Afghanistan National Human Development Report

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Afghanistan National Human Development Report

Gender Disparities as a Challenge to Human Development

“Never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it themselves1.”

“Tu harakat ko, kay man barakat kunam.”

January 2004

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

List of acronyms
Context of gender relations and human development
Analysis of indicators according to thematic priorities

Rural women

Maternal mortality




Public voice
Policy recommendations
Annex 1 Bibiography

Annex 1 Millenium Development Indicators

Annex 3 Glossary

Annex 4 Cross-regional indicator comparisons

List of Acronyms


Directly observed treatment, short course


Purchasing price parity


Gross National Income

GNI per capita

Gross national income per capita


Gross national product

GDP per capita

Gross national product per capita


World Health Organization


Overseas Development Assistance


Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development


Total fertility rate


Infant mortality rate


Islamic Awareness Program


Gender Development Index


United Nations


Provincial Reconstruction Team


Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration


Executive Summary

I. Introduction
A friend was once applying to an elite graduate school and the topic of the essay was ‘What was the most difficult thing you’ve ever done?”. Her essay was titled ‘Being an Afghan woman3’. One does not have to be media hound to have at least heard of the trauma and indignities visited upon the women of Afghanistan, not to mention the ‘normal’ suffering and degradation of simply living in Afghanistan over the last 25 years. The purpose of this paper is not to review the historical details of the Afghan civil wars and natural disasters of the last two decades, but rather to explore the link between the most severe case of gender inequity and the consequent stunting of human development in the one of the most under-developed nations of the world.

While it is important to note that the traditional dichotomy of the public and private spheres4 in Afghan life has always had a limiting effect on women’s activities, the period of Taleban control was perhaps the most draconian manifestation of a truly phenomenal repression of women, particularly in the urban areas. Reports, photos, and films from that time abound with varying levels of accuracy describing the systematic discrimination against women, but none can really do justice to the reality of what the women experienced. As post-mortem analysts, we can only wonder at the coping mechanisms developed and the wounds yet to close from the survivors of that period.

