Arctic Affirmative 1AC



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Arctic Affirmative

1AC

Inherency

There is a severe lack of funding for arctic infrastructure


The Atlantic 2015 ("The U.S. Is Not Ready for a Melting Arctic." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 11 Mar. 2015. Web. 01 July 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-us-is-not-ready-for-a-melting-arctic/443829/) JTE
America faces an Arctic dilemma. Next month, the U.S. is set to take the helm of the Arctic Council, an international forum for the polar region. That event creates an opportunity for the Obama administration to talk up its commitment to advancing U.S. interests in the Arctic, an expansive land and sea territory that contains vast untapped energy resources. But America has essentially given the Arctic the cold shoulder. Lawmakers, federal officials, and experts warn that Arctic investment has not kept pace with rapid ice-melt and caution that the U.S. must overcome a lack of funding and resources as it patrols the polar region. Yet Congress has hardly lifted a finger so far to foot the bill for infrastructure and technology that would better equip the U.S. to safeguard Arctic waters. America's Arctic strategy has long been plagued by a lack of funding. Vast stretches of polar waters have not been charted or mapped to modern-day standards, and the Coast Guard has been forced to make do with a shrinking fleet of icebreakers, powerful ships that play a key role in search and rescue operations as well as Arctic exploration.¶

Plan


The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its economic engagement with China by bilaterally funding the establishment of arctic infrastructure.

ADV 1 Russia

Russia is creating a permanent military presence in the arctic to achieve its political ambitions.


International Business Times 2016 ("Russia Military Increases Arctic Permanent Presence Amid Regional Tension." International Business Times. N.p., 29 Jan. 2016. Web. 01 July 2016.

http//www.ibtimes.com/russia-military-increases-arctic-permanent-presence-amid-regional-tension-2285782) JTE



As Europe continues to worry about Russian aggression in the east, the country's defense ministry announced Friday that it is reinforcing its troops further north, in the Arctic, Russian state media reported. The expansion of its military presence there comes as the U.S. and Scandinavian states modernize their own defenses in the region. “The buildup of the permanent group of troops in the Arctic is underway,” Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said. “This will expand the armed forces’ capabilities for securing the defense of the national interests in the region.” Shoigu said Russian troops will be stationed in the Arctic on a permanent basis, with a focus on increasing the Kremlin's control over the region’s airspace. Moscow formed the 45th Air Force and Air Defense Army as part of its Northern Fleet in December 2015. Russia continues to build up the fleet with new bases in the region; four were completed in 2015, the defense minister said. “We are creating comfortable living conditions for our military personnel who will serve in the Arctic on a permanent basis,” Nikolai Yevmenov, the fleet’s chief of staff, said. Our neighbor in the east has built up its military capacity, also in areas close to us,” Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen of Norway’s navy said in October. “They have shown that they are willing to use military force to achieve political ambitions.

Arctic maritime transport and infrastructure policies are key to prevent competition from escalating by encouraging cooperation


Higginbotham and Grosu 14 (JOHN HIGGINBOTHAM a senior fellow at CIGI and Carleton University, MARINA GROSU master’s graduate in international public policy of Wilfrid Laurier University’s School of International Policy and Governance junior research fellowship at CIGI. “THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND ARCTIC MARITIME DEVELOPMENT IN THE BEAUFORT AREA” MAY 2014, CIGI, http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_pb_40.pdf) JTE
The Arctic is facing remarkable climatic and oceanic change that is triggering unprecedented opportunities and challenges for Arctic nations, as well as for countries that do not have Arctic territory but are eager to engage and invest in the region. For Canada and the United States, the Beaufort basin offers unique opportunities for Alaska and Canada’s Arctic territories. Large unexplored and unexploited oil, gas and mineral reserves, local and transpolar shipping, fishing and tourism are the main opportunities provided by the melting Arctic Ocean. International competition in attracting domestic and foreign investments for these challenging Arctic economic activities has started, with Russia and Scandinavia leading the way. Large integrated government and private investments in maritime infrastructure, resource development and shipping projects in the Arctic are central priorities for Russia and Scandinavia. The international geopolitical and legal Arctic environment has, so far, been conducive to cooperative development; however, recent tensions in relations with Russia over Ukraine underline the importance of insulating (as much as possible) Arctic cooperation from negative forces, as well as examining North American preparedness for a less benign political environment should it evolve. Arctic maritime transport and infrastructure investment will play a vital role in stimulating sustainable community development, responsible resource development and more efficient resupply in both Canadian and US Arctic regions. Canada and the United States, unfortunately, have not yet forcefully tackled Arctic maritime development, although it will be essential to the overall development of our Arctic regions. Canada’s High North, in particular, remains startlingly underdeveloped when compared with southern Canadian provinces and other Arctic regions.

