Adi drone Strikes Affirmative

Download 1,32 Mb.
Date conversion18.10.2017
Size1,32 Mb.
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   25

ADI - Drone Strikes Affirmative

ADI - Drone Strikes Affirmative 1

1AC 4

Hegemony Advantage 5

International Law Advantage 15

Pakistan Advantage 23

Terrorism Advantage 28

Plan Text 39

Solvency 40

Hegemony 43

UQ: Heg Sustainable 44

Link: Drones Hurt Alliances 45

Link: Drones Hurt Credibility 50

Link: Drones Hurt Foreign Aid 55

Internal Link: Alliances Key to Heg 57

Internal Link: Credibility Key to Hegemony 59

Internal Link: Foreign Aid 61

Internal Link: Soft Power Key to Hegemony 63

Impact: Hegemony 64

Impact: Soft Power 67

A2: Drone Tech Good 69

A2: Hard Power 70

A2: Heg Bad 72

A2: Soft Power Fails 76

International Law 77

UQ: Drone Proliferation Coming Now – Generic 78

Link: US Precedent Ensures Drone Prolif 80

Link: Drones Will Be Used to Strike Dimona 84

Link: US Drone Policy Ensures China Prolif 85

Internal Link: Dimona Strike Ensures Meltdown 87

Internal Link: China Drones Destablize Senkaku/SE Asia 91

Impact: Meltdowns Cause Extinction 93

Impact: Senkaku Conflict Causes Extinction 94

Solvency: Restrictions/Oversight Solves the Advantage 97

New Scenario: Human Rights Law 101

Pakistan 104

UQ: Drone Strikes Increasing 105

UQ: Pakistani Stability on the Brink 107

Link: Drones Radicalize the Populace 109

Link: Drones Undermine the Government 114

Link: Drones Lead to Pakistani Terrorism 119

New Link: Drones Lead to Military Coup 124

Internal Link: Pakistani Instability Leads to Conflict 127

Impact: Indo-Pak Nuke War 129

Impact: Pakistani Terrorism 133

A2: Alt Cause to Pak instability 136

A2: Indo-Pak relations resilient 137

A2: New Pakistani gov’t changes status quo 138

A2: Reform education CP 139

Terrorism 140

UQ: AQAP Dangerous/Competent 141

Link: Drones Lead to Backlash and Retaliation 145

Link: Drones Hurt Intel - Alienates Allies 148

Link: Drones Hurt Intel - Host States 150

Link: Drones Hurt International Cooperation 152

Link: Drones Increase Recruitment 158

Internal Link: Relations with Target States Key to Solve Terrorism 165

Internal Link: International Cooperation Solves 167

New Impact Scenario: Chem Attacks/Food Supply 169

A2: AQAP Can’t Attack US 173

A2: AQAP Has No Leadership 174

A2: Decapitation 177

Solvency 191

International Solvency 192

Transparency Solvency 198

Solvency Extension 203

A2 Judges Aren’t Capable 204

A2 Flexibility 205

A2 Top Secret Info 207

A2 Normalizes Targeted Killing 208

Off Case Answers 209

Executive Restraint CP 210

CMR DA 213

Politics DA 216


Hegemony Advantage

Status quo drone policy undermines U.S. soft power

Zenko 13

(Douglas, Fellow at the Douglas Dillon institute, “US Drone Strike Policies,” Council on Foreign Relation, January 22, 2013, accessed 8/1)

MICAH ZENKO: Well, thank you so much for the opportunity and for the privilege of speaking with you all and for speaking alongside Admiral Blair, who has had a long, distinguished career of actual operational and command responsibilities, versus myself, who has the privilege of just essentially thinking and writing for a living, with no consequences of what I say.¶ What I try to do in this report is look at the -- to try to articulate the scope and intensity of U.S. nonbattlefield targeted killings since September 11th. You know, if you had told anybody, even soon after 9/11, that the U.S. would be -- have conducted something like 425 targeted killings in at least three countries, killing over 3,000 people, nobody who -- nobody would have believed you, even after 9/11.¶ And the United States has sort of merged into this policy of drones being the pre-eminent counterinsurgency tactic against a range of threats that its intended to face.¶ One of the biggest problems which Admiral Blair gets to is that the Obama administration's strategy for how it uses drones is poorly articulated and not very transparent. But for example, the United States and the Obama administration makes the claim that every individual targeted -- and they do this for legal purposes -- is a senior al-Qaida leader who poses a significant and imminent threat of attack to the United States homeland. Now, that's not who the United States actually targets -- and this gets to the issue of signature strikes, which the Obama administration has never, on the record, acknowledged that it conducts. So there's poor -- there's poor articulation of it. It's also poorly coordinated with other elements of national power in the countries where it's being -- where it's being used, and you can talk to the U.S. ambassadors to Pakistan or Yemen and you can talk to the USAID contractors who are trying to do sort of soft power efforts there, and they will tell you that when you go to the tribal areas of Pakistan or you go to southern Yemen, drones are the face of U.S. foreign policy. Because we don't articulate and describe our vision for how these are used very well, we essentially -- again, to echo Admiral Blair -- we allow the Taliban and the ISI and the Pakistani government to tell our story about drones, which is a -- which is a tremendous strategic communications lapse.¶ And then finally, I'll just say that I slightly disagree with Admiral Blair about whether or not international norms matter. If that's true, then the administration should do -- shouldn't lay out its policies at all.¶ It should, you know, close down its websites, close down its spokespersons, not address people in press conferences if you don't think how you articulate these policies matter. It is the position of the Obama administration, and President Obama has said this on the record several times, that how the United States is using drones will have some normative impact on others, and they could emulate how we use them, not just emulate how we use them in the field, but the justifications we provide. So though there are plenty of potential near-term threats, or -- either to the U.S. homeland or to the governments where these strikes occur, and the United States, I think correctly, in some instances is using lethal force to deal with those threats, there is not the longer-term discussion about what impact U.S. drone use today will have on emerging drone powers once they have the technology.