From the dry and objective tone of official UN reports5 to the anger of journalists and feminists shouting ‘gender apartheid’, one thing is clear: the world failed Afghan women for six solid years, and this neglect has direct outcomes in the abysmal human development index of the country, as well as in shaping subsequent international events and policy. Extreme caution should be taken not to make the same mistake twice.
A major constraint to this report is the dearth of accurate data available on Afghan women. Unfortunately, this is not only the product of the long war, which prevented the usual surveys and censuses that provide data for other countries, but it is also partly due to the lack of gender disaggregated data collection by the various international agencies and donors that were active in Afghanistan during the war. Needless to say, the post-Communist local authorities did not assist in their regressive attitudes towards women’s contributions to the economy and social sphere.
Finally, what is the solution? Progress for women in Afghanistan is progress for all Afghan citizens. Human development cannot proceed without gender equity. The power of Islam to bring equity and justice between the genders cannot be underestimated. To harness this energy, Islam has to be readily available to the masses, both men and women, in its most unadulterated form, that of the text of the Holy Quran translated into the local languages. The Holy Quran has codified human development from the most basic tenets of personal hygiene to the most lofty realms of social protection and gender equality. The key to improving human development in Afghanistan is to convince the international community to invest in getting the true words of the Holy Quran out to every Afghan man, woman, and child.
Context of gender relations and human development
What is human development? What is gender? How are the two related? Gender is the social construct of biology, or the two sexes, and therefore should include consideration of men, as well as the more obvious women, in analyses and interventions. In the case of Afghanistan, special weight is given to the women and girls because of the politico-economic oppression that they have suffered, which has retarded their progress radically. Human development is the right of every man, woman and child to reach his or her full potential physically, mentally, and intellectually. Sectorally, human development can be divided into health, education, and social protection, the latter which includes old-age security and labor force issues. For a nation, human development is a necessary component of economic growth. The evidence base to prove that gender equity is an essential ingredient of human development is irrefutable.6
The context of gender relations in Afghanistan must be viewed through the prism of traditional Afghan culture, which is intensely patriarchal. It must be recognized that primary social unit in Afghanistan is the family, extending to kin group, and tribe. Most Afghan women do not want to be marginalized from their family unit, and the integrity of the family must be respected, particularly when targeting specific groups for assistance, especially women. Afghan culture is based on the code of honor, which is largely manifested in the behavior of one’s ‘women’. The foundation of gender roles is the division of space into the public/community (men’s) space and the private/domestic (women’s) space, with corresponding roles and responsibilities for each7. Many men and women, particularly in the rural areas, are satisfied with this arrangement in relation to one another. What is not acceptable to them are their current social conditions, which are related directly to human development. Basic needs for food, shelter, health and education are not being met, and the demand for these necessities transcend gender roles. Deprivation of basic human needs affects ALL -- men, women, and children. Two important developments challenge these traditional gender roles, beyond engendered interventions by internal and external actors, and will serve as critical catalysts for change.
a) the inevitable advent of globalization with the influx of large amounts of aid and opening up of markets and media forces Afghanistan to join the international community, so it is to be expected that these traditional gender roles will change.
b) decades of conflict have modified traditional gender roles as women have been forced to take on new roles as heads of household through death, displacement, and participation in combat of their customary male providers. These women have managed lands, properties, agricultural activities and families. To see Afghan women as only victims grossly underestimates their growth and contributions.
The gender development index (GDI) of 19958 ranked Afghanistan at 170 out of 174 reported countries. It this worth noting that this ranking was prior to the Taleban’s retrogressive implementation of officially sanctioned discrimination against women, prohibiting their nascent access to health and education services. A GDI calculation has not been completed since then, but it doesn’t take an econometrician to see how bleak the numbers would be.
One dimension of human development that is cross-cutting for both genders in Afghanistan is the period of adolescence. Even in the annals of global human development, there has been limited attention paid to these most critical formative years of a person’s life, and the literature on lessons learned is scant. Adolescence in Afghanistan is particularly a sensitive stage since it is the period of time when gender disparities are enforced the most strongly as children enter puberty, and when sensitization to gender roles and restrictions are the greatest. As policy advocates, we owe it to the youth of Afghanistan and subsequent future generations to identify the special needs of adolescents in Afghanistan and to close this gap in programming9. Furthermore, human development is more than the early interventions of immunizing infants and primary school enrollment – what do we owe these beneficiaries 10 years down the line? What are their expectations for higher education? Employment? Old-age security? Engendered analysis of Afghan youth is ripe for study.

Section 1: Analysis of indicators according to thematic priorities

    • Rural women –

The majority of Afghans, up to 80%, are illiterate and live in the rural areas of Afghanistan, and of these rural inhabitants, Afghan women constitute at least 50%, if not more. Thus the majority of Afghan women are rural. This has serious implications for how gender is mainstreamed into rural and agricultural projects, as well as local governance structures, particularly since most needs assessments have not sought the views of rural women (and men), and thus their voices have not been heard. This silenced majority of the population cannot be overlooked both in terms of policy and practice, since historically, access to the most basic social services for these people has been limited. The burden of labor that falls on these women is substantial since it can encompass agriculture, child-rearing, livestock, traditional crafts (as source of income), in addition to care of the family. The fundamental causes of rural women’s lack of access to basic needs such as water, land, credit, training, and extension services must be taken into consideration in project planning and delivery.
Next, it is important to understand that the interconnections between women’s and men’s roles are stronger in the rural areas than it is in the cities due to the symbiosis of their labors10. For example, in rural areas the division of tasks related to collecting the wool necessary for carpet-weaving is shared between men and women. In this regard, urban gender roles are much more circumscribed than rural male/female relationships. According to Dupree, this mutual understanding of each other’s interdependence in rural areas is social capital that is missing from the urban areas.
Prior to the war, there is evidence that the women in rural areas knew about spacing children, even if they did have large families, so the birth rate was relatively stable at approximately 9 per woman, but the war and subsequent displacement destabilized this practice and knowledge among rural women, and birth rates in the refugee camps soared11. On the other hand, life in the refugee camps did teach rural Afghan women to expect and demand health services, particularly pre- and post-natal care, which led to higher survival rates for their children.
Rural development cannot proceed without input from women, both rural women beneficiaries, and urban women workers, who have access to resources. This poses a dilemma for development workers since most urban women’s families do not relish the prospect of long-distance travel for their women.