And the aff plan only incentivizes cooperation, easing the growing tension between world leaders, and prevents a US-Russian conflict. .


Aerandir 12 (Mate Wesley Aerandir Lieutenant United States Navy B.A., “BREAKING THE ICE: POTENTIAL U.S.-RUSSIAN MARITIME CONFLICT IN THE ARCTIC” December 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a573497.pdf) JTE
There is ample reason and precedent suggesting that countries will resort to armed conflict to secure their interests, especially when those interests are regarded as vital to their national security. While war in the Arctic appears unlikely at present, this thesis has analyzed why an escalation of territorial and resource disputes in the Arctic up to and including the use of force cannot and should not be ruled out. The potential for U.S.- Russian maritime conflict in the region is genuine. A. SUMMARY OF THE THREAT Opportunity, capability, and perceived intent on their own do not cause conflict, but they do serve to increase anxiety about an apparent threat to national interests. It is when these three factors combine that the potential for conflict emerges. All that remains for an otherwise benign event to quickly escalate into a militarized interstate dispute is a sufficient motive or misunderstanding. In the fog before war, an ostensibly banal event could quickly escalate into a political power play between navies in the presence of historical mistrust, a perception of vulnerability, and nationalist sentiment. In the Arctic, such motives include Russia’s critical reliance on hydrocarbon resources to maintain its political and economic stability, and therefore its national security. For the United States and its NATO allies, the need to maintain and credibly defend their sovereignty and their own economic interests provides ample incentive to act decisively, if necessary. When national security is challenged or threatened by another power, the potential for militarized conflict can quickly become an actual conflict. Despite the sub-zero physical climate, the Arctic is a hotbed of competing interests. Receding ice cover in the northern cryosphere presents Arctic nations, and others, with considerable economic opportunities. Whether to exploit a potential “treasure trove” of natural resources or simply to capitalize on time- and money-saving transportation routes, political leaders are under increasing pressure to resolve previously frozen or otherwise insignificant disputes and make these resources available as soon as possible to their constituents. Lack of resolution is bad for business: it creates a “wild west” (or, in this case, a no-law north) of uncertainty as to the legal standing of enterprises and exposes countries and companies alike to unnecessary harassment and possible prosecution by rival interests. Increasing economic opportunities go hand-in-hand with an increased presence in the region, creating an environment for potential conflict. Economic expansion is triggering an associated build-up in military and law enforcement capability in order to protect, defend, and regulate interests and claims. If economic encroachment were not enough to cause anxiety among the Arctic powers, the subsequent militarization of the Arctic has also caused alarm, making countries feel increasingly vulnerable to conventional military pressure from a previously ice-obstructed front. At present, only Russia is capable of defending its claims in the Arctic militarily. Given Russia’s economic dependence on hydrocarbon resources—which the Arctic promises to offer in abundance—Moscow’s economic claims in excess of its recognized EEZ are likely to encroach on, or overlap with, the legitimate claims of neighbors. But it stands alone. Russia’s overwhelming might in this domain may eventually make “right” in its favor if NATO is unable to deter assertive uses of force similar to those to which the Russian Coast Guard continually subjects Japan near the Kuril Islands. Any loss in this regard would be much more damaging to NATO’s deterrence credibility than its current inaction. Unless Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States can come together under the NATO banner and make the Arctic a centerpiece of the Alliance’s collective defense 93 agenda for the twenty-first century, they each risk standing alone in the Arctic as well, and with a significantly smaller troop-to-task capability than their geopolitical rival. Simon Ollivant’s 1984 warning of the dangers of internal dispute within the Alliance is perhaps even more salient today. Analyzing the effects of the latest developments in military technology, force dispositions, and resource and sovereignty claims on the military stability of the region, Ollivant concluded that the greatest dangers to NATO unity were an unbalanced American hegemony in the region and increased political conflict among allied members over contested economic interests in the region.207 Denmark and Canada have yet to officially resolve their dispute over Hans Island. Canada and the United States continue to argue over the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. Either one of these disputes could undermine decades of Alliance cohesion. Meanwhile, Russia’s actions and rhetoric in the Arctic leave no room to deduce anything but a firm and committed intent on the part of its leadership to secure its claims. There have been scant, if any, peaceful actions undertaken by the Putin and Medvedev administrations to back up their peace-seeking rhetoric. Calls for diplomatic resolution of territorial disputes in the Arctic and for working “within existing international agreements and mechanisms” have only been operationalized through agreements to cooperate on search and rescue efforts and on (competitive) scientific exploration and research for submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a forum that has no binding authority to settle such disputes. All the while, however, Russia’s ambitious militarization of the Arctic has been clearly reinforced with explicit rhetoric proclaiming its intent to defend its national security interests. For Russia, the natural resources in the Arctic are a national security asset of strategic importance. Canada, too, beats the drum of sovereign defense in the Arctic. Though its rhetoric is significantly less militaristic than that of Russia, it is nevertheless increasingly nationalistic. Actions, in this case, speak for themselves. The Canadians have expressed an intention to build up forces in the region to the extent necessary to defend their sovereignty. If Prime Minister Stephen Harper had his way, this build-up would be happening more quickly than it has been. Indeed, financial constraints constitute the only reason that the four NATO countries in the Arctic have not been building up their Arctic capabilities more rapidly. The bottom line is that the intent of the Arctic nations to defend their regional and broader security interests is real. The capabilities, while in some cases only planned or very slowly coming into service, are materializing, and the economic opportunity has never been greater and will only increase in the future. The threat of a militarized conflict in the Arctic is therefore real as well.