Multiple warrants –

First, current drone policy risks U.S. alliances key to foreign and military policies – unresolved legitimacy issues

Kennedy 13 (Greg, a Professor ¶ of Strategic Foreign Policy ¶ at the Defence Studies ¶ Department, King's College ¶ London, based at the Joint ¶ Services Command and Staff ¶ College, Defence Academy ¶ of the United Kingdom, in ¶ Shrivenham, “Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism,” Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013, Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army War College

p. 26)
The current debate over the legitimacy of America’s use of drones to deliver deadly force is taking place in both public and official domains in the United States and many other countries.5¶ The four key features at ¶ the heart of the debate revolve around: who is controlling the weapon system; does the system of control and oversight violate international law governing the use of force; are the drone strikes proportionate acts that provide military effectiveness given the circumstances of the conflict they are being used in; and does their use violate the sovereignty of other nations and allow the United States to disregard formal national boundaries? Unless these four questions are dealt with in the near future the impact of the unresolved legitimacy issues will have a number of repercussions for American foreign and military policies: “Without a ¶ new doctrine for the use of drones that is understandable to friends ¶ and foes, the United States risks achieving near-term tactical benefits in killing terrorists while incurring potentially significant longer-term costs to its alliances, global public opinion, the war on terrorism and international stability.”6¶ This article will address only the first three critical questions.

AND alliances key to soft power problem solving
Kreisher 12 (Otto Kreisher, Former Naval Officer/veteran Washington correspondent and defense journalist, “Chuck Hagel, Touted As Next SecDef, Argues For Soft Power, Allies”, December 10 2012, Breaking Defense, )

Perhaps with an eye toward America losing its preeminent military position, Hagel argued that “engagement” is the key to address many international problems. In the national security world, engagement generally encompasses negotiations or multinational efforts. It has never been a popular tactic among most Republicans and some pro-military Democrats. However, Hagel insisted that “engagement is not surrender, it’s not appeasement,” clearly taking on some of his GOP colleagues, who have slung around appeasement — associated with the foolish actions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as he tried to avert war with Germany — to describe some of President Barack Obama’s efforts to prevent international tensions from flaring into conflict. Engagement is “an opportunity to better understand” others, Hagel said, and to bring “mutual self respectamong contesting parties. As the U.S. faces a litany of problems and potential crises in the future, he said, “we will need to turn our receivers on and our transmitters off.” The emerging issues, Hagel said, “are beyond the control of any great power” and the U.S. “cannot solve them alone.” Instead, they must be addressed through alliances, through “joint thinking,” he said.

Second, drone strikes as is hurt U.S. credibility – lack of transparency, oversight and restrictions allow any bombing to be blamed on the U.S.

Zenko 13, (Micah, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, with expertise in Conflict Prevention; US national security policy, military planning and operations and nuclear weapons policy. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, Council on Foerign Relations Special Report no. 65, January 2013, pg15)
The problem with maintaining that drone strikes are covert is that both the American and international publics often misunderstand how drones are used. And in affected states, citizens often blame the United States for collateral damage that could have been caused by the host states’ own weapon systems. According to a recent report from Yemen: It’s extremely difficult to figure out who is responsible for any given strike. . . . It could be a manned plane from the Yemeni Air Force or the U.S. military. Or it could be an unmanned drone flown by the U.S. military or the CIA. . . . But no matter who launches a particular strike, Yemenis are likely to blame it on the Americans. What’s more, we found that many more civilians are being killed than officials acknowledge.37 Congressional oversight of drone strikes varies depending on whether the CIA or the U.S. military is the lead executive authority. The CIA, according to the chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Dianne Feinstein, meets its “fully and currently informed” legal obligations through “monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program.” 38 Individual JSOC strikes are not reported to the relevant armed services committees, but are covered under the broad special access program biannual reporting to Congress. According to senior staff members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, many of their peers have little understanding of how drone strikes are conducted within the countries for which they are responsible for exercising oversight. Even serving White House officials and members of Congress repeatedly make inaccurate statements about U.S. targeted killings and appear to be unaware of how policies have changed over the past decade.39 At the same time, the judiciary committees have been repeatedly denied access to the June 2010 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that presented the legal basis for the drone strike that killed U.S. citizen and alleged leader of AQAP Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.40 Finally, despite nearly ten years of nonbattlefield targeted killings, no congressional committee has conducted a hearing on any aspect of them.