  • Maternal mortality

Globally, life expectancy has increased for both sexes in all regions, but female morbidity and mortality rates are sometimes higher than male rates in poor countries, in spite of the natural biological advantage that women have to outlive men. Typically, in the developed world, women tend to outlive men by four to eight years on average, while in poor countries the difference is more tapered – about two to three years, due to the gender disparities being greater among the poor.12 What is most striking about Afghanistan is that the male:female life expectancy ratio is 1:1(43 years for each, among the lowest in the world), which reflects an abnormally high morbidity and mortality rate for women. The principal cause for this statistical anomaly is the astronomical maternal mortality rate for Afghan women.
The key issues relating to poor health for Afghan women are disparities in intra-household distribution of food, selective feeding and care of boy children, which comes from the cultural preference for boys and its attendant baggage that leads to low prioritization of girls and women’s health needs in the family unit. This female disadvantage in access to health care is extended into adolescence and the reproductive years. There is a saying in Afghanistan that is a play on the words, ‘woman’ and ‘beating’:
“Zan, bezan.

Agar mort, degar zan,

Agar namort, degar zan.”13
Loosely translated, this means

“Woman, beat her.

If she dies, another woman,

If she doesn’t die, beat her.”

This is a striking, but very common view of the value of women and their health in Afghan culture. Generalizations have their risks, and in no way can we speak for all Afghan men, but the value of a woman’s life is low on the economic totem pole, and the decision-makers in the community/family that control access to health services often make the decision to seek help for women and girls’ health problems far too late.
Birth spacing and safe contraception are currently almost non-existent in Afghanistan. These are the types of lessons that are necessary in adolescence when future fathers and mothers begin assessing their plans for life. Prenatal care is also virtually absent in Afghanistan, particularly in the rural areas. Without effective prenatal care, complications related to pregnancy cannot be recognized, diagnosed or treated, and thus simple cases of breach births or eclampsia that could be treated in the West often lead to death for Afghan women.

  • Education

Prior to the war, overall student numbers doubled in primary (358,000 to 786,000) and tertiary (3,200 to 9,800) education and increased by 50% in secondary education (42,000 to 87,500), with increases among girls.14 At this point, women’s numbers increased in university enrollment also, with a doubling in all sciences, including medicine.
Again, there have been some positive externalities coming from the war and displacement in Afghanistan, and one of these is the increased demand for primary education for girls15. Prior to the war, most of the rural population was influenced by the local mullahs and village elders, whose stake in the status quo and entrenched patriarchal interests, perceived that outside information and education would damage the honor of the community, as manifested in the behavior of its girls and women. Experiences in the refugee camps changed this, as Afghans saw the direct benefits of educating girls, the value-added of having nurses, doctors, and project managers who were women. It was proven that women could be literate and still uphold the family honor.

  • Islamic feminism is alive and well, despite attempts to besmirch the term, and its potential for catapulting human development in Afghanistan is unlimited16. The essential equity that Islam bequeaths on all is not only a powerful instrument to improve the human development of all Afghans, but particularly to wield against prevailing patriarchal attitudes and behaviors of the spoilers who would like to destabilize the Transitional Authority/Government of Afghanistan.

  • One example of an indigenous effort to strengthen the public’s awareness of and claim on Islam is the Islamic Awareness Program (IAP). IAP was created in December, 2003 by a group of Afghan women that attended an Asia Foundation gathering in Columbo, Sri Lanka17. It was strongly felt that the religion of Islam had been hijacked by extremists and opportunists, and that a forum did not exist in Afghanistan where men and women could advocate on real Islamic values. Thus, this center was developed by Seema Ghani and colleagues to bring together religious scholars and community activists to explore the true meaning of human rights in Islam, and to further disseminate that awareness to the rest of Afghanistan.

  • Gender sensitivity and rights training have proven positive effects on the behavior and subsequent influence of Afghan aid workers who have benefited from such training in the work place18.