Methodological analysis proves our impact


Aerandir 12 (Mate Wesley Aerandir Lieutenant United States Navy B.A., “BREAKING THE ICE: POTENTIAL U.S.-RUSSIAN MARITIME CONFLICT IN THE ARCTIC” December 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a573497.pdf) JTE
1. Potential for Maritime Conflict in the Arctic Based on the methodology established for this analysis, it can be reasonably assessed that conflict in the Arctic is likely. To put this another way, with a score of 18 out of 24 possible points, there is a 75 percent chance that maritime disputes involving the United States and Russia will occur in the Arctic necessitating the show or use of force to achieve a political objective. It should be reiterated that this assessment is acknowledged to be an analytically subjective conclusion and that the intervals of measurement are notably coarse. The evidence presented in this analysis, however, supports this conclusion. Policy-makers should take care not to discount the physical indicators and declared policies of other Arctic nations when judging the seriousness of their intent to protect their various claims in the region. Advocates of a “Pax Arctica” involving regional cooperation ignore the more pragmatic factors underlying international relations and the actual limits of international institutions and economic incentives in restraining actors’ behavior in an anarchic system.

US-Russia war causes extinction


Helfand 14 (Ira Helfand, M.D, past president of Physicians for Social Responsibility, co-president of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. “Another View: Ukraine crisis puts focus on danger of nuclear war” May 3, 2014, http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/05/04/another-view-ukraine-crisis-danger-nuclear-war/8665185/)
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has made it clear that the danger of nuclear war is still with us and may be greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. What does that mean for United States nuclear policy? There are today more than 15,000 nuclear warheads in the world. The vast majority, more than 95 percent, are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. Some 3,000 of these warheads are on "hair-trigger" alert. They are mounted on missiles that can be fired in 15 minutes and destroy their targets around the world less than 30 minutes later. During the Cold War, there was a widespread understanding of what nuclear weapons could do. That is not true today. Those who lived through the Cold War have put this painful information out of mind, and a generation has come of age that never learned about the terrible effects of nuclear war. This must change if we are to make rational decisions about nuclear policy. Over the last few years, new information has emerged that underlines the danger posed by even the limited use of nuclear weapons. Studies published in 2006 by Rutgers University's Alan Robock and his colleagues examined the effects of a "limited" nuclear war involving just 100 small nuclear weapons, the size of the Hiroshima bomb, less than 0.5 percent of the world's nuclear arsenals. The specific scenario they examined involved a war between India and Pakistan. The two nations have fought three wars in the last 70 years, have come close to war on two other occasions, engage in daily skirmishes across their contested border in Kashmir, and have more than 200 nuclear weapons in their arsenals, many much larger than the weapons used in the study. The effects in India and Pakistan are horrific. In the first week more than 20 million people are killed by blast, fire and radiation as the great cities of South Asia are destroyed. But the global impact is far worse. As the cities burn, the fires loft 5 million tons of soot into the upper atmosphere, blocking out sunlight. Across the globe, temperatures fall an average of 1.3 degrees Celsius, and precipitation declines as less water evaporates into the cooler atmosphere to fall back as rain. This climate disruption has a catastrophic impact on food production around the world. In Iowa, as