AND credibility will make the difference in maintaining hegemonic standing

APSA 9 (American Political Science Association, The American Political Science Association is the leading professional organization for the study of political science and serves more than 15,000 members in over 80 countries. With a range of programs and services for individuals, departments and institutions, APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors within and outside academe in order to expand awareness and understanding of politics, “ U.S. Standing in the World: ¶ Causes, Consequences, ¶ and the Future,” Task Force Report, October 2009,

p. 3-4)
U nlike something a nation possesses and can easily measure, like wealth or military might, standing is an attribute assigned to the United States by actors beyond its borders—such as foreign leaders and peoples, international organizations, and transnational ¶ groups—and assessed by citizens within them. U.S. standing has both an absolute and a relative quality. It is absolute in the sense that it can be high or low and can vary over time. It is relative in that U.S. standing could be better or worse than that of other countries or actors, ¶ such as China or the European Union.¶ Standing has two major facets: credibility and esteem. Credibility refers to the U.S. government’s ability to do what it says it is going to do—to “stand up” for what it believes, and to “stand against” threats to its interests and ideals. Esteem refers to America’s stature, or what America is perceived to “stand for” in the hearts and minds of foreign publics and policymakers. Credibility and esteem can be mutually reinforcing, but they can also be ¶ difficult to pursue in tandem—a trade-off implied by Machiavelli’s famous dictum: “it is much ¶ safer to be feared than loved.” ¶ Standing is densely interwoven with U.S. “hard power”—the nation’s material military ¶ and economic capabilities. U.S. capabilities help the nation realize its interests, and a modern ¶ military and robust economy breed appeal and respect. Power and standing, however, are not ¶ the same thing. U.S. standing may vary even if U.S. hard power does not, as we have seen since ¶ 2000: standing has declined (see Figure 3), but relative American power has been steady (see ¶ Figure 5 below).. Likewise with “soft power”: a country’s standing can rise and fall even as the ¶ attractiveness of its system remains relatively constant. And unlike pro- or anti-Americanism, ¶ standing is not about whether others are ¶ for or against the United States, but instead ¶ whether they view the United States as a credible actor with traits that should be admired or emulated. ¶ Why should policymakers—or political scientists—care about standing at all?¶ First, recent history suggests that standing can play a fundamental role in the shaping ¶ of strategy. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush initiated a new national strategy for the United States that favored the credibility dimension of standing— emphasizing a policy package of assertive unilateralism, preventive use of force, and aggressive democratization. The administration achieved some initial successes, swiftly toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan, securing dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear program, and encouraging an apparent halt or slow-down in Iran’s nuclear program. Yet, over time, despite the lack of further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, American standing declined. The Bush administration’s single-minded approach lost significant ¶ support at home and abroad, as the United States grew mired in Iraq, was accused of violations of international law, and drew international criticism and resentment—even as ¶ Osama bin Laden remained at large. This decline in standing only made it harder for the United States to be effective in foreign affairsprompting the Bush administration to take what some saw as a reverse course after 2005 and return to the typical pattern of American internationalism since World War II. ¶ More distant history speaks to the significance of standing as well. In the long ¶ competition with the Soviet Union, the United States was anxious that its reputation to ¶ protect its allies, especially those in Europe, be seen as credible by both Soviet leaders and ¶ Europeans. U.S. participation in the Korean and Viet Nam wars was spurred by the fear that a ¶ perception of diminished U.S. credibility would lead others to join a rising Communist tide. ¶ As Lyndon Johnson explained to Martin Luther King, Jr. in early 1965, “If I pulled out [of ¶ Vietnam] ... I think the Germans would be scared to death that our commitment to them was ¶ no good, and God knows what we’d have in other places in the world....”¶ Standing is the everyday currency of America’s existence in the world. Political standing is akin to long-term political capital (or “goodwill” in accounting). It has intrinsic value, including in the self-understanding of Americans, even when it has no readily observable behavioral implications.