  • Employment

Estimates of women in the labor force are usually lower than those of men and are not comparable internationally because for women, what constitutes their labor is often not regarded as economic contribution to the formal economy. Much of women’s labor, including the triple burden of productive, reproductive, and community managing, is non-monetized, and thus not recognized19. Afghan women have always been part of the productive capacity and labor force in Afghanistan. This has not been recognized due to the fact that non-monetized measurements of productive labor are not considered in most economic assessments of gross domestic product (GDP). An engendered analysis of the Afghan economy would doubtlessly give us a different picture of inputs and outputs. From food stock management, seed multiplication, animal husbandry, veterinarian and income generation via carpet-weaving in the rural areas, to professional urban women, the range of Afghan women’s contributions to the formal and informal economies vary widely, but they are solidly there20.
It is internationally recognized that labor market flexibility and the economy’s capacity to adapt to change are seriously reduced by sex segregation in the range of occupations.21 For Afghan women, this divide is even more harmful because they have a much narrower range of labor market choices at present. In the long run, it’s also harmful to Afghan men as the economy changes and their traditional jobs (civil servant, farmer, fighter, mullah, etc.) begin to wither away with economic reforms and demobilization. Job growth may then be concentrated in the growing service industries, where women often tend to dominate in other countries. Thus labor market integration of gender is good for men, as well as women in Afghanistan, and the few western agencies that have taken it upon themselves to include a quota system for women, such as the European Community, should be lauded for their progressive attitudes.22
It is also essential to realize that Afghan women have been forced to shoulder more economic and social responsibilities during the war years, which has created a disparity the reality of women’s lives, and the traditionally accepted roles they are expected to follow. This divide will have to be recognized in project and program planning by the assistance community and the local authorities.23
Poverty and women – With the increase in female-headed households due to the war and displacement, as well as the loss of traditional kin-based coping mechanisms, poverty disempowers Afghan women much more insidiously than official discrimination does. As long as women are focused on meeting their own and their families’ basic needs for food, water, and shelter, they are effectively blocked from seeking real power via education, activism, and legislation. This is where the need for practical gender needs sometimes conflicts with strategic gender needs. The two are indivisible. Malnourished, sick women cannot lead political movements for change, and political power should not rest in the hands of a few elite women, who are largely representative of the jehadi groups.

Self-employment for Afghan women has been limited due to the lack of credit and banking facilities in Afghanistan. When women do have access to funding external from family sources, as in the northern carpet weaving populations, it is usually from traders in the markets, who charge fairly high levels of interest, so that the final product, when sold, provides a marginal income to women once they’ve paid off their loans. Microcredit schemes implemented by NGOs in Afghanistan have had mixed results. Often only disbursement and repayment data has been collected, so that the overall impact on the lives of women and children has not been measurable. Nonetheless, there is a huge push to extend credit to Afghan men and women via the World Bank’s Microcredit Institute Support Facility (MISFA), which is being contracted out to local and international NGOs. The results of this intervention remain to be seen.

“Trafficking in women and girls has increased. Girls are purchased in Afghanistan, trafficked through Pakistan and sold into prostitution or marriage in the Persian Gulf countries24.”

  • Justice

The bulk of data regarding women’s identity and access to legal resources are unknown at present. Are we real? Do we exist? Only 1-2% of women in Afghanistan have identity cards and 98% have no formal papers, proof of citizenship, or identity25.

Much discussion has been held regarding the new Constitution and women’s rights in it. The end-result of the mix of Islamic law and specific rights granted to women as full Afghan citizens will be monitored by the Gender and Law Working Group, the Afghan Human Rights Commission, and various international agencies. Each province will have woman representing them in the lower house of Parliament, the House of the People, and the President will appoint one third of the delegates to the upper house, the House of the Elders, half of which will be women (1/6th of the total)26.