across the entire U.S. Corn Belt, soy production declines an average of 7 percent for a full decade, and corn production declines an average of 12 percent. In China, rice production declines an average of 17 percent and the equally important wheat crop declines a staggering 31 percent. "Nuclear Famine," a report issued last year by Physicians for Social Responsibility, explored the impact this decline in food production would have on human health. The world is not prepared to withstand a fall in food production of this magnitude. World grain reserves amount to only some 70 days of consumption and would quickly be exhausted. There are already 870 million people in the developing world who are malnourished today. They get just enough food to maintain their body mass and do a little work to gather or grow food. There are also 300 million people who get adequate nutrition today but live in countries that depend on imported food. All of these people, more than 1 billion, many far removed from the actual conflict, would be at risk of starvation in the event of even this very "limited" use of nuclear weapons. Another 1.3 billion people in China might also starve given the enormous shortfalls in Chinese grain production. And no one has yet studied the effects of climate disruption on other food crops in other countries. Will U.S., Canadian and European wheat production fall as dramatically as in China? A famine of this magnitude is unprecedented in human history. Never have we faced the possible death of 15 percent to 30 percent of the human race in the course of a single decade. Such a catastrophe would not mean the extinction of our species, but it would almost certainly bring about the end of modern civilization as we know it. These data make clear that even the smaller nuclear weapons states, countries that might well go to war, and over whose nuclear arsenals the U.S. has no direct control, pose a threat to all mankind. But the danger posed by the U.S. and Russian arsenals is even greater. A single U.S. Trident submarine carries 96 warheads, each 10 to 30 times larger than the bombs used in the South Asia scenario. That means that each Trident can cause the nuclear famine scenario many times over. We have 14 of them, and that is only one-third of our nuclear arsenal, which also includes land-based missiles and long-range bombers. The Russians have the same incomprehensible level of overkill capacity. What would happen if there were a large nuclear war? A 2002 report by Physicians for Social Responsibility showed that if only 300 of the 1,500 warheads in the Russian arsenal got through to targets in the United States, up to 100 million people would die in the first 30 minutes. The entire economic infrastructure on which we depend — the public health system, banking system, communications network, food distribution system — would be destroyed. In the months following this attack, most of the rest of the population would also die, from starvation, exposure to cold, epidemic disease and radiation poisoning. The global climate disruption would be even more catastrophic. Limited war in South Asia would drop global temperatures 1.3 degrees Celsius. A war between the United States and Russia, using only those weapons they will still possess when the New START treaty is fully implemented in 2017, drops temperatures an average of 8 degrees Celsius. In the interior of Eurasia, North America and in Iowa, temperatures drop 20 to 30 degrees Celsius to a level not seen in 18,000 years — since the coldest time of the last Ice Age. Agriculture stops, ecosystems collapse, the vast majority of the human race starves and many species, perhaps including our own, become extinct. As events in Ukraine have made clear, there is still a very real possibility that the United States and Russia may find themselves on opposite sides of an armed conflict, and that means that these vast nuclear arsenals might be used. Even if there is not a deliberate use of nuclear weapons, there is the danger of an accidental nuclear war.

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