Third, these drone strikes overshadow effectiveness of foreign aid programs

Zenko 13, (Micah, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, with expertise in Conflict Prevention; US national security policy, military planning and operations and nuclear weapons policy. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, Council on Foerign Relations Special Report no. 65, January 2013, pg11)
At the same time, some drone strikes contradict stated nonmilitary foreign policy objectives. In February 2012, at a press conference for the International Contact Group on Somalia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked: “I know enough to say airstrikes would not be a good idea. And we have absolutely no reason to believe anyone—certainly not the United States—is considering that.”25 Within hours, a convoy was attacked in the Shabelle region of Somalia, killing between four and seven suspected Islamic militants.26 An anonymous U.S. official confirmed that a JSOC drone killed the militants.27 Even where military commands are responsible for advancing U.S. interests within a region, coordination with other military branches and the CIA or JSOC is negligible, according to current and former intelligence and military officials. Lieutenant General Sam Helland, who led Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa from 2004 to 2005, described the division as such: “[It was like] the separation of church and state—they were state, I was church. [The CIA and JSOC] did what they did. . . . We stayed on the civil affairs side, drilling wells, building roads, schoolhouses, churches.”28 In countries where drone strikes have occurred, some State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials strongly believe that the broadly unpopular attacks overshadow and diminish the effectiveness of civilian assistance programs. One former senior military official closely involved in U.S. targeted killings argued that “drone strikes are just a signal of arrogance that will boomerang against America,” while former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter explained, “The problem is the political fallout. . . . Do you want to win a few battles and lose the war?”29 In Pakistan, the continuation of drone strikes has exposed fault lines between the army and the democratically elected parliament, which in April 2012 demanded “an immediate cessation of drone attacks inside the territorial borders of Pakistan.”30 However, the central governments of Yemen and Somalia (as represented by the Transitional Federal Government) have provided either public or private consent for U.S. drone strikes

within their territories.

AND foreign aid sustains US Hegemony – past proves

Ehrenfeld 04, (Daniel, University of Maryland professor posting in a peer reviewed journal analyzing humanitarian intervention, “Foreign Aid Effectiveness, Political Rights and Bilateral Distribution”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, February 1st,
Despite the existence of multilateral programs, bilateral technical assistance to independent countries and even the emergence of the Soviet Aid program in 1956, the 1950s may be described as a decade of US hegemony in aid distribution, as it alone accounted for two-thirds of total aid in that decade. Although the program was subject to continued commercial pressures (especially in the use of food aid), the intensification of the Cold War gave US aid a strongly strategic orientation, which it has retained to this day. Aid was quite consciously used to stop countries ‘going communist’, and development aid and military aid mixed as necessary. In the 1960s, the second wave of independence and the troubled financial state of some already independent countries (notably India) prompted the emergence of greater amounts of bilateral programs.

Ultimately, soft power is key to US hegemony

Nye 2004 (Joseph S. Nye, political scientist and former Harvard school of government dean, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy” Vol. 119, No. 2, Summer 2004 ,,p. 260-261)
In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weakening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow these nations to train together and quickly be come interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for ex ample, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony" and "served as political constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States."18 Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt argue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.19 As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of at traction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

U.S. hegemony prevents extinction – laundry list of reasons

Thayer 6 (Bradley A. is an associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, “In Defense of Primacy,” November/December 2006, Issue 86, National Interest, p.32, EBSCOHost, Accessed Date: 5-7-13 y2k)
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.(FN1)¶ Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests.¶ But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy.¶ There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this.¶ So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not.¶ A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor.¶ In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.¶ And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.¶ Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.(FN2) This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.¶ A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence.¶ Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many alliesU.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.¶ You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington.¶ Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States.¶ China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.¶ The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.¶ THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics.¶ Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)."¶ Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars.¶ Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.(FN3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.¶ Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted.¶ Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive.¶ Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.¶ Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.(FN4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.¶ Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forcesAmerican generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkriegTHERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.¶ While the benefits of American primacy are considerable, no country can ever escape from the iron law of Economics 101--there is no free lunch. American primacy is no exception. Leadership requires that the United States incur costs and run risks not borne by other countries. These costs can be stark and brutal, and they have to be faced directly by proponents of primacy. It means that some Americans will die in the service of their country. These are the costs, and they are significant. Americans should be conscious of them and use them in their contemplation of the value of primacy. Additionally, the costs of primacy must impose upon American policy-makers a sharp focus and prudence concerning how they wield American power. Equally, all Americans should be aware of the benefits that flow from primacy and that they enjoy.¶ While primacy's advantages and costs must be weighed objectively and solemnly, the scholars who are proclaiming that the sky is falling, primacy is doomed and America must retrench have to confront the reality of U.S. power. The world is a long way from seeing the end of American primacy, and it is in America's interest--and the world's--to have it last as long as possible
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   25

The database is protected by copyright © 2016
send message

    Main page