Without ensuring serious protection and security, any small gains made for Afghan women in the refugee camps, the new Constitution, or international projects will swiftly fade away. In spite of the promises to expand NATO outside Kabul and to expand the security mandate of the dubious Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) being run by the Coalition Forces, security for both Afghan men and women remains poor and splotchy.
International donors often hold the model of village shuras as ideal for solving local disputes, but for Afghan women, these are not just venues to go to for addressing criminal offences. Most shuras are composed of representatives of the landed gentry (a.k.a. feudal lords) and have an inherent bias towards supporting the status quo. There are both class biases, as well as rich-poor biases in the structure of these shuras, and international community’s (particularly the male members) avid adoption of these shuras for community decision-making and conflict resolution should be re-examined in terms of both gender, class, and income.
When problems such as rape, domestic violence, honor killings, etc. are dealt with communally, as in the shuras, the potential for further victimization of the woman is high, and the possibility of a just outcome is low, so it’s not surprising that few women come forward to report these types of crimes. There is hope in the nascent Afghan Women Lawyers and Professionals Association, but without donor support for building such institutions, they are bound to fail. Surveys of existing family codes, Islamic legal precedents, inheritance, land ownership, and property are essential.
Police reform and integration of women into the police forces is one of a gender interventions that holds the most promise for Afghan women at present. The prisons for women are abysmal, and the crimes of most of the imprisoned women have been dubiously convicted. Serious attention needs to be paid to the improvement of judicial institutions and their implementing bodies.
Finally, the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) program must include women as decision-makers and evaluators – not because women ex-combatants are part of the target population, but because the target population of male ex-combatants will be returning to villages, cities, and communities that consist of women and girls. These ex-combatants must be sensitized to gender and human rights issues, domestic violence, and non-violent methods of conflict resolution, not to mention HIV/AIDS prevention – all issues that will dramatically affect their communities of return.

  • Public voice

Afghan women are raising their voices, whether educated or not, there is a clear feeling that enough is enough. Proof is the projected participation of 11% for women in the first Emergency Loya Jirga, which was exceeded by almost half. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs had called for 25% women’s representation on the Loya Jirga, but the target was set by the interim government at 11%. The extra 4% that came through other channels showed that a more ambitious target could and should have been set.27 Further proof is the proliferation of women’s publications in spite of the still prevalent atmosphere of fear and retribution that threatens women who dare to claim a public presence.
Section 2: Analysis of what is being done

NB: In as much as possible, make comparisons of the situation from baseline of before the Taliban (1996 baseline), during Taliban (1990s) and after Taliban period (post 2000).

Total population

1980 = 16.0 million

2001 = 27.2 million

2015 = 38.8 million

Population age composition, 2001

Ages 0-14 = 43.7 %

Ages 15-64 = 53.5 %

Ages 65+ = 2.8 %

Average annual population growth rate

1980-2001 = 2.6 %

2001-2015 = 2.5 %

Ratio of female to male enrollments in primary and secondary schools

1990 – 50%

199528 – 10%

2000 – n/a29

Literacy rates of boys and girls

Net intake in grade 1 as % of school age population – n/a

Share of cohort reaching grade 5 as % of grade 1 students


male = 62%

female = 61%



Primary completion rate as % of relevant age group

Total 1995-2001 = 8%

Male = 15%

Female = 0 (less than .5%)

Adult literacy rates30 of men and women compared

Female as % of total = 4%

Female as % of male = 10%
Average years of schooling

Total 2000 = 1.7 years

Male = 2.6 years

Female = .8 years

Literacy gender parity index ages 15-24

2001 = N/A

Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR)

1995 – n/a …or 17 out of 1,000 live births (ick)

Births attended by skilled health staff

1990 – 9

2000 – n/a
Life expectancy at birth


male= 43

female = 44


male = 43

female = 43
Average age at marriage = n/a

Pregnant women receiving prenatal care – n/a

Maternity leave benefits

% of wages paid in covered period = n/a

Crude birth rate per 1,000 people = 48

Crude death rate per 1,000 people = 21

Using contraception = n/a

Fertility rate32

197833 = 9.3 per woman

1985 = 13.6 per woman (in the refugee camps)

1995 = 7-9 per woman

Female participation in the labor force

1980 = 34.8

2001 = 35.7

By specific sector:



Male = 66%

Female = 86%


Male = 9%

Female = 12%


Male = 26%

Female = 2%

Wages of women

Access to loans and credits

Female-headed households

Women in the private sector and in the informal economy

Women within the household: Contribution to the budget, number of women headed households, etc

