the Criteria Defining Social Economies,” Review of Social Economy, December, pp. 285-309.

Polanyi, The Great Transformation – Chps 1-2.

Polanyi, K. (1947). “Our Obsolete Market Mentality: Civilization Must Find a New Thought Pattern.” Commentary, vol. 3.


* Erturk, K. (1999), “Marx, Postmodernity and the Transformation of the Individual.” Review of Radical Political Economics, 31(2).

III. Economics in Flux – What Does it All Mean?
Leinjohnufvud, A. (2007). “The Individual the Market and the Division of Labor in Society,” Capitalism and Society 2(2).


The database is protected by copyright ©sckool.org 2016
send message

    Main page