Labor force parity index

1990 = 0.5

2001 = 0.6

Inheritance laws

Land ownership

Representation of women in the political structure

Representation of women in the Loya Jirga and other councils

Representation of women in NGO movements

Calculate if possible the GDI and the GEM

Women in decision-making positions

%of total at ministerial level

1994 = n/a

1998 = n/a

2004 = 2/29 = 6%

% senior level positions in the civil service34

2003 = 3.2%

Local municipalities or equivalent

Female council members = n/a

Female governors = n/a

Parliamentary: upper/lower Chambers = n/a

Section 3: Policy Recommendations

Policy recommendations are nothing without being put into practice. In other words, follow-up is everything. We can recommend the moon, but if no action is taken and no evaluation of progress is made, then there is no point in making policy recommendations. With this in mind, the team suggests the following immediate policies:

1. Physical security - Expand NATO beyond Kabul
2. Professionally mainstream gender in the analysis, formulation and evaluation of polices, programs, and projects. Mainstreaming gender is a long-term process that requires solid financial, strategic, and institutional commitment from all partners. Mainstream gender in international organizations and international NGOs, as well as Afghan institutions.
Repeal all legal and other orders that discriminate against women and end all forms of discrimination against women, including hate language that is expressed by public figures. The international community and the Transitional Authority must condemn misogynistic and inaccurate statements that are made in public.
Guarantee a secure environment free from verbal or physical violence to ensure women’s participation in public life.
Employ short-term measures, including targets and quotas, aimed at women to accelerate the inclusion of women in decision-making roles at all levels.
Authorize the full participation of women in the assessment of short, medium, and long-term priorities in all sectors.”
“Afghan women should be seen as primary stakeholders and agents of change who have identified their own needs and priorities in all sectors of society and are ready to be full partners in the rebuilding of their society.”
“NGOs should not be seen as the sole or main space for women’s involvement, in particular, given the tendencies to equate civil society with women or to assign women a role in civil society only”
“Women’s effective participation in civil, cultural, economic, political and social life should be promoted and protected throughout the country, including the right to life; respect for the right of women to work; the right to education, the security of person, to freedome of movement and association, freedom of opinion and expression, to equal access to facilities necessary to protect their right to highest attainable physical and mental health.”
“Ensure that international male staff work with national male staff on gender and human rights issues.”
Effective health referral systems must be developed in both rural and urban dsettings, and the cadre of female health practitioners must be enlarged.
“Develop indicators to measure progress and facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of all programs and projects with regard to their contribution towards the achievement of gender equality goals.”
“Judicial reform, including women’s participation and representation, compliance with highest international standards, and being informed by good practice from Islamic countries.”
Legal scholarships and fellowships for women advocates to study abroad to bring back best practices and lessons learned from countries with strong family law codes, such as Tunisia.
“Securing written and public commitment to women’s rights from all members of the Afghan Transitional Government.”

Annex 1


Dupree, Nancy Hatch, The Women of Afghanistan,, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, 1996.

The Holy Quran, Verse 11, Surah 13, Al Rad, or The Thunder.
Nezam, Taies, Personal conversation, 1993.
Hunte, Pamela …….., …p. . Women and the Development Process in Afghanistan - July 1978


Afghanistan Project: 298-035 Regional Training for Women

Integration of Women into UN Projects and Programs in Afghanistan -


for UNDP Kabul July 1992

Discrimination against women and girls in Afghanistan: Report of the Secretary-General, United National Economic and Social Council, January 28, 2002, E/CN.6/2002/5.
The World Bank, Engendering Development, 2003,
United Nations Human Development Report, 1995 (the first year of GDI introduction – subsequent reports did not include Afghanistan due to lack of data).
Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, “Report of the European Community Rapid Reaction Mechanism Assessment Mission, Afghanistan Gender Guidelines”, April 2002, p. 23.
Badran, Margot, “Islamic feminism: what’s in a name?” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 14
Informational flier from the Islamic Awareness Program, Karwan Sarai, Opposite Ministry of Interior, Kabul, Afghanistan. For more information, contact
UNICEF, Future Directions in Women’s Role and Status in Afghanistan, November, 2001.
WOMANKIND Worldwide, “Taking Stock: Afghan Women and Girls Six Months On”, July 2002,

World Development Indicators 2003, The World Bank, Section 1.2,
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) Database, at level two, which is equivalent to director level or above, October 2003.

UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1977 and 1988.

UNIFEM Update, Issue #3, November 03.
Annex 2

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